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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
	"Chao Peng" <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
	"James Gowans" <jgowans@amazon.com>,
	"James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
	"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
	"Trilok Soni" <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Yu Zhang" <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
	"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
	dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 13/19] heki: Implement a kernel page table walker
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 21:23:20 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231113022326.24388-14-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231113022326.24388-1-mic@digikod.net>

From: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>

The Heki feature needs to do the following:

- Find kernel mappings.

- Determine the permissions associated with each mapping.

- Determine the collective permissions for a guest physical page across
  all of its mappings.

This way, a guest physical page can reflect only the required
permissions in the EPT thanks to the KVM_HC_PROTECT_MEMORY hypercall..

Implement a kernel page table walker that walks all of the kernel
mappings and calls a callback function for each mapping.

Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
---

Change since v1:
* New patch and new file: virt/heki/walk.c
---
 include/linux/heki.h |  16 +++++
 virt/heki/Makefile   |   1 +
 virt/heki/walk.c     | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 virt/heki/walk.c

diff --git a/include/linux/heki.h b/include/linux/heki.h
index 9b0c966c50d1..a7ae0b387dfe 100644
--- a/include/linux/heki.h
+++ b/include/linux/heki.h
@@ -61,6 +61,22 @@ struct heki {
 	struct heki_hypervisor *hypervisor;
 };
 
+/*
+ * The kernel page table is walked to locate kernel mappings. For each
+ * mapping, a callback function is called. The table walker passes information
+ * about the mapping to the callback using this structure.
+ */
+struct heki_args {
+	/* Information passed by the table walker to the callback. */
+	unsigned long va;
+	phys_addr_t pa;
+	size_t size;
+	unsigned long flags;
+};
+
+/* Callback function called by the table walker. */
+typedef void (*heki_func_t)(struct heki_args *args);
+
 extern struct heki heki;
 extern bool heki_enabled;
 
diff --git a/virt/heki/Makefile b/virt/heki/Makefile
index 354e567df71c..a5daa4ff7a4f 100644
--- a/virt/heki/Makefile
+++ b/virt/heki/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 
 obj-y += main.o
+obj-y += walk.o
diff --git a/virt/heki/walk.c b/virt/heki/walk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e10b54226fcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/virt/heki/walk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Hypervisor Enforced Kernel Integrity (Heki) - Kernel page table walker.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2023 Microsoft Corporation
+ *
+ * Cf. arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+ */
+
+#include <linux/heki.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+
+static void heki_walk_pte(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long va, unsigned long va_end,
+			  heki_func_t func, struct heki_args *args)
+{
+	pte_t *pte;
+	unsigned long next_va;
+
+	for (pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, va); va < va_end;
+	     va = next_va, pte++) {
+		next_va = (va + PAGE_SIZE) & PAGE_MASK;
+
+		if (next_va > va_end)
+			next_va = va_end;
+
+		if (!pte_present(*pte))
+			continue;
+
+		args->va = va;
+		args->pa = pte_pfn(*pte) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		args->size = PAGE_SIZE;
+		args->flags = pte_flags(*pte);
+
+		func(args);
+	}
+}
+
+static void heki_walk_pmd(pud_t *pud, unsigned long va, unsigned long va_end,
+			  heki_func_t func, struct heki_args *args)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	unsigned long next_va;
+
+	for (pmd = pmd_offset(pud, va); va < va_end; va = next_va, pmd++) {
+		next_va = pmd_addr_end(va, va_end);
+
+		if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+			args->va = va;
+			args->pa = pmd_pfn(*pmd) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+			args->pa += va & (PMD_SIZE - 1);
+			args->size = next_va - va;
+			args->flags = pmd_flags(*pmd);
+
+			func(args);
+		} else {
+			heki_walk_pte(pmd, va, next_va, func, args);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void heki_walk_pud(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long va, unsigned long va_end,
+			  heki_func_t func, struct heki_args *args)
+{
+	pud_t *pud;
+	unsigned long next_va;
+
+	for (pud = pud_offset(p4d, va); va < va_end; va = next_va, pud++) {
+		next_va = pud_addr_end(va, va_end);
+
+		if (!pud_present(*pud))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pud_large(*pud)) {
+			args->va = va;
+			args->pa = pud_pfn(*pud) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+			args->pa += va & (PUD_SIZE - 1);
+			args->size = next_va - va;
+			args->flags = pud_flags(*pud);
+
+			func(args);
+		} else {
+			heki_walk_pmd(pud, va, next_va, func, args);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void heki_walk_p4d(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long va, unsigned long va_end,
+			  heki_func_t func, struct heki_args *args)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	unsigned long next_va;
+
+	for (p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, va); va < va_end; va = next_va, p4d++) {
+		next_va = p4d_addr_end(va, va_end);
+
+		if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
+			continue;
+
+		if (p4d_large(*p4d)) {
+			args->va = va;
+			args->pa = p4d_pfn(*p4d) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+			args->pa += va & (P4D_SIZE - 1);
+			args->size = next_va - va;
+			args->flags = p4d_flags(*p4d);
+
+			func(args);
+		} else {
+			heki_walk_pud(p4d, va, next_va, func, args);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void heki_walk(unsigned long va, unsigned long va_end, heki_func_t func,
+	       struct heki_args *args)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	unsigned long next_va;
+
+	for (pgd = pgd_offset_k(va); va < va_end; va = next_va, pgd++) {
+		next_va = pgd_addr_end(va, va_end);
+
+		if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pgd_large(*pgd)) {
+			args->va = va;
+			args->pa = pgd_pfn(*pgd) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+			args->pa += va & (PGDIR_SIZE - 1);
+			args->size = next_va - va;
+			args->flags = pgd_flags(*pgd);
+
+			func(args);
+		} else {
+			heki_walk_p4d(pgd, va, next_va, func, args);
+		}
+	}
+}
-- 
2.42.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-13  2:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-13  2:23 [RFC PATCH v2 00/19] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/19] virt: Introduce Hypervisor Enforced Kernel Integrity (Heki) Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/19] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/19] KVM: x86: Add notifications for Heki policy configuration and violation Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/19] heki: Lock guest control registers at the end of guest kernel init Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/19] KVM: VMX: Add MBEC support Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/19] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gva() Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/19] KVM: x86: Make memory attribute helpers more generic Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/19] KVM: x86: Extend kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() with a mask Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/19] KVM: x86: Extend kvm_range_has_memory_attributes() with match_all Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/19] KVM: x86: Implement per-guest-page permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/19] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to set EPT permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/19] x86: Implement the Memory Table feature to store arbitrary per-page data Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/19] heki: x86: Initialize permissions counters for pages mapped into KVA Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/19] heki: x86: Initialize permissions counters for pages in vmap()/vunmap() Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters when guest page permissions change Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters during text patching Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  8:19   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 16:48     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-27 20:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-29 21:07         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-30 11:33           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-12-06 16:37             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-12-06 18:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-12-08 18:41                 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-12-01  0:45           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-06 16:41             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] heki: x86: Protect guest kernel memory using the KVM hypervisor Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  8:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 17:05     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-27 20:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-29 19:47         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/19] virt: Add Heki KUnit tests Mickaël Salaün

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