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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list),
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS),
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY
	SUBSYSTEM)
Subject: [PATCH v2 5/9] tpm2-sessions: Umask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session()
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 06:59:34 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250929035938.1773341-6-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250929035938.1773341-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>

Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt() in order to unmask the code
paths in the call sites of tpm_buf_append_hmac_session().

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
---
v2:
- Uncorrupt the patch.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c               | 14 +++++++++++---
 include/linux/tpm.h                       | 23 -----------------------
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index c182a07b70de..eef324e61308 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -257,9 +257,17 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
 
 	do {
 		tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
-		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
-						| TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
-						NULL, 0);
+		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf,
+						    TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT |
+						    TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
+						    NULL, 0);
+		} else  {
+			offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+			if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+		}
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
 		tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
 		err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 1fa02e18e688..e72e7657faa2 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -532,29 +532,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 				 int passphraselen);
 void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
 			 u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen);
-static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
-						   struct tpm_buf *buf,
-						   u8 attributes,
-						   u8 *passphrase,
-						   int passphraselen)
-{
-	struct tpm_header *head;
-	int offset;
-
-	if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
-		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen);
-	} else  {
-		offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-		head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
-
-		/*
-		 * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to
-		 * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
-		 */
-		if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
-			head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
-	}
-}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
 
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index e165b117bbca..c414a7006d78 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -482,8 +482,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
 			   u32 blob_handle)
 {
+	struct tpm_header *head;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u16 data_len;
+	int offset;
 	u8 *data;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -518,8 +520,14 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
 				     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
 				     options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
-		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
-						NULL, 0);
+		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+		} else  {
+			offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+			if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+		}
 	}
 
 	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
-- 
2.39.5


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-09-29  4:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-29  3:59 [PATCH v2 0/9] tpm: Decouple PCR extend from driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] tpm: cap PCR bank in tpm2_get_pcr_allocations() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] tpm: Use -EPERM as fallback error code in tpm_ret_to_err Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] tpm2-sessions: Remove 'attributes' from tpm_buf_append_auth Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] tpm-buf: check for corruption in tpm_buf_append_handle() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameeter from tpm_buf_append_handle Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-09-29  3:59 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] tpm-buf: Build PCR extend commands Jarkko Sakkinen

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