From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keescook@chromium.org, lennart@poettering.net, cyphar@cyphar.com,
luto@kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com, sargun@sargun.me
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 01/14] bpf: introduce BPF token object
Date: Tue, 4 Jul 2023 15:34:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230704-gourmet-radius-55a8d9c4c9e5@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner>
On Tue, Jul 04, 2023 at 02:43:59PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 28, 2023 at 10:18:19PM -0700, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> > Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to to
> > allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
> > program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
> > unprivileged process, all while have a good amount of control over which
> > privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
> >
> > This patch adds new BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command to bpf() syscall, which
> > allows to create a new BPF token object along with a set of allowed
> > commands that such BPF token allows to unprivileged applications.
> > Currently only BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself can be
> > delegated, but other patches gradually add ability to delegate
> > BPF_MAP_CREATE, BPF_BTF_LOAD, and BPF_PROG_LOAD commands.
> >
> > The above means that new BPF tokens can be created using existing BPF
> > token, if original privileged creator allowed BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command.
> > New derived BPF token cannot be more powerful than the original BPF
> > token.
> >
> > Importantly, BPF token is automatically pinned at the specified location
> > inside an instance of BPF FS and cannot be repinned using BPF_OBJ_PIN
> > command, unlike BPF prog/map/btf/link. This provides more control over
> > unintended sharing of BPF tokens through pinning it in another BPF FS
> > instances.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
> > ---
>
> The main issue I have with the token approach is that it is a completely
> separate delegation vector on top of user namespaces. We mentioned this
> duringthe conf and this was brought up on the thread here again as well.
> Imho, that's a problem both security-wise and complexity-wise.
>
> It's not great if each subsystem gets its own custom delegation
> mechanism. This imposes such a taxing complexity on both kernel- and
> userspace that it will quickly become a huge liability. So I would
> really strongly encourage you to explore another direction.
>
> I do think the spirit of your proposal is workable and that it can
> mostly be kept in tact.
>
> As mentioned before, bpffs has all the means to be taught delegation:
>
> // In container's user namespace
> fd_fs = fsopen("bpffs");
>
> // Delegating task in host userns (systemd-bpfd whatever you want)
> ret = fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "delegate", ...);
>
> // In container's user namespace
> fd_mnt = fsmount(fd_fs, 0);
>
> ret = move_mount(fd_fs, "", -EBADF, "/my/fav/location", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH)
>
> Roughly, this would mean:
>
> (i) raise FS_USERNS_MOUNT on bpffs but guard it behind the "delegate"
> mount option. IOW, it's only possibly to mount bpffs as an
> unprivileged user if a delegating process like systemd-bpfd with
> system-level privileges has marked it as delegatable.
> (ii) add fine-grained delegation options that you want this
> bpffs instance to allow via new mount options. Idk,
>
> // allow usage of foo
> fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "abilities", "foo");
>
> // also allow usage of bar
> fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "abilities", "bar");
>
> // reset allowed options
> fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "");
>
> // allow usage of schmoo
> fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "abilities", "schmoo");
This is really just one crummy way of doing this. It's ofc possible to
make this a binary struct if you wanted to; of any form:
struct bpf_delegation_opts {
u64 a;
u64 b;
u64 c;
u32 d;
u32 e;
};
and then
struct bpf_delegation_opts opts = {
.a = SOMETHING_SOMETHING,
.d = SOMETHING_SOMETHING_ELSE,
};
fsconfig(fd_fs, FSCONFIG_SET_BINARY, "abilities", &opts, sizeof(opts));
you'll get:
param->size == sizeof(opts);
param->blob = memdup_user_nul();
and then you can version this by size like we do for extensible structs
and change whatever you'd like to change in the future.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-04 13:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-29 5:18 [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 00/14] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 01/14] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-04 12:43 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-04 13:34 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2023-07-04 23:28 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-05 7:20 ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-07-05 8:45 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-05 12:34 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-05 14:16 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-05 14:42 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-05 16:00 ` Paul Moore
2023-07-05 21:38 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-06 11:32 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-06 20:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-07 13:04 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-07 17:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-07 22:00 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-07 23:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-10 23:42 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-07-11 13:33 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-11 22:06 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 02/14] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 03/14] selftests/bpf: add BPF_TOKEN_CREATE test Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 04/14] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 05/14] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 06/14] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled test for BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 07/14] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 08/14] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 09/14] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_BTF_LOAD selftest Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 10/14] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 11/14] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 12/14] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 13/14] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 5:18 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 14/14] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_PROG_LOAD tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-29 23:15 ` [PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 00/14] BPF token Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-30 18:25 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-04 9:38 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-04 23:20 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-05 12:57 ` Stefano Brivio
2023-07-02 6:59 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-07-04 9:51 ` Christian Brauner
2023-07-04 23:33 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-07-05 20:39 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-01 2:05 ` Yafang Shao
2023-07-05 20:37 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-06 1:26 ` Yafang Shao
2023-07-06 20:34 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-07 1:42 ` Yafang Shao
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