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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	 Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	 jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,  linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [lsm?] general protection fault in hook_inode_free_security
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 09:31:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240516.doyox6Iengou@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240515.Yoo5chaiNai9@digikod.net>

Adding membarrier experts.

On Wed, May 15, 2024 at 05:12:58PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Thu, May 09, 2024 at 08:01:49PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, May 8, 2024 at 3:32 PM syzbot
> > <syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > syzbot found the following issue on:
> > >
> > > HEAD commit:    dccb07f2914c Merge tag 'for-6.9-rc7-tag' of git://git.kern..
> > > git tree:       upstream
> > > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14a46760980000
> > > kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6d14c12b661fb43
> > > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5446fbf332b0602ede0b
> > > compiler:       Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
> > >
> > > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.
> > >
> > > Downloadable assets:
> > > disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/39d66018d8ad/disk-dccb07f2.raw.xz
> > > vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c160b651d1bc/vmlinux-dccb07f2.xz
> > > kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/3662a33ac713/bzImage-dccb07f2.xz
> > >
> > > IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > > Reported-by: syzbot+5446fbf332b0602ede0b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > >
> > > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc018f62f515: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
> > > KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000c7b17a8a8-0x0000000c7b17a8af]
> > > CPU: 1 PID: 5102 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-00012-gdccb07f2914c #0
> > > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024
> > > RIP: 0010:hook_inode_free_security+0x5b/0xb0 security/landlock/fs.c:1047
> > 
> > Possibly a Landlock issue, Mickaël?
> 
> It looks like security_inode_free() is called two times on the same
> inode.  This could happen if an inode labeled by Landlock is put
> concurrently with release_inode() for a closed ruleset or with
> hook_sb_delete().  I didn't find any race condition that could lead to
> two calls to iput() though.  Could WRITE_ONCE(object->underobj, NULL)
> change anything even if object->lock is locked?
> 
> A bit unrelated but looking at the SELinux code, I see that selinux_inode()
> checks `!inode->i_security`.  In which case could this happen?
> 
> > 
> > > Code: 8a fd 48 8b 1b 48 c7 c0 c4 4e d5 8d 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 75 3e 48 63 05 33 59 65 09 48 01 c3 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 30 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 66 be 8a fd 48 83 3b 00 75 0d e8
> > > RSP: 0018:ffffc9000307f9a8 EFLAGS: 00010212
> > > RAX: 000000018f62f515 RBX: 0000000c7b17a8a8 RCX: ffff888027668000
> > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff88805c0bb270
> > > RBP: ffffffff8c01fb00 R08: ffffffff82132a15 R09: 1ffff1100b81765f
> > > R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff846ff540 R12: dffffc0000000000
> > > R13: 1ffff1100b817683 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
> > > FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > > CR2: 00007f43c42de000 CR3: 00000000635f8000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
> > > Call Trace:
> > >  <TASK>
> > >  security_inode_free+0x4a/0xd0 security/security.c:1613
> > >  __destroy_inode+0x2d9/0x650 fs/inode.c:286
> > >  destroy_inode fs/inode.c:309 [inline]
> > >  evict+0x521/0x630 fs/inode.c:682
> > >  dispose_list fs/inode.c:700 [inline]
> > >  evict_inodes+0x5f9/0x690 fs/inode.c:750
> > >  generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2d0 fs/super.c:626
> > >  kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1675
> > >  deactivate_locked_super+0xc6/0x130 fs/super.c:472
> > >  cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1267
> > >  task_work_run+0x251/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:180
> > >  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
> > >  do_exit+0xa1b/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:878
> > >  do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
> > >  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1038 [inline]
> > >  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1036 [inline]
> > >  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1036
> > >  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
> > >  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
> > >  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> > > RIP: 0033:0x7f731567dd69
> > > Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f731567dd3f.
> > > RSP: 002b:00007fff4f0804d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
> > > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f73156c93a3 RCX: 00007f731567dd69
> > > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
> > > RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00007fff4f07e277 R09: 00007fff4f081790
> > > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff4f081790
> > > R13: 00007f73156c937e R14: 00000000000154d0 R15: 000000000000001e
> > >  </TASK>
> > > Modules linked in:
> > > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> > 
> > -- 
> > paul-moore.com
> > 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-16  7:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-08 19:32 [syzbot] [lsm?] general protection fault in hook_inode_free_security syzbot
2024-05-10  0:01 ` Paul Moore
2024-05-15 15:12   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-05-16  7:31     ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2024-05-16 13:07       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2024-06-27 13:33         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-06-27 13:34       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-06-27 18:12         ` Kees Cook
2024-06-27 18:45           ` Paul E. McKenney
2024-06-27 19:29           ` Paul Moore
2024-07-08 14:02           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:25             ` Kees Cook
2024-07-09  5:12             ` Christian Brauner
2024-06-27 18:28         ` Paul Moore
2024-07-08 14:11           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 22:32             ` Paul Moore
2024-07-09  5:46             ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-09 23:13               ` Paul Moore
2024-07-10  5:52             ` Christian Brauner
2024-07-10 12:23           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 13:53             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 21:22             ` Paul Moore
2024-07-11  0:30           ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-07-11 14:06             ` Paul Moore

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