From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, jackmanb@google.com,
renauld@google.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org,
revest@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v10 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 19:35:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202405071930.A3022BFDC7@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTWB+zL-cqNGFOfW_LsPHp3=ddoHkjUTq+NoSj7BdRvmw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, May 07, 2024 at 09:45:09PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> I don't want individual LSMs manipulating the LSM hook state directly;
> they go through the LSM layer to register their hooks, they should go
> through the LSM layer to unregister or enable/disable their hooks.
> I'm going to be pretty inflexible on this point.
No other LSMs unregister or disable hooks. :) Let's drop patch 5; 1-4
stand alone.
> Honestly, I see this more as a problem in the BPF LSM design (although
> one might argue it's an implementation issue?), just as I saw the
> SELinux runtime disable as a problem. If you're upset with the
> runtime hook disable, and you should be, fix the BPF LSM, don't force
> more bad architecture on the LSM layer.
We'll have to come back to this later. It's a separate (but closely
related) issue.
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-08 2:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-07 22:10 [PATCH bpf-next v10 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2024-05-07 22:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v10 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2024-05-07 22:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v10 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2024-05-07 22:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v10 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2024-05-07 22:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v10 4/5] security: Update non standard hooks to use " KP Singh
2024-05-07 22:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v10 5/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2024-05-08 0:01 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-08 1:45 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-08 2:35 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-05-09 20:08 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-08 7:00 ` KP Singh
2024-05-08 7:48 ` Kees Cook
2024-05-09 20:24 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-10 13:23 ` KP Singh
2024-05-15 16:08 ` KP Singh
2024-05-15 16:44 ` KP Singh
2024-05-15 16:57 ` Casey Schaufler
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