From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, ast@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 08:54:16 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309200848.7099DFF1B@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230918212459.1937798-4-kpsingh@kernel.org>
On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 11:24:57PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> is especially bad in kernel hot paths:
I feel like the performance details in the cover letter should be
repeated in this patch, since it's the one doing the heavy lifting.
> [...]
>
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Regardless, this is a nice improvement on execution time and one of the
more complex cases for static calls.
> -struct security_hook_heads {
> - #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME;
> - #include "lsm_hook_defs.h"
> +/*
> + * @key: static call key as defined by STATIC_CALL_KEY
> + * @trampoline: static call trampoline as defined by STATIC_CALL_TRAMP
> + * @hl: The security_hook_list as initialized by the owning LSM.
> + * @active: Enabled when the static call has an LSM hook associated.
> + */
> +struct lsm_static_call {
> + struct static_call_key *key;
> + void *trampoline;
> + struct security_hook_list *hl;
> + /* this needs to be true or false based on what the key defaults to */
> + struct static_key_false *active;
> +};
Can this be marked __randomize_layout too?
Everything else looks good to me. I actually find the result more
readable that before. But then I do love a good macro. :)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-20 15:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-18 21:24 [PATCH v3 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:46 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:00 ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:48 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:07 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-20 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21 8:41 ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 20:59 ` Song Liu
2023-09-21 13:20 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-21 13:58 ` KP Singh
2023-09-22 11:25 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-22 14:45 ` KP Singh
2023-09-23 6:56 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-23 16:06 ` KP Singh
2023-09-25 11:03 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 11:22 ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 10:51 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-01 14:26 ` KP Singh
2023-10-01 15:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-10-02 10:56 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-10-02 13:04 ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 14:34 ` Tetsuo Handa
2023-09-25 15:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-23 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-22 14:57 ` Paul Moore
2023-09-23 16:08 ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 14:13 ` KP Singh
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:54 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-09-21 9:13 ` KP Singh
2023-09-20 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 9:14 ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 21:02 ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-09-20 16:00 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 18:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-21 21:04 ` Song Liu
2023-09-18 21:24 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-20 15:44 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-21 8:53 ` KP Singh
2023-09-21 23:03 ` Song Liu
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