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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	ast@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2023 23:24:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230918212459.1937798-3-kpsingh@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230918212459.1937798-1-kpsingh@kernel.org>

These macros are a clever trick to determine a count of the number of
LSMs that are enabled in the config to ascertain the maximum number of
static calls that need to be configured per LSM hook.

Without this one would need to generate static calls for (number of
possible LSMs * number of LSM hooks) which ends up being quite wasteful
especially when some LSMs are not compiled into the kernel.

Suggested-by: Kui-Feng Lee <sinquersw@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/lsm_count.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 106 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_count.h

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_count.h b/include/linux/lsm_count.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0c0ff3c7dddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_count.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+/*
+ * Macros to count the number of LSMs enabled in the kernel at compile time.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Capabilities is enabled when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
+#define SMACK_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define SMACK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+#define APPARMOR_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define APPARMOR_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)
+#define TOMOYO_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define TOMOYO_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)
+#define YAMA_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define YAMA_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)
+#define LOADPIN_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LOADPIN_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)
+#define LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LOCKDOWN_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)
+#define BPF_LSM_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define BPF_LSM_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)
+#define LANDLOCK_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LANDLOCK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+
+#define __COUNT_COMMAS(_0, _1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, _9, _10, _11, _12, _n, X...) _n
+#define COUNT_COMMAS(a, X...) __COUNT_COMMAS(, ##X, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0)
+#define ___COUNT_COMMAS(args...) COUNT_COMMAS(args)
+
+
+#define MAX_LSM_COUNT			\
+	___COUNT_COMMAS(		\
+		CAPABILITIES_ENABLED	\
+		SELINUX_ENABLED		\
+		SMACK_ENABLED		\
+		APPARMOR_ENABLED	\
+		TOMOYO_ENABLED		\
+		YAMA_ENABLED		\
+		LOADPIN_ENABLED		\
+		LOCKDOWN_ENABLED	\
+		BPF_LSM_ENABLED		\
+		LANDLOCK_ENABLED)
+
+#else
+
+#define MAX_LSM_COUNT 0
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+#endif  /* __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H */
-- 
2.42.0.459.ge4e396fd5e-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-09-18 21:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-18 21:24 [PATCH v3 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:46   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:06   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:00   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` KP Singh [this message]
2023-09-20 15:48   ` [PATCH v3 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:07   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 19:24     ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  8:41       ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 20:59         ` Song Liu
2023-09-21 13:20   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-21 13:58     ` KP Singh
2023-09-22 11:25       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-22 14:45         ` KP Singh
2023-09-23  6:56           ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-23 16:06             ` KP Singh
2023-09-25 11:03               ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 11:22                 ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 10:51                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-01 14:26                     ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 15:00                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-02 10:56                       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-02 13:04                         ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 14:34                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 15:48                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-23 18:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-22 14:57         ` Paul Moore
2023-09-23 16:08           ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 14:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:54   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  9:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-20 18:10   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21  9:14     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 21:02   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-09-20 16:00   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:11   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:04   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:44   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  8:53     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 23:03   ` Song Liu

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