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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>,
	Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 02:12:26 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202403050211.86A44769@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240305-kontakt-ticken-77fc8f02be1d@brauner>

On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 10:58:25AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Since the write handler for /proc/<pid>/mem does raise FOLL_FORCE
> unconditionally it likely would implicitly. But I'm not familiar enough
> with FOLL_FORCE to say for sure.

I should phrase the question better. :) Is the supervisor writing into
read-only regions of the child process?

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-05 10:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-01 21:34 [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-01 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2024-03-02 10:31   ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:06   ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:42     ` Kees Cook
2024-03-04 13:20 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 13:48   ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 14:05     ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-04 14:35       ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-04 17:56         ` Kees Cook
2024-03-04 17:49   ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05  8:59     ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05  9:41       ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05  9:58         ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 10:12           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-03-05 10:32             ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 18:37               ` Kees Cook
2024-03-05 19:34                 ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-03-05 19:38                   ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:31                 ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 11:03           ` Christian Brauner
2024-03-05 18:33             ` Kees Cook
2024-03-06 10:49             ` Matt Denton
2024-03-05 15:38         ` Adrian Ratiu

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