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Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 09:50:37 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>,
	Tadeusz Struk <tstruk@gigaio.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>,
	Saulo Alessandre <saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br>,
	Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
	Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>,
	Marek Behun <kabel@kernel.org>,
	Varad Gautam <varadgautam@google.com>,
	Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
	Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg
 backend
Message-ID: <20241025165037.GA1141@sol.localdomain>
References: <cover.1725972333.git.lukas@wunner.de>
 <743afd4f298a3fad03e42ab46f913d1f51cb8b7c.1725972335.git.lukas@wunner.de>
 <2ed09a22-86c0-4cf0-8bda-ef804ccb3413@gmail.com>
 <ZxalYZwH5UiGX5uj@wunner.de>
 <9c33d208-168c-4af7-a155-9571872ede4d@gmail.com>
 <ZxtF7qVpAuX6YMXa@wunner.de>
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In-Reply-To: <ZxtF7qVpAuX6YMXa@wunner.de>

On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 09:17:02AM +0200, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> So below is a new patch which reinstates support for these legacy
> protocols.  It should also fix the issue you're seeing with TLS 1.2
> or newer (which is caused by invoking KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY without
> specifying a hash algorithm).
[...]
> I've looked at the source code of wpa_supplicant as well as
> various IKEv1 daemons (strongswan, libreswan, isakmpd, raccoon)
> and none of them seems to use the kernel's Key Retention Service,
> so iwd is the only known user space application affected so far.

Yes, based on historical mailing list discussions it appears that KEYCTL_PKEY_*
were added to the kernel for iwd, and iwd is their only user.  This design is a
huge mistake both on the part of iwd and the kernel community, for a variety of
reasons that have already been covered extensively in the discussions that occur
each time iwd breaks.  iwd should be using a real crypto library, like all the
other wireless daemons.

- Eric