From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ben Scarlato" <akhna@google.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Charles Zaffery" <czaffery@roblox.com>,
"Francis Laniel" <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@google.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Phil Sutter" <phil@nwl.cc>,
"Praveen K Paladugu" <prapal@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Robert Salvet" <robert.salvet@roblox.com>,
"Shervin Oloumi" <enlightened@google.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 17/23] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 15:33:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241122143353.59367-18-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241122143353.59367-1-mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support to socket_bind and socket_connect hooks.
Audit event sample:
type=LL_DENY [...]: domain=195ba459b blockers=net_connect_tcp daddr=127.0.0.1 dest=80
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122143353.59367-18-mic@digikod.net
---
Changes since v2:
- Remove potentially superfluous IPv6 saddr log, spotted by Francis
Laniel.
- Cosmetic improvements.
---
security/landlock/audit.c | 12 +++++++++
security/landlock/audit.h | 1 +
security/landlock/net.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index e51c8ea14aec..0b69b4c9ba1c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ static const char *const fs_access_strings[] = {
static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+static const char *const net_access_strings[] = {
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)] = "net_bind_tcp",
+ [BIT_INDEX(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)] = "net_connect_tcp",
+};
+
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings) == LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
+
static __attribute_const__ const char *
get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
const unsigned long access_bit)
@@ -59,6 +66,11 @@ get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(fs_access_strings)))
return "unknown";
return fs_access_strings[access_bit];
+
+ case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS:
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit >= ARRAY_SIZE(net_access_strings)))
+ return "unknown";
+ return net_access_strings[access_bit];
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
index 320394fd6b84..1075b0c8401f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ enum landlock_request_type {
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE = 1,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_LAYOUT,
LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_ACCESS,
+ LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
};
/*
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index d5dcc4407a19..45c80fa417c4 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@
*/
#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include "audit.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
#include "limits.h"
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
landlock_get_applicable_domain(landlock_get_current_domain(),
any_net);
+ struct lsm_network_audit audit_net = {};
+ struct landlock_request request = {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
+ };
if (!dom)
return 0;
@@ -73,18 +79,48 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
- case AF_INET:
+ case AF_INET: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr4;
+
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
+
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ port = addr4->sin_port;
+
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
+ audit_net.dport = port;
+ audit_net.v4info.daddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ audit_net.sport = port;
+ audit_net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
break;
+ }
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- case AF_INET6:
+ case AF_INET6: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
- port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
+
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ port = addr6->sin6_port;
+
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) {
+ audit_net.dport = port;
+ audit_net.v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+ } else if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ audit_net.sport = port;
+ audit_net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
break;
+ }
#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
default:
@@ -153,6 +189,13 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
return 0;
+ audit_net.family = address->sa_family;
+ request.audit.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+ request.audit.u.net = &audit_net;
+ request.access = access_request;
+ request.layer_masks = &layer_masks;
+ request.layer_masks_size = ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks);
+ landlock_log_denial(dom, &request);
return -EACCES;
}
--
2.47.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-22 14:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-22 14:33 [PATCH v3 00/23] Landlock audit support Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/23] lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-04 16:47 ` [PATCH v3 1/23] " Paul Moore
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/23] lsm: Add audit_log_lsm_data() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-05 1:23 ` [PATCH v3 2/23] " Paul Moore
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/23] landlock: Factor out check_access_path() Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/23] landlock: Add unique ID generator Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/23] landlock: Move access types Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 06/23] landlock: Simplify initially denied access rights Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/23] landlock: Move domain hierarchy management Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/23] landlock: Log ptrace denials Mickaël Salaün
2024-12-20 14:36 ` Francis Laniel
2024-12-24 14:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-05 1:23 ` [PATCH v3 8/23] " Paul Moore
2025-01-06 14:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 09/23] audit: Add a new audit_get_ctime() helper Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-05 1:23 ` [PATCH v3 9/23] " Paul Moore
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/23] landlock: Log domain properties and release Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-05 1:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 14:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-06 21:56 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-07 14:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/23] landlock: Log mount-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/23] landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/23] selftests/landlock: Add test to check partial access in a mount tree Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/23] landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/23] landlock: Log file-related denials Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/23] landlock: Log truncate and ioctl denials Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2025-01-05 1:23 ` [PATCH v3 17/23] landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials Paul Moore
2025-01-06 14:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-06 22:29 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-07 14:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/23] landlock: Log scoped denials Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-05 1:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 14:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-06 22:33 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-07 14:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 19/23] landlock: Control log events with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOGLESS Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 20/23] samples/landlock: Do not log denials from the sandboxer by default Mickaël Salaün
2024-12-20 14:36 ` Francis Laniel
2024-12-24 14:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 21/23] selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self()'s flags Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 22/23] selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit Mickaël Salaün
2024-11-22 14:33 ` [PATCH v3 23/23] selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace Mickaël Salaün
2024-12-20 14:36 ` [PATCH v3 00/23] Landlock audit support Francis Laniel
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