linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
	<brauner@kernel.org>, <lennart@poettering.net>,
	<kernel-team@meta.com>, <sargun@sargun.me>
Subject: [PATCH v8 bpf-next 11/18] bpf,lsm: add BPF token LSM hooks
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 11:02:13 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231016180220.3866105-12-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016180220.3866105-1-andrii@kernel.org>

Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.

Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h           |  3 ++
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  5 +++
 include/linux/security.h      | 25 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c          |  4 +++
 kernel/bpf/token.c            | 13 ++++++--
 security/security.c           | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index c87af564f464..dfcac60f1857 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1585,6 +1585,9 @@ struct bpf_token {
 	u64 allowed_maps;
 	u64 allowed_progs;
 	u64 allowed_attachs;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	void *security;
+#endif
 };
 
 struct bpf_struct_ops_value;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 0adfb136521a..94590503c851 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -404,6 +404,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_map_free, struct bpf_map *map)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog_load, struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	 struct bpf_token *token)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free, struct bpf_prog *prog)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+	 struct path *path)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_token_free, struct bpf_token *token)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_allow_cmd, const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 59c5fab2c4d6..bfe58ac773f3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ struct fs_parameter;
 enum fs_value_type;
 struct watch;
 struct watch_notification;
+enum bpf_cmd;
 
 /* Default (no) options for the capable function */
 #define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0
@@ -2031,6 +2032,11 @@ extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
 extern int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 				  struct bpf_token *token);
 extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog);
+extern int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				     struct path *path);
+extern void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token);
+extern int security_bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd);
+extern int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
 #else
 static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
 					     unsigned int size)
@@ -2065,6 +2071,25 @@ static inline int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *
 
 static inline void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 { }
+
+static inline int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+				     struct path *path)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index 9e4e615f11eb..2b491e07485d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -265,6 +265,10 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_load)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_token_create)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_token_free)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_token_allow_cmd)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_token_capable)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_check_security)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_committed_creds)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bprm_committing_creds)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c
index 35e6f55c2a41..5d04da54faea 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/token.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@
 #include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
 {
 	/* BPF token allows ns_capable() level of capabilities */
-	if (token) {
+	if (token && security_bpf_token_capable(token, cap) == 0) {
 		if (ns_capable(token->userns, cap))
 			return true;
 		if (cap != CAP_SYS_ADMIN && ns_capable(token->userns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ void bpf_token_inc(struct bpf_token *token)
 
 static void bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 {
+	security_bpf_token_free(token);
 	put_user_ns(token->userns);
 	kvfree(token);
 }
@@ -172,6 +174,10 @@ int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	token->allowed_progs = mnt_opts->delegate_progs;
 	token->allowed_attachs = mnt_opts->delegate_attachs;
 
+	err = security_bpf_token_create(token, attr, &path);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_token;
+
 	fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		err = fd;
@@ -216,8 +222,9 @@ bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
 {
 	if (!token)
 		return false;
-
-	return token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd);
+	if (!(token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd)))
+		return false;
+	return security_bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, cmd) == 0;
 }
 
 bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 145e8082b9a6..caf0a24236a1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5201,6 +5201,55 @@ int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, 0, prog, attr, token);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed
+ * @token BPF token object
+ * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token
+ * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS
+ * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
+			      struct path *path)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, 0, token, attr, path);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF syscall command
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF syscall command.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_allow_cmd, 0, token, cmd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
+ * requested BPF-related capability
+ * @token: BPF token object
+ * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ *
+ * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
+ * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, 0, token, cap);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob
  * @map: bpf map
@@ -5222,6 +5271,17 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
 	call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog);
 }
+
+/**
+ * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob
+ * @token: BPF token struct
+ *
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token.
+ */
+void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
+{
+	call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token);
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
 
 /**
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-10-16 18:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 18:02 [PATCH v8 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token and BPF FS-based delegation Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 01/18] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 02/18] bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 03/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 04/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 05/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 06/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 07/18] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 08/18] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 09/18] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-17 13:56   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-17 17:46     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 10/18] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-17 14:59   ` kernel test robot
2023-10-16 18:02 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-10-17 15:44   ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 11/18] bpf,lsm: add BPF token " kernel test robot
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 12/18] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 13/18] selftests/bpf: fix test_maps' use of bpf_map_create_opts Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 14/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 15/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 16/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 17/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-17 11:02   ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-17 17:32     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-17 17:44       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-16 18:02 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 18/18] bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-20 13:18 ` [PATCH v8 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token and BPF FS-based delegation Lorenz Bauer
2023-10-20 16:25   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-24 17:52 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-24 18:23   ` Paul Moore
2023-10-24 19:38     ` Andrii Nakryiko

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20231016180220.3866105-12-andrii@kernel.org \
    --to=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@meta.com \
    --cc=lennart@poettering.net \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sargun@sargun.me \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).