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From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@chromium.org>,
	mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev,
	brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, gnoack@google.com,
	shuah@kernel.org, jorgelo@chromium.org, allenwebb@chromium.org,
	Shervin Oloumi <enlightened@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook
Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2024 14:01:57 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202412311322.DkS3TbED-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241231014632.589049-1-enlightened@chromium.org>

Hi Shervin,

kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:

[auto build test ERROR on fc033cf25e612e840e545f8d5ad2edd6ba613ed5]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Shervin-Oloumi/landlock-add-support-for-private-bind-mount/20241231-094806
base:   fc033cf25e612e840e545f8d5ad2edd6ba613ed5
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241231014632.589049-1-enlightened%40chromium.org
patch subject: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook
config: um-randconfig-001-20241231 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241231/202412311322.DkS3TbED-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 319b89197348b7cad1215e235bdc7b5ec8f9b72c)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241231/202412311322.DkS3TbED-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202412311322.DkS3TbED-lkp@intel.com/

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> fs/namespace.c:2768:8: error: call to undeclared function 'security_sb_bindmount'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
    2768 |         err = security_sb_bindmount(&old_path, path);
         |               ^
   1 error generated.


vim +/security_sb_bindmount +2768 fs/namespace.c

  2751	
  2752	/*
  2753	 * do loopback mount.
  2754	 */
  2755	static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
  2756					int recurse)
  2757	{
  2758		struct path old_path;
  2759		struct mount *mnt = NULL, *parent;
  2760		struct mountpoint *mp;
  2761		int err;
  2762		if (!old_name || !*old_name)
  2763			return -EINVAL;
  2764		err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
  2765		if (err)
  2766			return err;
  2767	
> 2768		err = security_sb_bindmount(&old_path, path);
  2769		if (err)
  2770			goto out;
  2771	
  2772		err = -EINVAL;
  2773		if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
  2774			goto out;
  2775	
  2776		mp = lock_mount(path);
  2777		if (IS_ERR(mp)) {
  2778			err = PTR_ERR(mp);
  2779			goto out;
  2780		}
  2781	
  2782		parent = real_mount(path->mnt);
  2783		if (!check_mnt(parent))
  2784			goto out2;
  2785	
  2786		mnt = __do_loopback(&old_path, recurse);
  2787		if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
  2788			err = PTR_ERR(mnt);
  2789			goto out2;
  2790		}
  2791	
  2792		err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
  2793		if (err) {
  2794			lock_mount_hash();
  2795			umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_SYNC);
  2796			unlock_mount_hash();
  2797		}
  2798	out2:
  2799		unlock_mount(mp);
  2800	out:
  2801		path_put(&old_path);
  2802		return err;
  2803	}
  2804	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-12-31  6:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-31  1:46 [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook Shervin Oloumi
2024-12-31  1:46 ` [PATCH 2/2] landlock: add support for private bind mount Shervin Oloumi
2024-12-31 21:03   ` kernel test robot
2024-12-31  5:28 ` [PATCH 1/2] fs: add loopback/bind mount specific security hook kernel test robot
2024-12-31  6:01 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-12-31 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-03  5:11 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-10  4:11   ` Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-03 11:10 ` Jan Kara
2025-01-10  4:14   ` Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-10 15:42     ` [PATCH v3 " Christian Brauner
2025-01-23 20:34       ` Mickaël Salaün
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-01-10  2:10 Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-10  2:10 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] landlock: add support for private bind mount Shervin Oloumi
2025-01-23 20:34   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-23 21:08     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-01-23 22:02       ` Mickaël Salaün

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