From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCHES] simple part of ->d_name stuff
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 06:01:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250911050149.GW31600@ZenIV> (raw)
Rules for ->d_name access are rather unpleasant and so's
verifying that they are followed. There is a relatively simple part,
though - nobody outside of fs/dcache.c has any business modifying
that thing.
So let's make sure that all functions we are passing
&dentry->d_name are taking const struct qstr * and replace
->d_name with an anon union of struct qstr *__d_name and
const struct qstr *d_name.
It is *not* enough to guarantee that another thread will
not call __d_move() right under you - checking the requirements
for that is the hard part. It does make it easy to verify that
nothing else accidentally starts changing it.
This stuff lives in
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs.git #work.qstr
Branch is -rc4-based, individual patches in followups.
Please, review. If nobody objects, I'll put that in #for-next.
Shortlog:
security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument
exfat_find(): constify qstr argument
afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): constify qstr argument
afs_dir_search: constify qstr argument
generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument
make it easier to catch those who try to modify ->d_name
Diffstat:
fs/afs/dir_edit.c | 4 ++--
fs/afs/dir_search.c | 2 +-
fs/afs/internal.h | 6 +++---
fs/dcache.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
fs/exfat/namei.c | 2 +-
include/linux/dcache.h | 5 ++++-
include/linux/fs.h | 6 ++++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
12 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2025-09-11 5:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-11 5:01 Al Viro [this message]
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 1/6] security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument Al Viro
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 2/6] exfat_find(): " Al Viro
2025-09-11 6:02 ` Namjae Jeon
2025-09-15 12:45 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 3/6] afs_edit_dir_{add,remove}(): " Al Viro
2025-09-15 12:45 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 4/6] afs_dir_search: " Al Viro
2025-09-15 12:46 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 5/6] generic_ci_validate_strict_name(): constify name argument Al Viro
2025-09-15 12:46 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 5:05 ` [PATCH 6/6] make it easier to catch those who try to modify ->d_name Al Viro
2025-09-15 12:46 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 14:30 ` [PATCH 1/6] security_dentry_init_security(): constify qstr argument Casey Schaufler
2025-09-11 20:54 ` Paul Moore
2025-09-15 12:45 ` Christian Brauner
2025-09-11 5:59 ` [PATCHES] simple part of ->d_name stuff David Howells
2025-09-11 16:56 ` Linus Torvalds
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