linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, jackmanb@google.com,
	renauld@google.com, paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
	song@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 1/4] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 01:08:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230120000818.1324170-2-kpsingh@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230120000818.1324170-1-kpsingh@kernel.org>

This helps in easily initializing blocks of code (e.g. static calls and
keys).

UNROLL(N, MACRO, __VA_ARGS__) calls MACRO N times with the first
argument as the index of the iteration. This allows string pasting to
create unique tokens for variable names, function calls etc.

As an example:

	#include <linux/unroll.h>

	#define MACRO(N, a, b)            \
		int add_##N(int a, int b) \
		{                         \
			return a + b + N; \
		}

	UNROLL(2, MACRO, x, y)

expands to:

	int add_0(int x, int y)
	{
		return x + y + 0;
	}

	int add_1(int x, int y)
	{
		return x + y + 1;
	}

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/unroll.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/unroll.h

diff --git a/include/linux/unroll.h b/include/linux/unroll.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e19aef95b94b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/unroll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __UNROLL_H
+#define __UNROLL_H
+
+#define __UNROLL_CONCAT(a, b) a ## _ ## b
+#define UNROLL(N, MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_CONCAT(__UNROLL, N)(MACRO, args)
+
+#define __UNROLL_0(MACRO, args...)
+#define __UNROLL_1(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_0(MACRO, args)  MACRO(0, args)
+#define __UNROLL_2(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_1(MACRO, args)  MACRO(1, args)
+#define __UNROLL_3(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_2(MACRO, args)  MACRO(2, args)
+#define __UNROLL_4(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_3(MACRO, args)  MACRO(3, args)
+#define __UNROLL_5(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_4(MACRO, args)  MACRO(4, args)
+#define __UNROLL_6(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_5(MACRO, args)  MACRO(5, args)
+#define __UNROLL_7(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_6(MACRO, args)  MACRO(6, args)
+#define __UNROLL_8(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_7(MACRO, args)  MACRO(7, args)
+#define __UNROLL_9(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_8(MACRO, args)  MACRO(8, args)
+#define __UNROLL_10(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_9(MACRO, args)  MACRO(9, args)
+#define __UNROLL_11(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_10(MACRO, args) MACRO(10, args)
+#define __UNROLL_12(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_11(MACRO, args) MACRO(11, args)
+#define __UNROLL_13(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_12(MACRO, args) MACRO(12, args)
+#define __UNROLL_14(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_13(MACRO, args) MACRO(13, args)
+#define __UNROLL_15(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_14(MACRO, args) MACRO(14, args)
+#define __UNROLL_16(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_15(MACRO, args) MACRO(15, args)
+#define __UNROLL_17(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_16(MACRO, args) MACRO(16, args)
+#define __UNROLL_18(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_17(MACRO, args) MACRO(17, args)
+#define __UNROLL_19(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_18(MACRO, args) MACRO(18, args)
+#define __UNROLL_20(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_19(MACRO, args) MACRO(19, args)
+
+#endif /* __UNROLL_H */
-- 
2.39.0.246.g2a6d74b583-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-20  5:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-20  0:08 [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 0/4] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-01-20  0:08 ` KP Singh [this message]
2023-01-20  3:48   ` [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 1/4] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling Kees Cook
2023-01-20  0:08 ` [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 2/4] security: Generate a header with the count of enabled LSMs KP Singh
2023-01-20  4:04   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-20  7:33   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-20  9:50   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-20  9:50   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-20  0:08 ` [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 3/4] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-01-20  4:36   ` Kees Cook
2023-01-20 18:26     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-02-06 13:04     ` KP Singh
2023-02-06 16:29       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-02-06 17:48         ` Song Liu
2023-02-06 18:19           ` KP Singh
2023-02-06 18:29           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-02-06 18:41             ` KP Singh
2023-02-06 18:50               ` Kees Cook
2023-06-08  2:48                 ` KP Singh
2023-06-13 21:43                   ` Paul Moore
2023-06-13 22:03                     ` KP Singh
2023-02-06 19:05             ` Song Liu
2023-02-06 20:11               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-01-20 10:10   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-20 10:41   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-20  0:08 ` [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 4/4] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20230120000818.1324170-2-kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --to=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=jackmanb@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=renauld@google.com \
    --cc=revest@chromium.org \
    --cc=song@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).