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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
	daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 08:54:16 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309200848.7099DFF1B@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230918212459.1937798-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>

On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 11:24:57PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> is especially bad in kernel hot paths:

I feel like the performance details in the cover letter should be
repeated in this patch, since it's the one doing the heavy lifting.

> [...]
> 
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>

Regardless, this is a nice improvement on execution time and one of the
more complex cases for static calls.

> -struct security_hook_heads {
> -	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME;
> -	#include "lsm_hook_defs.h"
> +/*
> + * @key: static call key as defined by STATIC_CALL_KEY
> + * @trampoline: static call trampoline as defined by STATIC_CALL_TRAMP
> + * @hl: The security_hook_list as initialized by the owning LSM.
> + * @active: Enabled when the static call has an LSM hook associated.
> + */
> +struct lsm_static_call {
> +	struct static_call_key *key;
> +	void *trampoline;
> +	struct security_hook_list *hl;
> +	/* this needs to be true or false based on what the key defaults to */
> +	struct static_key_false *active;
> +};

Can this be marked __randomize_layout too?

Everything else looks good to me. I actually find the result more
readable that before. But then I do love a good macro. :)

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-20 15:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-18 21:24 [PATCH v3 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:46   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:06   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:00   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:48   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:07   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 19:24     ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  8:41       ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 20:59         ` Song Liu
2023-09-21 13:20   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-21 13:58     ` KP Singh
2023-09-22 11:25       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-22 14:45         ` KP Singh
2023-09-23  6:56           ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-23 16:06             ` KP Singh
2023-09-25 11:03               ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 11:22                 ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 10:51                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-01 14:26                     ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 15:00                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-02 10:56                       ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-02 13:04                         ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 14:34                         ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 15:48                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-23 18:10             ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-22 14:57         ` Paul Moore
2023-09-23 16:08           ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 14:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:54   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-09-21  9:13     ` KP Singh
2023-09-20 18:10   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21  9:14     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 21:02   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-09-20 16:00   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:11   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:04   ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:44   ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21  8:53     ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 23:03   ` Song Liu

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