From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com, paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/5] smack: Always determine inode labels in smack_inode_init_security()
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 17:13:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230724151341.538889-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230724151341.538889-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
The inode_init_security hook is already a good place to initialize the
in-memory inode. And that is also what SELinux does.
In preparation for this, move the existing smack_inode_init_security() code
outside the 'if (xattr)' condition, and set the xattr, if provided.
This change does not have any impact on the current code, since every time
security_inode_init_security() is called, the initxattr() callback is
passed and, thus, xattr is non-NULL.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 9eae830527d..5a31d005c6d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -948,51 +948,51 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
int may;
- if (xattr) {
- /*
- * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
- * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
- */
- if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
- rcu_read_lock();
- may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
- &skp->smk_rules);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- }
+ /*
+ * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
+ * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
+ */
+ if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+ &skp->smk_rules);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
+ * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
+ * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
+ * Mark the inode as changed.
+ */
+ if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
+ (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+ smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
+ struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
/*
- * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
- * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
- * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
- * Mark the inode as changed.
+ * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
+ * should have overridden the current cred, so the
+ * inode label was already set correctly in
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security().
*/
- if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
- (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
- smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
- struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
-
- /*
- * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
- * should have overridden the current cred, so the
- * inode label was already set correctly in
- * smack_inode_alloc_security().
- */
- if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
- isp = dsp;
- xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
- xattr_count);
- if (xattr_transmute) {
- xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
- TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
- GFP_NOFS);
- if (!xattr_transmute->value)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
- xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
- }
+ if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
+ isp = dsp;
+ xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
+ xattr_count);
+ if (xattr_transmute) {
+ xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
+ TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
+ GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!xattr_transmute->value)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
+ xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
}
+ }
+ if (xattr) {
xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
if (!xattr->value)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-24 15:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-24 15:13 [PATCH v2 0/5] Smack transmute fixes Roberto Sassu
2023-07-24 15:13 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] smack: Set SMACK64TRANSMUTE only for dirs in smack_inode_setxattr() Roberto Sassu
2023-07-24 15:13 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] smack: Handle SMACK64TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_setsecurity() Roberto Sassu
2023-07-24 15:13 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-07-24 15:13 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu
2023-07-24 15:13 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ramfs: Initialize security of in-memory inodes Roberto Sassu
2023-11-15 8:01 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-15 22:24 ` Andrew Morton
2023-07-25 18:18 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Smack transmute fixes Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20230724151341.538889-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com \
--to=roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).