From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz,
chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
eric.snowberg@oracle.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, shuah@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:31:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240215103113.2369171-13-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240215103113.2369171-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and
extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on
the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log.
LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the
access mask requested with open().
The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
fs/namei.c | 2 ++
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++++++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 4e0de939fea1..ef867f1d6704 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3639,6 +3639,8 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
error = may_open(idmap, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
+ if (!error)
+ error = security_file_post_open(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error)
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error && do_truncate)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index b7c7a9273ea0..e44d8239545b 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ __nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type,
goto out;
}
+ host_err = security_file_post_open(file, may_flags);
+ if (host_err) {
+ fput(file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags);
if (host_err) {
fput(file);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index f849f7d5bb53..3c84942d2818 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 84ae03690340..97f2212c13b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
@@ -1074,6 +1075,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_truncate(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0f0f2c11ef73..5b442032c273 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2967,6 +2967,23 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)
return fsnotify_open_perm(file);
}
+/**
+ * security_file_post_open() - Evaluate a file after it has been opened
+ * @file: the file
+ * @mask: access mask
+ *
+ * Evaluate an opened file and the access mask requested with open(). The hook
+ * is useful for LSMs that require the file content to be available in order to
+ * make decisions.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_post_open, 0, file, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_post_open);
+
/**
* security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed
* @file: file
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 10:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-15 10:30 [PATCH v10 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:30 ` [PATCH v10 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 16:09 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 0:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 20/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 21/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 22/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 23/25] evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 24/25] ima: " Roberto Sassu
2024-02-15 10:31 ` [PATCH v10 25/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 4:43 ` [PATCH v10 0/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2024-02-16 7:54 ` Roberto Sassu
2024-02-16 22:34 ` [PATCH v10 00/25] " Eric Snowberg
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