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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
	daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 08:44:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309200840.722352CCB@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230918212459.1937798-6-kpsingh@kernel.org>

On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 11:24:59PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> This config influences the nature of the static key that guards the
> static call for LSM hooks.
> 
> When enabled, it indicates that an LSM static call slot is more likely
> to be initialized. When disabled, it optimizes for the case when static
> call slot is more likely to be not initialized.
> 
> When a major LSM like (SELinux, AppArmor, Smack etc) is active on a
> system the system would benefit from enabling the config. However there
> are other cases which would benefit from the config being disabled
> (e.g. a system with a BPF LSM with no hooks enabled by default, or an
> LSM like loadpin / yama). Ultimately, there is no one-size fits all
> solution.
> 
> with CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY enabled, the inactive /
> uninitialized case is penalized with a direct jmp (still better than
> an indirect jmp):
> [...]
> index 52c9af08ad35..bd2a0dff991a 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ config SECURITY
>  
>  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>  
> +config SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY
> +	bool "LSM hooks are likely to be initialized"
> +	depends on SECURITY
> +	default y
> +	help
> +	  This controls the behaviour of the static keys that guard LSM hooks.
> +	  If LSM hooks are likely to be initialized by LSMs, then one gets
> +	  better performance by enabling this option. However, if the system is
> +	  using an LSM where hooks are much likely to be disabled, one gets
> +	  better performance by disabling this config.

Since you described the situations where it's a net benefit, this could
be captured in the Kconfig too. How about this, which tracks the "major"
LSMs as in the DEFAULT_SECURITY choice:

	depends on SECURITY && EXPERT
	default BPF_LSM || SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_TOMOYO || SECURITY_APPARMOR


-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-20 15:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-18 21:24 [PATCH v3 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:46   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:06   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:00   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:48   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:07   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 19:24     ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  8:41       ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 20:59         ` Song Liu
2023-09-21 13:20   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-21 13:58     ` KP Singh
2023-09-22 11:25       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-22 14:45         ` KP Singh
2023-09-23  6:56           ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-23 16:06             ` KP Singh
2023-09-25 11:03               ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 11:22                 ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 10:51                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-01 14:26                     ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 15:00                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-02 10:56                       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-02 13:04                         ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 14:34                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 15:48                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-23 18:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-22 14:57         ` Paul Moore
2023-09-23 16:08           ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 14:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:54   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  9:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-20 18:10   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21  9:14     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 21:02   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-09-20 16:00   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:11   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:04   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:44   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-09-21  8:53     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 23:03   ` Song Liu

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