From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
llvm@lists.linux.dev, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hardening: Enable i386 FORTIFY_SOURCE on Clang 16+
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 11:14:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250304101445.GA2529736@ax162> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250303214929.work.499-kees@kernel.org>
On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 01:49:37PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> The i386 regparm bug exposed with FORTIFY_SOURCE with Clang was fixed
> in Clang 16[1].
>
> Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/c167c0a4dcdb998affb2756ce76903a12f7d8ca5 [1]
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Yes, thank you for catching this!
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
I assume you'll take this?
> ---
> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
> Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
> Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
> Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 23ffb0d7c845..c17366ce8224 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ config FORTIFY_SOURCE
> bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
> depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
> # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
> - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
> + depends on !X86_32 || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000
> help
> Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
> where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
> --
> 2.34.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-04 10:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-03 21:49 [PATCH] hardening: Enable i386 FORTIFY_SOURCE on Clang 16+ Kees Cook
2025-03-04 10:14 ` Nathan Chancellor [this message]
2025-03-04 17:50 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-07 21:47 ` Nathan Chancellor
2025-03-07 22:57 ` Kees Cook
2025-03-07 23:10 ` Nathan Chancellor
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