From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>, <brauner@kernel.org>,
<torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <kernel-team@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 04/29] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 14:20:09 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240103222034.2582628-5-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240103222034.2582628-1-andrii@kernel.org>
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++
kernel/bpf/inode.c | 3 +-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 59 ++++++++++++++-----
kernel/bpf/token.c | 16 +++++
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 8 +++
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c | 2 +
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c | 3 +
8 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index e87fe928645f..ad51f3d9f3f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1629,6 +1629,7 @@ struct bpf_token {
atomic64_t refcnt;
struct user_namespace *userns;
u64 allowed_cmds;
+ u64 allowed_maps;
};
struct bpf_struct_ops_value;
@@ -2267,6 +2268,7 @@ int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr);
struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd);
bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd);
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type);
int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, int path_fd, const char __user *pathname);
int bpf_obj_get_user(int path_fd, const char __user *pathname, int flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index ab48e037d543..f493f14ce6ef 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+ __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
};
/* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1362,6 +1363,8 @@ enum {
/* Get path from provided FD in BPF_OBJ_PIN/BPF_OBJ_GET commands */
BPF_F_PATH_FD = (1U << 14),
+/* BPF token FD is passed in a corresponding command's token_fd field */
+ BPF_F_TOKEN_FD = (1U << 15),
};
/* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
@@ -1435,6 +1438,10 @@ union bpf_attr {
* to using 5 hash functions).
*/
__u64 map_extra;
+ /* BPF token FD to use with BPF_MAP_CREATE operation.
+ * If provided, map_flags should have BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag set.
+ */
+ __s32 map_token_fd;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
index 565be1f3f1ea..034b7e4d8f19 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c
@@ -620,7 +620,8 @@ static int bpf_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
else if (opts->delegate_cmds)
seq_printf(m, ",delegate_cmds=0x%llx", opts->delegate_cmds);
- if (opts->delegate_maps == ~0ULL)
+ mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1;
+ if ((opts->delegate_maps & mask) == mask)
seq_printf(m, ",delegate_maps=any");
else if (opts->delegate_maps)
seq_printf(m, ",delegate_maps=0x%llx", opts->delegate_maps);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 423702f33ba6..65c9feafb02f 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1011,8 +1011,8 @@ int map_check_no_btf(const struct bpf_map *map,
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
-static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
- u32 btf_key_id, u32 btf_value_id)
+static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_token *token,
+ const struct btf *btf, u32 btf_key_id, u32 btf_value_id)
{
const struct btf_type *key_type, *value_type;
u32 key_size, value_size;
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(map->record)) {
int i;
- if (!bpf_capable()) {
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto free_map_tab;
}
@@ -1128,14 +1128,16 @@ static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
return capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
-#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
+#define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
/* called via syscall */
static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
+ struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
u32 map_type = attr->map_type;
struct bpf_map *map;
+ bool token_flag;
int f_flags;
int err;
@@ -1143,6 +1145,12 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (err)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* check BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag, remember if it's set, and then clear it
+ * to avoid per-map type checks tripping on unknown flag
+ */
+ token_flag = attr->map_flags & BPF_F_TOKEN_FD;
+ attr->map_flags &= ~BPF_F_TOKEN_FD;
+
if (attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id) {
if (attr->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
attr->btf_key_type_id || attr->btf_value_type_id)
@@ -1183,14 +1191,32 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (token_flag) {
+ token = bpf_token_get_from_fd(attr->map_token_fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(token))
+ return PTR_ERR(token);
+
+ /* if current token doesn't grant map creation permissions,
+ * then we can't use this token, so ignore it and rely on
+ * system-wide capabilities checks
+ */
+ if (!bpf_token_allow_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE) ||
+ !bpf_token_allow_map_type(token, attr->map_type)) {
+ bpf_token_put(token);
+ token = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = -EPERM;
+
/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
* creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
* on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
* object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
* capability checks are still carried out.
*/
- if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
+ if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+ goto put_token;
/* check privileged map type permissions */
switch (map_type) {
@@ -1223,25 +1249,27 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
- if (!bpf_capable())
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_BPF))
+ goto put_token;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
- if (!bpf_net_capable())
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ goto put_token;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported map type %d", map_type);
- return -EPERM;
+ goto put_token;
}
map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
- if (IS_ERR(map))
- return PTR_ERR(map);
+ if (IS_ERR(map)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(map);
+ goto put_token;
+ }
map->ops = ops;
map->map_type = map_type;
@@ -1278,7 +1306,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
map->btf = btf;
if (attr->btf_value_type_id) {
- err = map_check_btf(map, btf, attr->btf_key_type_id,
+ err = map_check_btf(map, token, btf, attr->btf_key_type_id,
attr->btf_value_type_id);
if (err)
goto free_map;
@@ -1299,6 +1327,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
goto free_map_sec;
bpf_map_save_memcg(map);
+ bpf_token_put(token);
err = bpf_map_new_fd(map, f_flags);
if (err < 0) {
@@ -1319,6 +1348,8 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
free_map:
btf_put(map->btf);
map->ops->map_free(map);
+put_token:
+ bpf_token_put(token);
return err;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c
index e18aaecc67e9..06c34dae658e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/token.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c
@@ -72,6 +72,13 @@ static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\tany\n");
else
seq_printf(m, "allowed_cmds:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_cmds);
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE >= 64);
+ mask = (1ULL << __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE) - 1;
+ if ((token->allowed_maps & mask) == mask)
+ seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\tany\n");
+ else
+ seq_printf(m, "allowed_maps:\t0x%llx\n", token->allowed_maps);
}
#define BPF_TOKEN_INODE_NAME "bpf-token"
@@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
mnt_opts = path.dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
token->allowed_cmds = mnt_opts->delegate_cmds;
+ token->allowed_maps = mnt_opts->delegate_maps;
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0) {
@@ -212,3 +220,11 @@ bool bpf_token_allow_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
return token->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << cmd);
}
+
+bool bpf_token_allow_map_type(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_map_type type)
+{
+ if (!token || type >= __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+ return false;
+
+ return token->allowed_maps & (1ULL << type);
+}
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 57487d0c0b73..f493f14ce6ef 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ enum bpf_map_type {
BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF,
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE,
+ __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE
};
/* Note that tracing related programs such as
@@ -1362,6 +1363,8 @@ enum {
/* Get path from provided FD in BPF_OBJ_PIN/BPF_OBJ_GET commands */
BPF_F_PATH_FD = (1U << 14),
+/* BPF token FD is passed in a corresponding command's token_fd field */
+ BPF_F_TOKEN_FD = (1U << 15),
};
/* Flags for BPF_PROG_QUERY. */
@@ -1435,6 +1438,10 @@ union bpf_attr {
* to using 5 hash functions).
*/
__u64 map_extra;
+ /* BPF token FD to use with BPF_MAP_CREATE operation.
+ * If provided, map_flags should have BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag set.
+ */
+ __s32 map_token_fd;
};
struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_*_ELEM commands */
@@ -6941,6 +6948,7 @@ enum {
BPF_TCP_LISTEN,
BPF_TCP_CLOSING, /* Now a valid state */
BPF_TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV,
+ BPF_TCP_BOUND_INACTIVE,
BPF_TCP_MAX_STATES /* Leave at the end! */
};
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c
index 9f766ddd946a..573249a2814d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_probes.c
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ void test_libbpf_probe_map_types(void)
if (map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_UNSPEC)
continue;
+ if (strcmp(map_type_name, "__MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE") == 0)
+ continue;
if (!test__start_subtest(map_type_name))
continue;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
index eb34d612d6f8..1f328c0d8aff 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_str.c
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ static void test_libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(void)
const char *map_type_str;
char buf[256];
+ if (map_type == __MAX_BPF_MAP_TYPE)
+ continue;
+
map_type_name = btf__str_by_offset(btf, e->name_off);
map_type_str = libbpf_bpf_map_type_str(map_type);
ASSERT_OK_PTR(map_type_str, map_type_name);
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-03 22:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-03 22:20 [PATCH bpf-next 00/29] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/29] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/29] bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/29] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-05 20:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-05 20:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-01-05 20:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-05 22:06 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-05 22:05 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-05 22:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-01-05 21:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-05 22:18 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-08 12:02 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-08 23:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-09 14:52 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-09 19:00 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-10 14:59 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-11 0:42 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-11 10:38 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-11 17:41 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-12 7:58 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-12 18:32 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-12 19:16 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-14 2:29 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-16 16:37 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-08 12:01 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-08 16:45 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-09 0:07 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-10 19:29 ` Paul Moore
2024-01-08 11:44 ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-03 22:20 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/29] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/29] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/29] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/29] bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/29] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/29] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/29] bpf,lsm: add BPF token " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/29] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/29] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-04 19:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-04 19:23 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 14/29] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 15/29] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 16/29] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 17/29] bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 18/29] bpf: fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 19/29] bpf: support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 20/29] selftests/bpf: utilize string values for delegate_xxx " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 21/29] libbpf: split feature detectors definitions from cached results Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 22/29] libbpf: further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 23/29] libbpf: move feature detection code into its own file Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 24/29] libbpf: wire up token_fd into feature probing logic Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 25/29] libbpf: wire up BPF token support at BPF object level Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 26/29] selftests/bpf: add BPF object loading tests with explicit token passing Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 27/29] selftests/bpf: add tests for BPF object load with implicit token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 28/29] libbpf: support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 22:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 29/29] selftests/bpf: add tests for " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-03 23:49 ` [PATCH bpf-next 00/29] BPF token Jakub Kicinski
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