From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, pvorel@suse.cz,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
erpalmer@linux.vnet.ibm.com, coxu@redhat.com, jlee@suse.com,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions
Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2023 01:02:31 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230329220231.h6afgarrvdlwwdjc@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230322161634.2233838-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Wed, Mar 22, 2023 at 12:16:28PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Prior to the introduction of the machine keyring, most distros simply
> allowed all keys contained within the platform keyring to be used
> for both kernel and module verification. This was done by an out of
> tree patch. Some distros took it even further and loaded all these keys
> into the secondary trusted keyring. This also allowed the system owner
> to add their own key for IMA usage.
>
> Each distro contains similar documentation on how to sign kernel modules
> and enroll the key into the MOK. The process is fairly straightforward.
> With the introduction of the machine keyring, the process remains
> basically the same, without the need for any out of tree patches.
>
> The machine keyring allowed distros to eliminate the out of tree patches
> for kernel module signing. However, it falls short in allowing the end
> user to add their own keys for IMA. Currently, the machine keyring can not
> be used as another trust anchor for adding keys to the ima keyring, since
> CA enforcement does not currently exist. This would expand the current
> integrity gap. The IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
> Kconfig states that keys may be added to the ima keyrings if the key is
> validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or secondary trusted
> keyring. Currently, there is not code that enforces the contents of a
> CA cert.
>
> This series introduces a way to do CA enforcement with the machine
> keyring. It introduces three different ways to configure the machine
> keyring. New Kconfig options are added to control the types of keys
> that may be added to it. The default option allows all MOK keys into the
> machine keyring. When CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING is selected,
> the X.509 CA bit must be true and the key usage must contain keyCertSign;
> any other usage field may also be set. When
> CONFIG_INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX is also selected, the X.509 CA
> bit must be true and the key usage must contain keyCertSign. With this
> option digitialSignature usage may not be set. If a key doesn't pass
> the CA restriction check, instead of going into the machine keyring, it
> is added to the platform keyring. With the ability to configure the
> machine keyring with CA restrictions, code that prevented the machine
> keyring from being enabled with
> IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY has been removed.
>
> Changelog:
> v6:
> - No new code changes
> - Added Reviewed-by and ACKs
> - Formatting change requested by Jarkko
>
> v5:
> - Removed the Kconfig _MIN Kconfig option and split it into different
> entries.
> - Added requested commit message changes
>
> v4:
> - Removed all code that validated the certificate chain back to the root
> CA. Now the only restriction is what is initially placed in the
> machine keyring.
> - Check and store if the X.509 usage contains digitalSignature
> - New Kconfig menu item with none, min and max CA restriction on the
> machine keyring
>
> v3:
> - Allow Intermediate CA certs to be enrolled through the MOK. The
> Intermediate CA cert must contain keyCertSign key usage and have the
> CA bit set to true. This was done by removing the self signed
> requirement.
>
> Eric Snowberg (6):
> KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature
> KEYS: Add missing function documentation
> KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA
> KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage
> KEYS: CA link restriction
> integrity: machine keyring CA configuration
>
> certs/system_keyring.c | 14 +++++--
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 28 +++++++++++++
> security/integrity/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++-
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 +++-
> 6 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
>
> base-commit: e8d018dd0257f744ca50a729e3d042cf2ec9da65
> --
> 2.27.0
>
I can pick this, and I guess I can add Mimi's tested-by's to all of the
patches?
BR, Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-29 22:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-22 16:16 [PATCH v6 0/6] Add CA enforcement keyring restrictions Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] KEYS: Create static version of public_key_verify_signature Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 2/6] KEYS: Add missing function documentation Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: X.509: Parse Basic Constraints for CA Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] KEYS: X.509: Parse Key Usage Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2023-03-22 16:16 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] integrity: machine keyring CA configuration Eric Snowberg
2023-03-29 22:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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