From: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huaweicloud.com>
To: dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, chenridong@huawei.com
Subject: [PATCH v2] security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 12:46:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241008124639.70000-1-chenridong@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
From: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
KASAN reports an out of bounds read:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410
security/keys/permission.c:54
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362
CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline]
dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400
__kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560
kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585
__kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline]
uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline]
key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54
search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793
This issue was also reported by syzbot [1].
It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [2]):
1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the
pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'.
2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1.
The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened:
1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the
slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta
and node->back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to
descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root,
and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a
keyring.
2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function.
However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as
ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK.
3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT
has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits
NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that
all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a
shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points
to a shortcut.
NODE A
+------>+---+
ROOT | | 0 | xxe6
+---+ | +---+
xxxx | 0 | shortcut : : xxe6
+---+ | +---+
xxe6 : : | | | xxe6
+---+ | +---+
| 6 |---+ : : xxe6
+---+ +---+
xxe6 : : | f | xxe6
+---+ +---+
xxe6 | f |
+---+
4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut,
it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read
out-of-bounds read.
To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a
shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
---
security/keys/keyring.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 4448758f643a..f331725d5a37 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -772,8 +772,11 @@ static bool search_nested_keyrings(struct key *keyring,
for (; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) {
ptr = READ_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
- if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr) && node->back_pointer)
- goto descend_to_node;
+ if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
+ if (node->back_pointer ||
+ assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr))
+ goto descend_to_node;
+ }
if (!keyring_ptr_is_keyring(ptr))
continue;
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2024-10-08 12:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-08 12:46 Chen Ridong [this message]
2024-10-16 1:33 ` [PATCH v2] security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission Chen Ridong
2024-10-16 5:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-16 5:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 1:19 ` Chen Ridong
2024-10-17 8:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241008124639.70000-1-chenridong@huaweicloud.com \
--to=chenridong@huaweicloud.com \
--cc=chenridong@huawei.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).