From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Felix Fu <fuzhen5@huawei.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling
Date: Sat, 4 May 2024 15:38:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240504203820.GA1488570@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18f45490f18.28a4.85c95baa4474aabc7814e68940a78392@paul-moore.com>
On Sat, May 04, 2024 at 04:26:24PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On May 4, 2024 1:04:57 PM Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > Hm, so if it should happen that lsm 2 returns 0 (allow) but lsm 3
> > has skipcap return 3, and lsm 3 would have returned
> > 1 to deny the remove, we will get an unexpected result. It feels like
> > we need a stronger tie between the lsm which allowed and the one
> > saying skip the capability check.
>
> That's not an unexpected result, that is a valid outcome in the world of LSM
> stacking. The skipcap check only guarantees that the capability check will
> be skipped if an LSM returns a non-zero value. The vast majority (all?) of
> the hooks operate as you describe: a LSM towards the back of the list can
> reject an operation that was previous LSM has allowed. This isn't limited
> to LSMs either, there are plenty of reasons, e.g. transient failures, which
> could cause an operation to fail after being authorized by a particular LSM.
>
> A particular LSM can only authorize a requested operation; a successful
> return value from a LSM hook implementation can not guarantee a successful
> operation result.
Ok, thanks.
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-04 20:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-03 0:58 [RFC PATCH] lsm: fixup the inode xattr capability handling Paul Moore
2024-05-03 15:26 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-03 15:36 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-03 15:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-03 16:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-03 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-05-06 20:51 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-07 19:17 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-03 22:32 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-04 17:04 ` Serge Hallyn
2024-05-04 20:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-04 20:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2024-07-05 20:28 ` KP Singh
2024-07-06 4:31 ` Paul Moore
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