From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs,security: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2024 19:44:55 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202408131900.xhbYFHR4-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240812144936.1616628-1-mic@digikod.net>
Hi Mickaël,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on pcmoore-selinux/next]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.11-rc3]
[cannot apply to brauner-vfs/vfs.all next-20240813]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Micka-l-Sala-n/fs-security-Fix-file_set_fowner-LSM-hook-inconsistencies/20240813-004648
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git next
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812144936.1616628-1-mic%40digikod.net
patch subject: [PATCH] fs,security: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
config: x86_64-randconfig-122-20240813 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240813/202408131900.xhbYFHR4-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-11 (Debian 11.3.0-12) 11.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240813/202408131900.xhbYFHR4-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408131900.xhbYFHR4-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> fs/file_table.c:153:25: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred @@ got struct cred const * @@
fs/file_table.c:153:25: sparse: expected struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred
fs/file_table.c:153:25: sparse: got struct cred const *
>> fs/file_table.c:157:36: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred @@
fs/file_table.c:157:36: sparse: expected struct cred const *cred
fs/file_table.c:157:36: sparse: got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred @@
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: expected struct cred const *cred
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred @@
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: expected struct cred const *cred
fs/file_table.c:69:28: sparse: got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *cred
vim +153 fs/file_table.c
147
148 static int init_file(struct file *f, int flags, const struct cred *cred)
149 {
150 int error;
151
152 f->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
> 153 f->f_owner.cred = get_cred(cred);
154 error = security_file_alloc(f);
155 if (unlikely(error)) {
156 put_cred(f->f_cred);
> 157 put_cred(f->f_owner.cred);
158 return error;
159 }
160
161 rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock);
162 spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock);
163 mutex_init(&f->f_pos_lock);
164 f->f_flags = flags;
165 f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(flags);
166 /* f->f_version: 0 */
167
168 /*
169 * We're SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU so initialize f_count last. While
170 * fget-rcu pattern users need to be able to handle spurious
171 * refcount bumps we should reinitialize the reused file first.
172 */
173 atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1);
174 return 0;
175 }
176
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-13 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-06 18:10 [PATCH v2 0/4] Landlock: Signal Scoping Support Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-06 18:10 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] Landlock: Add signal control Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-06 18:56 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-06 21:55 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-07 18:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-07 23:36 ` Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-08 1:10 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-08 14:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-08 14:42 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-09 10:59 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 12:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 12:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 12:44 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-09 13:17 ` f_modown and LSM inconsistency (was [PATCH v2 1/4] Landlock: Add signal control) Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 14:00 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-09 14:44 ` Christian Brauner
2024-08-11 22:04 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-12 13:09 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-12 14:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-12 14:57 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-12 15:06 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-12 16:30 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-12 17:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-12 18:17 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-12 14:49 ` [PATCH] fs,security: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-12 15:00 ` Paul Moore
2024-08-13 1:32 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-13 1:42 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-13 1:42 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-13 11:44 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-08-09 13:37 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] Landlock: Add signal control Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 13:57 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-06 22:00 ` Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-06 22:55 ` Jann Horn
2024-08-06 18:10 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] selftest/Landlock: Signal restriction tests Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-06 18:10 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] sample/Landlock: Support signal scoping restriction Tahera Fahimi
2024-08-06 18:10 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Landlock: Document LANDLOCK_SCOPED_SIGNAL Tahera Fahimi
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