* [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 24/37] ima: process_measurement() needlessly takes inode_lock() on MAY_READ
[not found] <20250429235122.537321-1-sashal@kernel.org>
@ 2025-04-29 23:51 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-04-29 23:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, stable
Cc: Frederick Lawler, Roberto Sassu, Mimi Zohar, Sasha Levin,
dmitry.kasatkin, paul, jmorris, serge, linux-integrity,
linux-security-module
From: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
[ Upstream commit 30d68cb0c37ebe2dc63aa1d46a28b9163e61caa2 ]
On IMA policy update, if a measure rule exists in the policy,
IMA_MEASURE is set for ima_policy_flags which makes the violation_check
variable always true. Coupled with a no-action on MAY_READ for a
FILE_CHECK call, we're always taking the inode_lock().
This becomes a performance problem for extremely heavy read-only workloads.
Therefore, prevent this only in the case there's no action to be taken.
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index a9aab10bebcaa..2f3f267e72167 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -245,7 +245,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
- (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+ (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+ ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+ (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
if (!action && !violation_check)
return 0;
--
2.39.5
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