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From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>
To: paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, daniel@iogearbox.net, eddyz87@gmail.com,
	gnoack@google.com, haoluo@google.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, jolsa@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	kuni1840@gmail.com, kuniyu@google.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev,
	memxor@gmail.com, mic@digikod.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	omosnace@redhat.com, sdf@fomichev.me, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, song@kernel.org,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, yonghong.song@linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to filter SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg().
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2025 13:40:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250614204044.2190213-1-kuni1840@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1976e40bd50.28a7.85c95baa4474aabc7814e68940a78392@paul-moore.com>

From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2025 07:43:46 -0400
> On June 13, 2025 6:24:15 PM Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com> wrote:
> > From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
> >
> > Since commit 77cbe1a6d873 ("af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS."),
> > we can disable SCM_RIGHTS per socket, but it's not flexible.
> >
> > This series allows us to implement more fine-grained filtering for
> > SCM_RIGHTS with BPF LSM.
> 
> My ability to review this over the weekend is limited due to device and 
> network access, but I'll take a look next week.
> 
> That said, it would be good if you could clarify the "filtering" aspect of 
> your comments; it may be obvious when I'm able to look at the full patchset

I meant to mention that just below the quoted part :)

---8<---
Changes:
  v2: Remove SCM_RIGHTS fd scrubbing functionality
---8<---

> in context, but the commit descriptions worry me that perhaps you are still 
> intending on using the LSM framework to cut SCM_RIGHTS payloads from 
> individual messages?  Blocking messages at send time if they contain 
> SCM_RIGHTS is likely okay (pending proper implementation review), but 
> modifying packets in flight in the LSM framework is not.
> 
> Also, a quick administrative note, I see you have marked this as 
> "bpf-next", however given the diffstat of the proposed changes this 
> patchset should go to Linus via the LSM tree and not the BPF tree.

This was to kick the BPF CI for the selftest patch, and the __nullable
arg suffix in patch 3 is BPF specific stuff, but I don't have preference
here and whichever is fine to me.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-14 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-13 22:22 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to filter SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-13 22:22 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-14 17:32   ` kernel test robot
2025-06-13 22:22 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/4] af_unix: Call security_unix_may_send() in sendmsg() for all socket types Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-13 22:22 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 3/4] af_unix: Pass skb to security_unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-13 22:22 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 4/4] selftest: bpf: Add test for BPF LSM on unix_may_send() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-14 11:43 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] af_unix: Allow BPF LSM to filter SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg() Paul Moore
2025-06-14 20:40   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2025-06-19  3:23     ` Paul Moore
2025-06-19  4:00       ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-06-19 18:55         ` Paul Moore

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