[PATCH 0/1] v2 security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[PATCH 0/1] v2 security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[Blaise Boscaccy]

Hello,

While trying to implement an eBPF gatekeeper program, we ran into an
issue whereas the LSM hooks are missing some relevant data.

Certain subcommands passed to the bpf() syscall can be invoked from
either the kernel or userspace. Additionally, some fields in the
bpf_attr sruct contain pointers, and depending on where the subcommand
was invoked, could point to either user or kernel memory. One example
of this, is the bpf_prog_load subcommand and it's fd_array.  This data
is made available and used by the verifier, but not made available to
the LSM subsystem. This patchset simply exposes that information to
applicable LSM hooks.


Change list:
- v1 -> v2
  - Pass a boolean flag in lieu of bpfptr_t

Revisions:
- v1
  https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250226003055.1654837-1-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com/

Blaise Boscaccy (1):
  security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  6 +++---
 include/linux/security.h      | 12 ++++++------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c          | 10 +++++-----
 security/security.c           | 17 ++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c      |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

-- 
2.48.1

[PATCH 1/1] security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[Blaise Boscaccy]

Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.

Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.

Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  6 +++---
 include/linux/security.h      | 12 ++++++------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c          | 10 +++++-----
 security/security.c           | 17 ++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c      |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index e2f1ce37c41ef..25f4e74c173be 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -426,14 +426,14 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel, unsigned int size)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map_create, struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-	 struct bpf_token *token)
+	 bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_map_free, struct bpf_map *map)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog_load, struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-	 struct bpf_token *token)
+	 bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	 const struct path *path)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 980b6c207cade..549936a2a4278 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2249,14 +2249,14 @@ struct bpf_map;
 struct bpf_prog;
 struct bpf_token;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size);
+extern int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel, unsigned int size);
 extern int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode);
 extern int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 extern int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				   struct bpf_token *token);
+				   bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token);
 extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
 extern int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				  struct bpf_token *token);
+				  bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token);
 extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 extern int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
 				     const struct path *path);
@@ -2265,7 +2265,7 @@ extern int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cm
 extern int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
 #else
 static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					     unsigned int size)
+			       bool is_kernel, unsigned int size)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@ static inline int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 }
 
 static inline int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					  struct bpf_token *token)
+					  bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static inline void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 { }
 
 static inline int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					 struct bpf_token *token)
+					 bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 694a675769a60..e2d9a1e0c1188 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
 
 #define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
 /* called via syscall */
-static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
+static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
 	struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 			attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id;
 	}
 
-	err = security_bpf_map_create(map, attr, token);
+	err = security_bpf_map_create(map, attr, is_kernel, token);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_map_sec;
 
@@ -2947,7 +2947,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto free_prog;
 
-	err = security_bpf_prog_load(prog, attr, token);
+	err = security_bpf_prog_load(prog, attr, uattr.is_kernel, token);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_prog_sec;
 
@@ -5776,13 +5776,13 @@ static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
 	if (copy_from_bpfptr(&attr, uattr, size) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	err = security_bpf(cmd, &attr, size);
+	err = security_bpf(cmd, &attr, uattr.is_kernel, size);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
-		err = map_create(&attr);
+		err = map_create(&attr, uattr.is_kernel);
 		break;
 	case BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM:
 		err = map_lookup_elem(&attr);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 143561ebc3e89..ee267ddbe4230 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5626,7 +5626,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
  * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed
  * @cmd: command
  * @attr: bpf attribute
- * @size: size
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
+ * @size: size of bpf attribute
  *
  * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into
  * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to
@@ -5634,9 +5635,9 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel, unsigned int size)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, is_kernel, size);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5672,6 +5673,7 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed
  * @map: BPF map object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
@@ -5680,15 +5682,16 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-			    struct bpf_token *token)
+			    bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, is_kernel, token);
 }
 
 /**
  * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed
  * @prog: BPF program object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
  *
  * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
@@ -5698,9 +5701,9 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-			   struct bpf_token *token)
+			   bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, is_kernel, token);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b867dfec88ba..6ac30498916f0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6866,7 +6866,7 @@ static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				     unsigned int size)
+		       bool is_kernel, unsigned int size)
 {
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
@@ -6953,7 +6953,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 }
 
 static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				  struct bpf_token *token)
+				  bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
@@ -6976,7 +6976,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 }
 
 static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				 struct bpf_token *token)
+				 bool is_kernel, struct bpf_token *token)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
-- 
2.48.1

Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[Song Liu]

On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 8:53 AM Blaise Boscaccy
<bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
> userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
> need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
> a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.
>
> Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
> arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
> not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
> to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
> hooks.
>
> Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
> a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
> kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
> to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  6 +++---
>  include/linux/security.h      | 12 ++++++------
>  kernel/bpf/syscall.c          | 10 +++++-----
>  security/security.c           | 17 ++++++++++-------
>  security/selinux/hooks.c      |  6 +++---
>  5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c
has a BPF program for security_bpf(), please also update it.

>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index e2f1ce37c41ef..25f4e74c173be 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -426,14 +426,14 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel, unsigned int size)

I think we should add is_kernel to the end of the argument list. This will cause
fewer issues for existing users.

Thanks,
Song

[PATCH 1/1] security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[Blaise Boscaccy]

Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.

Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.

Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                     |  6 +++---
 include/linux/security.h                          | 12 ++++++------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                              | 10 +++++-----
 security/security.c                               | 15 +++++++++------
 security/selinux/hooks.c                          |  6 +++---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c |  3 ++-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c  |  4 ++--
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c |  6 +++---
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c |  2 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c      |  2 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c  |  2 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c   |  2 +-
 12 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index e2f1ce37c41ef..c5f045019456f 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -426,14 +426,14 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_map_create, struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-	 struct bpf_token *token)
+	 struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_map_free, struct bpf_map *map)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_prog_load, struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-	 struct bpf_token *token)
+	 struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bpf_prog_free, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_create, struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	 const struct path *path)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 980b6c207cade..7e3e58030777c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2249,14 +2249,14 @@ struct bpf_map;
 struct bpf_prog;
 struct bpf_token;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size);
+extern int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel);
 extern int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode);
 extern int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 extern int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				   struct bpf_token *token);
+				   struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel);
 extern void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map);
 extern int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				  struct bpf_token *token);
+				  struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel);
 extern void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog);
 extern int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
 				     const struct path *path);
@@ -2265,7 +2265,7 @@ extern int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cm
 extern int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
 #else
 static inline int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					     unsigned int size)
+			       unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@ static inline int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 }
 
 static inline int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					  struct bpf_token *token)
+					  struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ static inline void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 { }
 
 static inline int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-					 struct bpf_token *token)
+					 struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 694a675769a60..fc51737b9e3dc 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@ static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
 
 #define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_token_fd
 /* called via syscall */
-static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
+static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
 	struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 			attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id;
 	}
 
-	err = security_bpf_map_create(map, attr, token);
+	err = security_bpf_map_create(map, attr, token, is_kernel);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_map_sec;
 
@@ -2947,7 +2947,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto free_prog;
 
-	err = security_bpf_prog_load(prog, attr, token);
+	err = security_bpf_prog_load(prog, attr, token, uattr.is_kernel);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_prog_sec;
 
@@ -5776,13 +5776,13 @@ static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
 	if (copy_from_bpfptr(&attr, uattr, size) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	err = security_bpf(cmd, &attr, size);
+	err = security_bpf(cmd, &attr, size, uattr.is_kernel);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
-		err = map_create(&attr);
+		err = map_create(&attr, uattr.is_kernel);
 		break;
 	case BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM:
 		err = map_lookup_elem(&attr);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 143561ebc3e89..38c977091a7fd 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5627,6 +5627,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
  * @cmd: command
  * @attr: bpf attribute
  * @size: size
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
  *
  * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into
  * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to
@@ -5634,9 +5635,9 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf, cmd, attr, size, is_kernel);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5673,6 +5674,7 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * @map: BPF map object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
  *
  * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
  * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them.
@@ -5680,9 +5682,9 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-			    struct bpf_token *token)
+			    struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, is_kernel);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5690,6 +5692,7 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
  * @prog: BPF program object
  * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
  * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
+ * @is_kernel: whether or not call originated from kernel
  *
  * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
  * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for
@@ -5698,9 +5701,9 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
  * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
  */
 int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-			   struct bpf_token *token)
+			   struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token);
+	return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, is_kernel);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7b867dfec88ba..5a5ce26c51900 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6866,7 +6866,7 @@ static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				     unsigned int size)
+		       unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
@@ -6953,7 +6953,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 }
 
 static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				  struct bpf_token *token)
+				  struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
@@ -6976,7 +6976,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 }
 
 static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
-				 struct bpf_token *token)
+				 struct bpf_token *token, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
index ab3a532b7dd6d..f85d0e282f2ae 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ int inproper_sleepable_helper(void *ctx)
 }
 
 SEC("?lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(inproper_sleepable_kfunc, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(inproper_sleepable_kfunc, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size,
+	     bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_key *bkey;
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c
index 44628865fe1d4..0e741262138f2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c
@@ -51,13 +51,13 @@ static int bpf_link_create_verify(int cmd)
 }
 
 SEC("lsm/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	return bpf_link_create_verify(cmd);
 }
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(lsm_s_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(lsm_s_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	return bpf_link_create_verify(cmd);
 }
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c
index cd4d752bd089c..ce36a55ba5b8b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
 SEC("?lsm.s/bpf")
 __failure __msg("cannot pass in dynptr at an offset=-8")
-int BPF_PROG(not_valid_dynptr, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(not_valid_dynptr, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
 
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(not_valid_dynptr, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 
 SEC("?lsm.s/bpf")
 __failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr")
-int BPF_PROG(not_ptr_to_stack, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(not_ptr_to_stack, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	unsigned long val = 0;
 
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(not_ptr_to_stack, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 }
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(dynptr_data_null, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(dynptr_data_null, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_key *trusted_keyring;
 	struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
index c73776990ae30..c46077e01a4ca 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ extern struct bpf_key *bpf_lookup_system_key(__u64 id) __ksym;
 extern void bpf_key_put(struct bpf_key *key) __ksym;
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_key *bkey;
 	__u32 pid;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c
index 2fdc44e766248..21fce1108a21d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 char tp_name[128];
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c
index 7e750309ce274..18ad24a851c6c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(tp_btf_run, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags)
 }
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct cgroup *cgrp = NULL;
 	struct task_struct *task;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
index 12034a73ee2d2..135665f011c7e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ struct {
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
 
 SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
-int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+int BPF_PROG(bpf, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool is_kernel)
 {
 	struct bpf_dynptr data_ptr, sig_ptr;
 	struct data *data_val;
-- 
2.48.1

Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: Propagate caller information in bpf hooks

[Song Liu]

For future patches, please use git-format-patch with --subject-prefix option and
specify target tree (bpf vs. bpf-next vs. bpf-next) and patchset version. For
this version of the patchset the subject prefix should be "PATCH v3 bpf-next".

On Mon, Mar 3, 2025 at 2:24 PM Blaise Boscaccy
<bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
> userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
> need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
> a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.
>
> Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
> arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
> not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
> to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
> hooks.
>
> Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
> a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
> kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
> to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                     |  6 +++---
>  include/linux/security.h                          | 12 ++++++------
>  kernel/bpf/syscall.c                              | 10 +++++-----
>  security/security.c                               | 15 +++++++++------
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                          |  6 +++---
>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rcu_read_lock.c |  3 ++-
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_cgroup1_hierarchy.c  |  4 ++--
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c |  6 +++---
>  .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_lookup_key.c |  2 +-
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_ptr_untrusted.c      |  2 +-
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_task_under_cgroup.c  |  2 +-
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_verify_pkcs7_sig.c   |  2 +-

Please put kernel changes and selftest changes in two
patches. Other than this:

Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>

>  12 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)