From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <repnop@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 12:09:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240212-gelungen-holzfiguren-3a07655ad780@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <036db535-587a-4e1b-bd44-345af3b51ddf@app.fastmail.com>
On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 12:49:23PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2024, at 12:06, Günther Noack wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 09, 2024 at 06:06:05PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> >
> > The IOCTL command in question is FIONREAD: fs/ioctl.c implements
> > FIONREAD directly for S_ISREG files, but it does call the FIONREAD
> > implementation in the VFS layer for other file types.
> >
> > The question we are asking ourselves is:
> >
> > * Can we let processes safely use FIONREAD for all files which get
> > opened for the purpose of reading, or do we run the risk of
> > accidentally exposing surprising IOCTL implementations which have
> > completely different purposes?
> >
> > Is it safe to assume that the VFS layer FIONREAD implementations are
> > actually implementing FIONREAD semantics?
Yes, otherwise this should considered a bug.
> >
> > * I know there have been accidental collisions of IOCTL command
> > numbers in the past -- Hypothetically, if this were to happen in one
> > of the VFS implementations of FIONREAD, would that be considered a
> > bug that would need to get fixed in that implementation?
>
> Clearly it's impossible to be sure no driver has a conflict
> on this particular ioctl, but the risk for one intentionally
> overriding it should be fairly low.
>
> There are a couple of possible issues I can think of:
>
> - the numeric value of FIONREAD is different depending
> on the architecture, with at least four different numbers
> aliasing to it. This is probably harmless but makes it
> harder to look for accidental conflicts.
>
> - Aside from FIONREAD, it is sometimes called SIOCINQ
> (for sockets) or TIOCINQ (for tty). These still go
> through the same VFS entry point and as far as I can
> tell always have the same semantics (writing 4 bytes
> of data with the count of the remaining bytes in the
> fd).
>
> - There are probably a couple of drivers that do something
> in their ioctl handler without actually looking at
> the command number.
>
> If you want to be really sure you get this right, you
> could add a new callback to struct file_operations
> that handles this for all drivers, something like
>
> static int ioctl_fionread(struct file *filp, int __user *arg)
> {
> int n;
>
> if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
> return put_user(i_size_read(inode) - filp->f_pos, arg);
>
> if (!file->f_op->fionread)
> return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
>
> n = file->f_op->fionread(filp);
>
> if (n < 0)
> return n;
>
> return put_user(n, arg);
> }
>
> With this, you can go through any driver implementing
> FIONREAD/SIOCINQ/TIOCINQ and move the code from .ioctl
> into .fionread. This probably results in cleaner code
> overall, especially in drivers that have no other ioctl
> commands besides this one.
>
> Since sockets and ttys tend to have both SIOCINQ/TIOCINQ
> and SIOCOUTQ/TIOCOUTQ (unlike regular files), it's
I'm not excited about adding a bunch of methods to struct
file_operations for this stuff.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-12 11:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-09 17:06 [PATCH v9 0/8] Landlock: IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:06 ` Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:49 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-12 11:09 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-02-12 22:10 ` Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:18 ` Günther Noack
2024-02-16 14:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-16 15:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-18 8:34 ` Günther Noack
2024-02-19 21:44 ` Günther Noack
2024-02-16 17:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-19 18:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-19 18:35 ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add vfs_masks_device_ioctl*() helpers Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 13:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 16:24 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-01 18:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-05 18:13 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-06 13:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-06 15:18 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 12:15 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-07 12:21 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 12:57 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-07 20:40 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-07 23:09 ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-07 23:35 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08 7:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-08 9:29 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-08 19:22 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08 20:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-08 22:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-08 22:25 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-09 8:14 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-09 17:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-11 19:04 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08 11:03 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-11 1:03 ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-11 9:01 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-11 22:12 ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-12 10:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-28 12:57 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right Günther Noack
2024-03-01 12:59 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 13:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] landlock: Document IOCTL support Günther Noack
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240212-gelungen-holzfiguren-3a07655ad780@brauner \
--to=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=allenwebb@google.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=dtor@google.com \
--cc=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@google.com \
--cc=jorgelo@chromium.org \
--cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=repnop@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox