From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
brauner@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
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Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] capabilities: Add securebit to restrict userns caps
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 08:05:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240610130540.GC2193924@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <svpbmv37f5n537seb3cfsylnlzi6ftuad4dqi5unoycylmcf7r@6knq7sibdw7w>
On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at 02:46:06AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 09:33:01PM GMT, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Sun, Jun 09, 2024 at 03:43:35AM -0700, Jonathan Calmels wrote:
> > > This patch adds a new capability security bit designed to constrain a
> > > task’s userns capability set to its bounding set. The reason for this is
> > > twofold:
> > >
> > > - This serves as a quick and easy way to lock down a set of capabilities
> > > for a task, thus ensuring that any namespace it creates will never be
> > > more privileged than itself is.
> > > - This helps userspace transition to more secure defaults by not requiring
> > > specific logic for the userns capability set, or libcap support.
> > >
> > > Example:
> > >
> > > # capsh --secbits=$((1 << 8)) --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- \
> > > -c 'unshare -r grep Cap /proc/self/status'
> > > CapInh: 0000000000000000
> > > CapPrm: 000001fffffdffff
> > > CapEff: 000001fffffdffff
> > > CapBnd: 000001fffffdffff
> > > CapAmb: 0000000000000000
> > > CapUNs: 000001fffffdffff
> >
> > But you are not (that I can see, in this or the previous patch)
> > keeping SECURE_USERNS_STRICT_CAPS in securebits on the next
> > level unshare. Though I think it's ok, because by then both
> > cap_userns and cap_bset are reduced and cap_userns can't be
> > expanded. (Sorry, just thinking aloud here)
>
> Right this is safe to reset, but maybe we do keep it if the secbit is
> locked? This is kind of a special case compared to the other bits.
I don't think it would be worth the extra complication in the
secbits code, and it's semantically very different from the
cap_userns.
> > > + /* Limit userns capabilities to our parent's bounding set. */
> >
> > In the case of userns_install(), it will be the target user namespace
> > creator's bounding set, right? Not "our parent's"?
>
> Good point, I should reword this comment.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-10 13:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-09 10:43 [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce user namespace capabilities Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] capabilities: Add " Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 1:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 8:47 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 12:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 13:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-11 8:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-15 15:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capabilities: Add securebit to restrict userns caps Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 2:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 9:46 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 13:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2024-06-28 14:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-28 14:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] capabilities: Add sysctl to mask off " Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] bpf,lsm: Allow editing capabilities in BPF-LSM hooks Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 0:18 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-11 8:09 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-11 10:31 ` John Johansen
2024-06-11 19:01 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-11 22:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-11 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-12 8:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-12 17:29 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-13 3:54 ` John Johansen
2024-06-13 8:50 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-13 20:55 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-15 15:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-13 10:45 ` Dr. Greg
2024-06-13 20:43 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-10 20:12 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce user namespace capabilities Josef Bacik
2024-06-11 8:33 ` Jonathan Calmels
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