From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 15:24:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202402141453.FEC8EF722@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240214160538.1086089-1-jannh@google.com>
On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 05:05:38PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to
> out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input:
> `lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and,
> redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on
> `lctx->ctx_len`.
> Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a
> value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len`
> will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM
> modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses.
Ugh. Thanks for catching this. I continue to want to get the unsigned
integer overflow sanitizer rolled out, which would have caught this.
>
> The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is
> loaded as an LSM):
> ```
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <stdint.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
>
> struct lsm_ctx {
> uint64_t id;
> uint64_t flags;
> uint64_t len;
> uint64_t ctx_len;
> char ctx[];
> };
>
> int main(void) {
> size_t size = sizeof(struct lsm_ctx);
> struct lsm_ctx *ctx = malloc(size);
> ctx->id = 104/*LSM_ID_APPARMOR*/;
> ctx->flags = 0;
> ctx->len = size;
> ctx->ctx_len = -sizeof(struct lsm_ctx);
> syscall(
> 460/*__NR_lsm_set_self_attr*/,
> /*attr=*/ 100/*LSM_ATTR_CURRENT*/,
> /*ctx=*/ ctx,
> /*size=*/ size,
> /*flags=*/ 0
> );
> }
> ```
>
> (I'm including an ASAN splat in the patch notes sent to the list.)
>
> Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> ASAN splat from the reproducer:
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_setattr (security/apparmor/lsm.c:860)
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff888006163abf by task setselfattr/548
I'd rather prefer that this splat (or some portion of it) stay in the
actual commit log. It makes it easier to scan for sanitizer-related
fixes, etc.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-14 23:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-14 16:05 [PATCH] security: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall Jann Horn
2024-02-14 16:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-02-15 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-15 13:02 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-14 18:53 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-14 23:24 ` Kees Cook [this message]
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