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From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
	<brauner@kernel.org>, <lennart@poettering.net>,
	<cyphar@cyphar.com>, <luto@kernel.org>, <kernel-team@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 07/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 16:53:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230607235352.1723243-8-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230607235352.1723243-1-andrii@kernel.org>

Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.

Further, add a filter of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, specified
at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h                           |  3 +
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h                      |  6 ++
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                          | 69 +++++++++++++++----
 kernel/bpf/token.c                            |  8 +++
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h                | 10 ++-
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c     |  3 +
 6 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 5f3944352c26..e0c7eb5b0bd7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
 	u32 btf_value_type_id;
 	u32 btf_vmlinux_value_type_id;
 	struct btf *btf;
+	struct bpf_token *token;
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
 	struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
 #endif
@@ -1538,6 +1539,7 @@ struct bpf_token {
 	struct work_struct work;
 	atomic64_t refcnt;
 	u64 allowed_cmds;
+	u64 allowed_map_types;
 };
 
 struct bpf_struct_ops_value;
@@ -2096,6 +2098,7 @@ int bpf_token_new_fd(struct bpf_token *token);
 struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd);
 
 bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd);
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type);
 
 int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, int path_fd, const char __user *pathname);
 int bpf_obj_get_user(int path_fd, const char __user *pathname, int flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 3e7e8d8cbe90..7ee499a440a3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+	__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
 };
 
 /* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1359,6 +1360,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
 		 * to using 5 hash functions).
 		 */
 		__u64	map_extra;
+		__u32	map_token_fd;
 	};
 
 	struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
@@ -1641,6 +1643,10 @@ union bpf_attr {
 		 * programs
 		 */
 		__u64		allowed_cmds;
+		/* similarly to allowed_cmds, a bit set of BPF map types that
+		 * are allowed to be created by requested BPF token;
+		 */
+		__u64		allowed_map_types;
 	} token_create;
 
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 093472ac40f7..cba7235d48da 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
 	struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
+	struct bpf_token *token = map->token;
 
 	security_bpf_map_free(map);
 	bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
@@ -706,6 +707,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
 	 * template bpf_map struct used during verification.
 	 */
 	btf_record_free(rec);
+	bpf_token_put(token);
 }
 
 static void bpf_map_put_uref(struct bpf_map *map)
@@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
 	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) {
 		int i;
 
-		if (!bpf_capable()) {
+		if (!bpf_token_capable(map->token, CAP_BPF)) {
 			ret = -EPERM;
 			goto free_map_tab;
 		}
@@ -1092,11 +1094,12 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
+#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
 /* called via syscall */
 static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
+	struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
 	u32 map_type = attr->map_type;
 	struct bpf_map *map;
@@ -1147,14 +1150,32 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (attr->map_token_fd) {
+		token = bpf_token_get_from_fd(attr->map_token_fd);
+		if (IS_ERR(token))
+			return PTR_ERR(token);
+
+		/* if current token doesn't grant map creation permissions,
+		 * then we can't use this token, so ignore it and rely on
+		 * system-wide capabilities checks
+		 */
+		if (!bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE) ||
+		    !bpf_token_allow_map_type(token, attr->map_type)) {
+			bpf_token_put(token);
+			token = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = -EPERM;
+
 	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
 	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
 	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
 	 * object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
 	 * capability checks are still carried out.
 	 */
-	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
-		return -EPERM;
+	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+		goto put_token;
 
 	/* check privileged map type permissions */
 	switch (map_type) {
@@ -1187,28 +1208,36 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
-		if (!bpf_capable())
-			return -EPERM;
+		if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+			goto put_token;
 		break;
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
-		if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-			return -EPERM;
+		if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+			goto put_token;
 		break;
 	default:
 		WARN(1, "unsupported map type %d", map_type);
-		return -EPERM;
+		goto put_token;
 	}
 
 	map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
-	if (IS_ERR(map))
-		return PTR_ERR(map);
+	if (IS_ERR(map)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(map);
+		goto put_token;
+	}
 	map->ops = ops;
 	map->map_type = map_type;
 
+	if (token) {
+		/* move token reference into map->token, reuse our refcnt */
+		map->token = token;
+		token = NULL;
+	}
+
 	err = bpf_obj_name_cpy(map->name, attr->map_name,
 			       sizeof(attr->map_name));
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -1281,8 +1310,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 free_map_sec:
 	security_bpf_map_free(map);
 free_map:
+	bpf_token_put(map->token);
 	btf_put(map->btf);
 	map->ops->map_free(map);
+put_token:
+	bpf_token_put(token);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -5086,9 +5118,11 @@ static bool is_bit_subset_of(u32 subset, u32 superset)
 	return (superset & subset) == subset;
 }
 
-#define BPF_TOKEN_CMDS_MASK ((1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE))
-
-#define BPF_TOKEN_CREATE_LAST_FIELD token_create.allowed_cmds
+#define BPF_TOKEN_CMDS_MASK (			\
+	(1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE)		\
+	| (1ULL << BPF_MAP_CREATE)		\
+)
+#define BPF_TOKEN_CREATE_LAST_FIELD token_create.allowed_map_types
 
 static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
@@ -5124,6 +5158,12 @@ static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 		err = -EPERM;
 		goto err_out;
 	}
+	/* requested map types should be a subset of associated token's set */
+	if (token && !is_bit_subset_of(attr->token_create.allowed_map_types,
+				       token->allowed_map_types)) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
 
 	new_token = bpf_token_alloc();
 	if (!new_token) {
@@ -5132,6 +5172,7 @@ static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	}
 
 	new_token->allowed_cmds = attr->token_create.allowed_cmds;
+	new_token->allowed_map_types = attr->token_create.allowed_map_types;
 
 	fd = bpf_token_new_fd(new_token);
 	if (fd < 0) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c
index 4257281ca1ec..0abb1fa4f181 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/token.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c
@@ -115,3 +115,11 @@ bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
 
 	return token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd);
 }
+
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
+{
+	if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+		return false;
+
+	return token->allowed_map_types & (1ULL << type);
+}
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 3e7e8d8cbe90..0722d42b55ea 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
 	BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+	__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
 };
 
 /* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1359,6 +1360,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
 		 * to using 5 hash functions).
 		 */
 		__u64	map_extra;
+		__u32	map_token_fd;
 	};
 
 	struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
@@ -1638,9 +1640,15 @@ union bpf_attr {
 		/* a bit set of allowed bpf() syscall commands,
 		 * e.g., (1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE) | (1ULL << BPF_PROG_LOAD)
 		 * will allow creating derived BPF tokens and loading new BPF
-		 * programs
+		 * programs;
+		 * see also BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS for its effect on
+		 * validity checking of this set
 		 */
 		__u64		allowed_cmds;
+		/* similarly to allowed_cmds, a bit set of BPF map types that
+		 * are allowed to be created by requested BPF token;
+		 */
+		__u64		allowed_map_types;
 	} token_create;
 
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
index efb8bd43653c..e677c0435cec 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ static void test_libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(void)
 		const char *map_type_str;
 		char buf[256];
 
+		if (map_type == __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+			continue;
+
 		map_type_name = btf__str_by_offset(btf, e->name_off);
 		map_type_str = libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(map_type);
 		ASSERT_OK_PTR(map_type_str, map_type_name);
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-07 23:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-07 23:53 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 01/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 02/18] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 03/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF_TOKEN_CREATE test Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 04/18] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 05/18] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 06/18] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 08/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 09/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled test for BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 10/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 11/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 12/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_BTF_LOAD selftest Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 13/18] bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 14/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 15/18] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 16/18] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 17/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 18/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_PROG_LOAD tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-08 18:49 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Stanislav Fomichev
2023-06-08 22:17   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 11:17 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 18:21   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 21:21     ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 22:03       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 10:49         ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-12 22:08           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-13 21:48             ` Hao Luo
2023-06-14 12:06             ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-15 22:55               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 18:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 19:08   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-19 17:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-21 23:48       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22  8:22         ` Maryam Tahhan
2023-06-22 16:49           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <5a75d1f0-4ed9-399c-4851-2df0755de9b5@redhat.com>
2023-06-22 18:40               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 21:04                 ` Maryam Tahhan
2023-06-22 23:35                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23  1:02                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 15:10                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 23:23                     ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-24 13:59                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-24 15:28                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-26 15:23                           ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-07-04 20:48                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-07-04 21:06                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-27 10:22                           ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-26 22:31                         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-26 22:08                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 19:05             ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23  3:28               ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 16:13                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-26 22:08                 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 18:20           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 23:07             ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-26 22:08               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-04 21:05                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 22:29 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-09 22:57   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:02     ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 14:31       ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 22:27       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-14  0:23         ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-14  9:39           ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-15 22:48             ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 22:18               ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-26 22:08                 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-15 22:47           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:44 ` Dave Tucker
2023-06-12 15:52   ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 23:04   ` Andrii Nakryiko

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