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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
	chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
	kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 18:33:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231120173318.1132868-14-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231120173318.1132868-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the file_release hook.

IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes
it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds.

LSMs could also take some action before the last reference of a file is
released.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 fs/file_table.c               |  1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  1 +
 include/linux/security.h      |  4 ++++
 security/security.c           | 11 +++++++++++
 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index de4a2915bfd4..c72dc75f2bd3 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
 	eventpoll_release(file);
 	locks_remove_file(file);
 
+	security_file_release(file);
 	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) {
 		if (file->f_op->fasync)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index e2b45fee94e2..175ca00a6b1d 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernfs_init_security, struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 	 struct kernfs_node *kn)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	 unsigned long arg)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c360458920b1..4c3585e3dcb4 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 				  struct kernfs_node *kn);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
+void security_file_release(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
@@ -1006,6 +1007,9 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{ }
+
 static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 { }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fe6a160afc35..9aa072ca5a19 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2724,6 +2724,17 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_file_release() - Perform actions before releasing the file ref
+ * @file: the file
+ *
+ * Perform actions before releasing the last reference to a file.
+ */
+void security_file_release(struct file *file)
+{
+	call_void_hook(file_release, file);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob
  * @file: the file
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-20 17:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-20 17:32 [PATCH v6 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 19/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-21  8:02   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 20/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 21/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 22/25] ima: Remove dependency on 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 23/25] evm: " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 24/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 25/25] security: Enforce ordering of 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs Roberto Sassu
2023-11-21  0:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-21  7:57     ` Roberto Sassu

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