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From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
	"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
	"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
	"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <repnop@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 12:09:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240212-gelungen-holzfiguren-3a07655ad780@brauner> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <036db535-587a-4e1b-bd44-345af3b51ddf@app.fastmail.com>

On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 12:49:23PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2024, at 12:06, Günther Noack wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 09, 2024 at 06:06:05PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> >
> > The IOCTL command in question is FIONREAD: fs/ioctl.c implements
> > FIONREAD directly for S_ISREG files, but it does call the FIONREAD
> > implementation in the VFS layer for other file types.
> >
> > The question we are asking ourselves is:
> >
> > * Can we let processes safely use FIONREAD for all files which get
> >   opened for the purpose of reading, or do we run the risk of
> >   accidentally exposing surprising IOCTL implementations which have
> >   completely different purposes?
> >
> >   Is it safe to assume that the VFS layer FIONREAD implementations are
> >   actually implementing FIONREAD semantics?

Yes, otherwise this should considered a bug.

> >
> > * I know there have been accidental collisions of IOCTL command
> >   numbers in the past -- Hypothetically, if this were to happen in one
> >   of the VFS implementations of FIONREAD, would that be considered a
> >   bug that would need to get fixed in that implementation?
> 
> Clearly it's impossible to be sure no driver has a conflict
> on this particular ioctl, but the risk for one intentionally
> overriding it should be fairly low.
> 
> There are a couple of possible issues I can think of:
> 
> - the numeric value of FIONREAD is different depending
>   on the architecture, with at least four different numbers
>   aliasing to it. This is probably harmless but makes it
>   harder to look for accidental conflicts.
> 
> - Aside from FIONREAD, it is sometimes called SIOCINQ
>   (for sockets) or TIOCINQ (for tty). These still go
>   through the same VFS entry point and as far as I can
>   tell always have the same semantics (writing 4 bytes
>   of data with the count of the remaining bytes in the
>   fd).
> 
> - There are probably a couple of drivers that do something
>   in their ioctl handler without actually looking at
>   the command number.
> 
> If you want to be really sure you get this right, you
> could add a new callback to struct file_operations
> that handles this for all drivers, something like
> 
> static int ioctl_fionread(struct file *filp, int __user *arg)
> {
>      int n;
> 
>      if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
>          return put_user(i_size_read(inode) - filp->f_pos, arg);
> 
>      if (!file->f_op->fionread)
>          return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
> 
>      n = file->f_op->fionread(filp);
> 
>      if (n < 0)
>          return n;
> 
>      return put_user(n, arg);
> }
> 
> With this, you can go through any driver implementing
> FIONREAD/SIOCINQ/TIOCINQ and move the code from .ioctl
> into .fionread. This probably results in cleaner code
> overall, especially in drivers that have no other ioctl
> commands besides this one.
> 
> Since sockets and ttys tend to have both SIOCINQ/TIOCINQ
> and SIOCOUTQ/TIOCOUTQ (unlike regular files), it's

I'm not excited about adding a bunch of methods to struct
file_operations for this stuff.

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-12 11:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-09 17:06 [PATCH v9 0/8] Landlock: IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:06   ` Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-02-12 11:09       ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2024-02-12 22:10         ` Günther Noack
2024-02-10 11:18   ` Günther Noack
2024-02-16 14:11     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-16 15:51       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-18  8:34         ` Günther Noack
2024-02-19 21:44           ` Günther Noack
2024-02-16 17:19   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-19 18:34   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-19 18:35     ` [RFC PATCH] fs: Add vfs_masks_device_ioctl*() helpers Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 13:42       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 16:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-01 18:35         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-05 18:13       ` Günther Noack
2024-03-06 13:47         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-06 15:18           ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 12:15             ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-07 12:21               ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-07 12:57                 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-07 20:40                   ` Paul Moore
2024-03-07 23:09                     ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-07 23:35                       ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08  7:02                       ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-08  9:29                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-08 19:22                           ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08 20:12                             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-08 22:04                               ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-08 22:25                               ` Paul Moore
2024-03-09  8:14                                 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-09 17:41                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2024-03-11 19:04                                   ` Paul Moore
2024-03-08 11:03                         ` Günther Noack
2024-03-11  1:03                           ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-11  9:01                             ` Günther Noack
2024-03-11 22:12                               ` Dave Chinner
2024-03-12 10:58                                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-28 12:57     ` [PATCH v9 1/8] landlock: Add IOCTL access right Günther Noack
2024-03-01 12:59       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-01 13:38         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL Günther Noack
2024-02-09 17:06 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] landlock: Document IOCTL support Günther Noack

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