From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <repnop@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 13:39:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240325134004.4074874-2-gnoack@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240325134004.4074874-1-gnoack@google.com>
If security_file_ioctl or security_file_ioctl_compat return
ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic in fs/ioctl.c will permit the given IOCTL
command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly
in fs/ioctl.c and does not use the f_ops->unhandled_ioctl or
f_ops->compat_ioctl operations, which are defined by the given file.
The possible return values for security_file_ioctl and
security_file_ioctl_compat are now:
* 0 - to permit the IOCTL
* ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall
back to the file implementation.
* any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that error
This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2],
and implements the proposal from [3].
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240309075320.160128-2-gnoack@google.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322151002.3653639-2-gnoack@google.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32b1164e-9d5f-40c0-9a4e-001b2c9b822f@app.fastmail.com/ [3]
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
---
fs/ioctl.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++--
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ioctl.c b/fs/ioctl.c
index 76cf22ac97d7..8244354ad04d 100644
--- a/fs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ioctl.c
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int do_vfs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int fd,
case FIONREAD:
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return vfs_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg);
+ return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
return put_user(i_size_read(inode) - filp->f_pos,
(int __user *)argp);
@@ -858,17 +858,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd, unsigned long, arg)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int error;
+ bool use_file_ops = true;
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
error = security_file_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
- if (error)
+ if (error == -ENOFILEOPS)
+ use_file_ops = false;
+ else if (error)
goto out;
error = do_vfs_ioctl(f.file, fd, cmd, arg);
- if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
- error = vfs_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
+ if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD) {
+ if (use_file_ops)
+ error = vfs_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
+ else
+ error = -EACCES;
+ }
out:
fdput(f);
@@ -916,12 +923,15 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd,
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int error;
+ bool use_file_ops = true;
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
error = security_file_ioctl_compat(f.file, cmd, arg);
- if (error)
+ if (error == -ENOFILEOPS)
+ use_file_ops = false;
+ else if (error)
goto out;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -967,6 +977,11 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd,
if (error != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
break;
+ if (!use_file_ops) {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+
if (f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl)
error = f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d0eb20f90b26..b769dc888d07 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -248,6 +248,12 @@ static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = {
__kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify)
};
+/*
+ * Returned by security_file_ioctl and security_file_ioctl_compat to indicate
+ * that the IOCTL request may not be dispatched to the file's f_ops IOCTL impl.
+ */
+#define ENOFILEOPS 532
+
static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
{
if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7035ee35a393..000c54a1e541 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2719,7 +2719,10 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
* value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used
* by the security module.
*
- * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. Returns -ENOFILEOPS if
+ * permission is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by
+ * f_ops->unlocked_ioctl(). Returns another negative error code is
+ * permission is denied.
*/
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
@@ -2736,7 +2739,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
* Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit
* processes running on 64-bit kernels.
*
- * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. Returns -ENOFILEOPS if permission
+ * is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by
+ * f_ops->compat_ioctl(). Returns another negative error code is
+ * permission is denied.
*/
int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
--
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-25 13:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-25 13:39 [PATCH v12 0/9] Landlock: IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2024-03-25 14:28 ` [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks Günther Noack
2024-03-25 15:19 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26 8:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26 9:33 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26 10:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26 11:58 ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26 13:09 ` Günther Noack
2024-03-26 14:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26 18:52 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 2/9] landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 3/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 4/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 5/9] selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 7/9] selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 8/9] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 9/9] landlock: Document IOCTL support Günther Noack
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