From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 15:08:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230807-gastdirigent-laufkundschaft-17e681a8e14e@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <650f7b6ea6b55de4c9cbc791af0da4f800907c21.camel@kernel.org>
On Mon, Aug 07, 2023 at 08:57:03AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Sat, 2023-08-05 at 14:43 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 04, 2023 at 12:09:34PM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > >
> > > When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
> > > aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
> > > leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
> > >
> > > This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when
> > > fscache is enabled:
> > >
> > > NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
> > >
> > > Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
> > > creation when alloc_fs_context() is creating the fs_context for it.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
> > > Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode)
> > > Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> > > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > > Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
> > > ---
> > > ver #7)
> > > - Drop lsm_set boolean
> > > - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802-master-v6-1-45d48299168b@kernel.org
> > >
> > > ver #6)
> > > - Rebase onto v6.5.0-rc4
> > >
> > > ver #5)
> > > - Removed unused variable.
> > > - Only allocate smack_mnt_opts if we're dealing with a submount.
> > >
> > > ver #4)
> > > - When doing a FOR_SUBMOUNT mount, don't set the root label in SELinux or
> > > Smack.
> > >
> > > ver #3)
> > > - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on fc->purpose ==
> > > FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT. Shouldn't happen on FOR_RECONFIGURE.
> > >
> > > ver #2)
> > > - Added Smack support
> > > - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on reference != NULL.
> > > ---
> > > fs/fs_context.c | 4 ++++
> > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> > > include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++
> > > security/security.c | 14 +++++++++++
> > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 6 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
> > > index 851214d1d013..a523aea956c4 100644
> > > --- a/fs/fs_context.c
> > > +++ b/fs/fs_context.c
> > > @@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static struct fs_context *alloc_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
> > > break;
> > > }
> > >
> > > + ret = security_fs_context_init(fc, reference);
> > > + if (ret < 0)
> > > + goto err_fc;
> > > +
> > > /* TODO: Make all filesystems support this unconditionally */
> > > init_fs_context = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context;
> > > if (!init_fs_context)
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > index 7308a1a7599b..7ce3550154b1 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *f
> > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_init, struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
> > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_dup, struct fs_context *fc,
> > > struct fs_context *src_sc)
> > > LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOPARAM, fs_context_parse_param, struct fs_context *fc,
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > > index 32828502f09e..61fda06fac9d 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > > @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
> > > int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> > > void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> > > void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> > > +int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
> > > int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
> > > int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
> > > int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
> > > @@ -629,6 +630,11 @@ static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > {
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static inline int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc,
> > > + struct dentry *reference)
> >
> > I think that's the wrong way of doing this hook. The security hook
> > really doesn't belong into alloc_fs_context().
> >
> > I think what we want is a dedicated helper similar to vfs_dup_context():
> >
> > // Only pass the superblock. There's no need for the dentry. I would
> > // avoid even passing fs_context but if that's preferred then sure.
> > security_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc, const struct super_block *sb)
> >
> > vfs_submount_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type, struct dentry *reference)
> > {
> > fc = fs_context_for_submount(fs_type, reference);
> >
> > security_fs_context_for_submount(fc, reference->d_sb);
> > }
> >
> > This automatically ensures it's only called for submounts, the LSM
> > doesn't need to care about fc->purpose and this isn't called
> > in a pure allocation function for all allocation calls.
> >
> > The we should switch all callers over to that new helper and unexport
> > that fs_context_for_submount() thing completely. Yes, that's more work
> > but that's the correct thing to do. And we need to audit fuse, cifs,
> > afs, and nfs anyway that they work fine with the new security hook.*
> >
>
> It's the same prototype. We could just move the hook call to the end of
> fs_context_for_submount, and that would be less churn for its callers.
If you just add it into fs_context_for_submount() after the allocation
and then leave that as first class citizen it's fine ofc. It's the same
result as what I mentioned earlier. We just shouldn't put generic hooks
in an allocation function that allocates different types of filesystem
contexts. I prefer to have them as targeted as possible and also avoid
unnecessary trips into the LSM layer.
> Or were you wanting to do that to make this a more gradual changeover
> for some reason?
No, I think it's fine if you switch it all in one go. I just don't know
if fuse/virtiofs submounts expect an selinux context to be bestowed upon
them.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-07 13:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-04 16:09 [PATCH v7] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing Jeff Layton
2023-08-05 12:43 ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-05 12:59 ` Christian Brauner
2023-08-07 12:57 ` Jeff Layton
2023-08-07 13:08 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
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