linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: cve@kernel.org, "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kent Overstreet" <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
	"Dave Chinner" <david@fromorbit.com>,
	linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 15:36:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025031034-savanna-debit-eb8e@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310.ooshu9Cha2oo@digikod.net>

On Mon, Mar 10, 2025 at 01:00:50PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> FYI, I don't think this patch fixes a security issue.  If attackers can
> corrupt a filesystem, then they should already be able to harm the whole
> system.
> 
> The commit description might be a bit confusing, but from an access
> control point of view, the filesystem on which we spotted this issue
> (bcachefs) does not allow to open weird files (but they are still
> visible, hence this patch) and I guess it would be the same for other
> filesystems, right?  I'm not sure how a weird file could be used by user
> space.  See
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zpc46HEacI%2Fwd7Rg@dread.disaster.area/
> 
> The goal of this fix was mainly to not warn about a bcachefs issue (and
> avoid related syzkaller report for Landlock), and to harden Landlock in
> case other filesystems have this kind of bug.

It was issue a CVE because the reviewers thought that it was a way to
circumvent the landlock permission checks, based on the changelog text
(note, creating a "corrupted filesystem" is quite easy to get many Linux
systems to auto-mount it, so those types of issues do get assigned
CVEs.)

If you all do not think this meets the definition of a vulnerability as
defined by CVE.org as:
	An instance of one or more weaknesses in a Product that can be
	exploited, causing a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or
	availability; a set of conditions or behaviors that allows the
	violation of an explicit or implicit security policy.

We will be glad to revoke it, just let us know.

thanks,

greg k-h

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-10 14:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2025030611-CVE-2025-21830-da64@gregkh>
2025-03-10 12:00 ` CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-10 13:49   ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-10 14:36   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2025-03-10 23:42     ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11  2:09       ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11  4:24         ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 10:50           ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11  2:19       ` Unprivileged filesystem mounts Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-11  5:57         ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-11 11:01           ` Christian Brauner
2025-03-11 17:36             ` Al Viro
2025-03-11 17:43               ` Kent Overstreet
2025-03-11 17:54           ` Eric Biggers
2025-03-11 20:10           ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-18  5:21             ` Dave Chinner
2025-03-19 14:55               ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 16:59                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:32                   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 20:11                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-18 22:11             ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-19 17:44               ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-19 21:25                 ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-20  6:26                   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-03-20 16:00                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2025-03-11  6:53       ` CVE-2025-21830: landlock: Handle weird files Greg Kroah-Hartman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2025031034-savanna-debit-eb8e@gregkh \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=cve@kernel.org \
    --cc=david@fromorbit.com \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=kent.overstreet@linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-bcachefs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).