From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
<brauner@kernel.org>, <lennart@poettering.net>,
<cyphar@cyphar.com>, <luto@kernel.org>, <kernel-team@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 07/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 16:53:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230607235352.1723243-8-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230607235352.1723243-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
Further, add a filter of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, specified
at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 69 +++++++++++++++----
kernel/bpf/token.c | 8 +++
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 10 ++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c | 3 +
6 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 5f3944352c26..e0c7eb5b0bd7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
u32 btf_value_type_id;
u32 btf_vmlinux_value_type_id;
struct btf *btf;
+ struct bpf_token *token;
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
#endif
@@ -1538,6 +1539,7 @@ struct bpf_token {
struct work_struct work;
atomic64_t refcnt;
u64 allowed_cmds;
+ u64 allowed_map_types;
};
struct bpf_struct_ops_value;
@@ -2096,6 +2098,7 @@ int bpf_token_new_fd(struct bpf_token *token);
struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd);
bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd);
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type);
int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, int path_fd, const char __user *pathname);
int bpf_obj_get_user(int path_fd, const char __user *pathname, int flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 3e7e8d8cbe90..7ee499a440a3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+ __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
};
/* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1359,6 +1360,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
* to using 5 hash functions).
*/
__u64 map_extra;
+ __u32 map_token_fd;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
@@ -1641,6 +1643,10 @@ union bpf_attr {
* programs
*/
__u64 allowed_cmds;
+ /* similarly to allowed_cmds, a bit set of BPF map types that
+ * are allowed to be created by requested BPF token;
+ */
+ __u64 allowed_map_types;
} token_create;
} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 093472ac40f7..cba7235d48da 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bpf_map *map = container_of(work, struct bpf_map, work);
struct btf_record *rec = map->record;
+ struct bpf_token *token = map->token;
security_bpf_map_free(map);
bpf_map_release_memcg(map);
@@ -706,6 +707,7 @@ static void bpf_map_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
* template bpf_map struct used during verification.
*/
btf_record_free(rec);
+ bpf_token_put(token);
}
static void bpf_map_put_uref(struct bpf_map *map)
@@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) {
int i;
- if (!bpf_capable()) {
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(map->token, CAP_BPF)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto free_map_tab;
}
@@ -1092,11 +1094,12 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
return ret;
}
-#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
+#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
/* called via syscall */
static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
+ struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
u32 map_type = attr->map_type;
struct bpf_map *map;
@@ -1147,14 +1150,32 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (attr->map_token_fd) {
+ token = bpf_token_get_from_fd(attr->map_token_fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(token))
+ return PTR_ERR(token);
+
+ /* if current token doesn't grant map creation permissions,
+ * then we can't use this token, so ignore it and rely on
+ * system-wide capabilities checks
+ */
+ if (!bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE) ||
+ !bpf_token_allow_map_type(token, attr->map_type)) {
+ bpf_token_put(token);
+ token = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = -EPERM;
+
/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
* creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
* on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
* object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
* capability checks are still carried out.
*/
- if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
+ if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+ goto put_token;
/* check privileged map type permissions */
switch (map_type) {
@@ -1187,28 +1208,36 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+ goto put_token;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ goto put_token;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported map type %d", map_type);
- return -EPERM;
+ goto put_token;
}
map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
- if (IS_ERR(map))
- return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (IS_ERR(map)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(map);
+ goto put_token;
+ }
map->ops = ops;
map->map_type = map_type;
+ if (token) {
+ /* move token reference into map->token, reuse our refcnt */
+ map->token = token;
+ token = NULL;
+ }
+
err = bpf_obj_name_cpy(map->name, attr->map_name,
sizeof(attr->map_name));
if (err < 0)
@@ -1281,8 +1310,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
free_map_sec:
security_bpf_map_free(map);
free_map:
+ bpf_token_put(map->token);
btf_put(map->btf);
map->ops->map_free(map);
+put_token:
+ bpf_token_put(token);
return err;
}
@@ -5086,9 +5118,11 @@ static bool is_bit_subset_of(u32 subset, u32 superset)
return (superset & subset) == subset;
}
-#define BPF_TOKEN_CMDS_MASK ((1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE))
-
-#define BPF_TOKEN_CREATE_LAST_FIELD token_create.allowed_cmds
+#define BPF_TOKEN_CMDS_MASK ( \
+ (1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE) \
+ | (1ULL << BPF_MAP_CREATE) \
+)
+#define BPF_TOKEN_CREATE_LAST_FIELD token_create.allowed_map_types
static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
@@ -5124,6 +5158,12 @@ static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
err = -EPERM;
goto err_out;
}
+ /* requested map types should be a subset of associated token's set */
+ if (token && !is_bit_subset_of(attr->token_create.allowed_map_types,
+ token->allowed_map_types)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
new_token = bpf_token_alloc();
if (!new_token) {
@@ -5132,6 +5172,7 @@ static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
}
new_token->allowed_cmds = attr->token_create.allowed_cmds;
+ new_token->allowed_map_types = attr->token_create.allowed_map_types;
fd = bpf_token_new_fd(new_token);
if (fd < 0) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c
index 4257281ca1ec..0abb1fa4f181 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/token.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c
@@ -115,3 +115,11 @@ bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
return token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd);
}
+
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
+{
+ if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+ return false;
+
+ return token->allowed_map_types & (1ULL << type);
+}
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 3e7e8d8cbe90..0722d42b55ea 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+ __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
};
/* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1359,6 +1360,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
* to using 5 hash functions).
*/
__u64 map_extra;
+ __u32 map_token_fd;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
@@ -1638,9 +1640,15 @@ union bpf_attr {
/* a bit set of allowed bpf() syscall commands,
* e.g., (1ULL << BPF_TOKEN_CREATE) | (1ULL << BPF_PROG_LOAD)
* will allow creating derived BPF tokens and loading new BPF
- * programs
+ * programs;
+ * see also BPF_F_TOKEN_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CMDS for its effect on
+ * validity checking of this set
*/
__u64 allowed_cmds;
+ /* similarly to allowed_cmds, a bit set of BPF map types that
+ * are allowed to be created by requested BPF token;
+ */
+ __u64 allowed_map_types;
} token_create;
} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
index efb8bd43653c..e677c0435cec 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ static void test_libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(void)
const char *map_type_str;
char buf[256];
+ if (map_type == __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+ continue;
+
map_type_name = btf__str_by_offset(btf, e->name_off);
map_type_str = libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(map_type);
ASSERT_OK_PTR(map_type_str, map_type_name);
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-07 23:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-07 23:53 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 01/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 02/18] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 03/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF_TOKEN_CREATE test Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 04/18] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 05/18] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 06/18] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 08/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 09/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled test for BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 10/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 11/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 12/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_BTF_LOAD selftest Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 13/18] bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 14/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 15/18] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 16/18] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 17/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 18/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_PROG_LOAD tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-08 18:49 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Stanislav Fomichev
2023-06-08 22:17 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 11:17 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 18:21 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 21:21 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 22:03 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 10:49 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-12 22:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-13 21:48 ` Hao Luo
2023-06-14 12:06 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-15 22:55 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 18:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 19:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-19 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-21 23:48 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 8:22 ` Maryam Tahhan
2023-06-22 16:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <5a75d1f0-4ed9-399c-4851-2df0755de9b5@redhat.com>
2023-06-22 18:40 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 21:04 ` Maryam Tahhan
2023-06-22 23:35 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 1:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 15:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 23:23 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-24 13:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-24 15:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-26 15:23 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-07-04 20:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-07-04 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-27 10:22 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-26 22:31 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-26 22:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 19:05 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 3:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 16:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-26 22:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 18:20 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 23:07 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-26 22:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-04 21:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 22:29 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-09 22:57 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:02 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 14:31 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 22:27 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-14 0:23 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-14 9:39 ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-15 22:48 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 22:18 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-26 22:08 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-15 22:47 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:44 ` Dave Tucker
2023-06-12 15:52 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 23:04 ` Andrii Nakryiko
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