From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, paul@paul-moore.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
ast@kernel.org, renauld@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2023 13:40:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202309301339.8196ECC78@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com>
On Sun, Oct 01, 2023 at 12:13:06AM +0800, kernel test robot wrote:
> Hi KP,
>
> kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
>
> [auto build test ERROR on bpf-next/master]
> [also build test ERROR on bpf/master pcmoore-selinux/next linus/master v6.6-rc3 next-20230929]
> [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
> And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
> https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
>
> url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/KP-Singh/kernel-Add-helper-macros-for-loop-unrolling/20230929-042610
> base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git master
> patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230928202410.3765062-4-kpsingh%40kernel.org
> patch subject: [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
> config: i386-randconfig-001-20230930 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230930/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/config)
> compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
> reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230930/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
>
> If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
> the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
> | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202309302332.1mxVwb0U-lkp@intel.com/
>
> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>
> >> security/security.c:139:1: error: Only string constants are supported as initializers for randomized structures with flexible arrays
> 139 | };
> | ^
Uuh, where is there a flexible array here?
> vim +139 security/security.c
>
> 118
> 119 /*
> 120 * Initialise a table of static calls for each LSM hook.
> 121 * DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL invocation above generates a key (STATIC_CALL_KEY)
> 122 * and a trampoline (STATIC_CALL_TRAMP) which are used to call
> 123 * __static_call_update when updating the static call.
> 124 */
> 125 struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init = {
> 126 #define INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME) \
> 127 (struct lsm_static_call) { \
> 128 .key = &STATIC_CALL_KEY(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM)), \
> 129 .trampoline = LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM), \
> 130 .active = &SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(NAME, NUM), \
> 131 },
> 132 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
> 133 .NAME = { \
> 134 LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL, NAME) \
> 135 },
> 136 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> 137 #undef LSM_HOOK
> 138 #undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL
> > 139 };
> 140
*confused*
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-30 20:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-28 20:24 [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-29 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-30 16:13 ` kernel test robot
2023-09-30 20:40 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-10-04 0:09 ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-10-05 8:09 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-05 13:26 ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:27 ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:52 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-05 16:07 ` KP Singh
2023-10-06 7:27 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06 9:05 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06 10:57 ` KP Singh
2023-10-06 18:32 ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-29 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-29 0:41 ` [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Kees Cook
2023-10-02 11:06 ` Paolo Abeni
2023-10-02 11:09 ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 13:27 ` Paolo Abeni
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