* [PATCH v6 03/10] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load()
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen, stable,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module,
linux-kernel
tpm2_load() allocates a blob indirectly via tpm2_key_decode() but it is
not freed in all failure paths. Address this with a scope-based cleanup
helper __free(). For legacy blobs, the implicit de-allocation is gets
disable by no_free_ptr().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v6:
- A new patch in this version.
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 024be262702f..468a4a339541 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -106,9 +106,8 @@ struct tpm2_key_context {
u32 priv_len;
};
-static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
- struct trusted_key_options *options,
- u8 **buf)
+static void *tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
int ret;
struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
@@ -119,16 +118,15 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
payload->blob_len);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!blob)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- *buf = blob;
options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
@@ -136,7 +134,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
- return 0;
+ return blob;
}
int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -391,13 +389,14 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
- u8 *blob, *pub;
+ u8 *pub;
int rc;
u32 attrs;
- rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
- if (rc) {
+ u8 *blob __free(kfree) = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options);
+ if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
/* old form */
+ no_free_ptr(blob);
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
}
@@ -464,8 +463,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
- if (blob != payload->blob)
- kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 04/10] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen,
James Bottomley, Jarkko Sakkinen, Mimi Zohar, David Howells,
Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Use tpm_ret_to_err() to transmute TPM return codes in trusted_tpm2.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
---
v6:
- No changes.
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- No changes.
v3:
- No changes.
v2:
- New patch split out from the fix.
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 ++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 468a4a339541..1cd00aad033a 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -346,25 +346,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
+ if (blob_len < 0)
+ rc = blob_len;
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- if (rc > 0) {
- if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
- rc = -EINVAL;
- else
- rc = -EPERM;
- }
- if (blob_len < 0)
- rc = blob_len;
- else
+ if (!rc)
payload->blob_len = blob_len;
out_put:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -465,10 +459,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- if (rc > 0)
- rc = -EPERM;
-
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -531,8 +522,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
- if (rc > 0)
- rc = -EPERM;
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
@@ -565,7 +554,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -597,6 +586,5 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
out:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
-
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 06/10] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session()
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Jonathan McDowell, Peter Huewe, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jason Gunthorpe,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-kernel, keyrings,
linux-security-module
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt() in order to unmask the code
paths in the call sites of tpm_buf_append_hmac_session().
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
---
v6:
- No changes.
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- Fixed typo in short summary.
v3:
- No changes.
v2:
- Uncorrupt the patch.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 14 +++++++++++---
include/linux/tpm.h | 23 -----------------------
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 12 ++++++++++--
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index bf8294e3d8f2..254003e5dd8b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -257,9 +257,17 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
do {
tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT
- | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
- NULL, 0);
+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf,
+ TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT |
+ TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
+ NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+ }
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 004680757923..973458a38250 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -535,29 +535,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
int passphraselen);
void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen);
-static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u8 attributes,
- u8 *passphrase,
- int passphraselen)
-{
- struct tpm_header *head;
- int offset;
-
- if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen);
- } else {
- offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
-
- /*
- * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to
- * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
- */
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
- }
-}
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 1cd00aad033a..a8cc18d6e9f0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -479,8 +479,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
+ struct tpm_header *head;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
+ int offset;
u8 *data;
int rc;
@@ -515,8 +517,14 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
- NULL, 0);
+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+ }
}
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 07/10] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append()
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen,
James Bottomley, Jarkko Sakkinen, Mimi Zohar, David Howells,
Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings,
linux-security-module, linux-kernel
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
tpm2_buf_append_auth() has only single call site and most of its parameters
are redundant. Open code it to the call site. Remove illegit FIXME comment
as there is no categorized bug and replace it with more sane comment about
implementation (i.e. "non-opionated inline comment").
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
---
v6:
- No changes.
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- No changes.
v3:
- No changes.
v2:
- No changes.
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 51 ++++-------------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index a8cc18d6e9f0..74eb1223c3da 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -196,36 +196,6 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
-/**
- * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
- *
- * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
- * @session_handle: session handle
- * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
- * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
- * @attributes: the session attributes
- * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
- * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
- */
-static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
- const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
- u8 attributes,
- const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
-{
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
-
- if (nonce && nonce_len)
- tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
-
- tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
-
- if (hmac && hmac_len)
- tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
-}
-
/**
* tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
*
@@ -504,19 +474,16 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth_len);
} else {
/*
- * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
- * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't
- * calculate a HMAC on it. Therefore, the user can
- * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must
- * send down the plain text password, which could be
- * intercepted. We can still encrypt the returned
- * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer
- * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
- * password.
+ * The policy session is generated outside the kernel, and thus
+ * the password will end up being unencrypted on the bus, as
+ * HMAC nonce cannot be calculated for it.
*/
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
- NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
- options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->policyhandle);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 08/10] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen,
Jonathan McDowell, Peter Huewe, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jason Gunthorpe,
James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, linux-kernel, keyrings,
linux-security-module
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID,
given that they are identical. The only difference are the log messages.
In addition, add a missing TPM_BUF_INVALID check to tpm_buf_append_handle()
following the pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
---
v6:
- Change short summary to something more descriptive.
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- No changes.
v3:
- No changes.
v2:
- A new patch.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 14 ++++++++------
include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++-----
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
index dc882fc9fa9e..69ee77400539 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -104,13 +104,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
*/
void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length)
{
- /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW)
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
return;
if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) {
WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n");
- buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW;
+ buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
return;
}
@@ -157,8 +156,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32);
*/
void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
{
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
+ return;
+
if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) {
dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n");
+ buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
return;
}
@@ -177,14 +180,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void
{
off_t next_offset;
- /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR)
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
return;
next_offset = *offset + count;
if (next_offset > buf->length) {
WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n");
- buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR;
+ buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
return;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 973458a38250..3eae22a06558 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -369,12 +369,10 @@ struct tpm_header {
} __packed;
enum tpm_buf_flags {
- /* the capacity exceeded: */
- TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0),
/* TPM2B format: */
- TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(1),
- /* read out of boundary: */
- TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR = BIT(2),
+ TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(0),
+ /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */
+ TPM_BUF_INVALID = BIT(1),
};
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 74eb1223c3da..991f9af92eb1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* creation PCR */
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
- if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+ if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
rc = -E2BIG;
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
goto out;
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
- if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
+ if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
rc = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
- if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
+ if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
rc = -E2BIG;
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
goto out;
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations.
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-18 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-20 9:04 ` Stefano Garzarella
5 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-18 11:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson, Jonathan McDowell,
Roberto Sassu, Stefano Garzarella, Jarkko Sakkinen, Stefan Berger,
Peter Huewe, Jarkko Sakkinen, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley,
Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris,
Serge E. Hallyn, linux-kernel, keyrings, linux-security-module
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be
done trivially:
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
Alternatively, stack allocations are also possible:
u8 buf_data[512];
struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data;
tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data));
Given that every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be changed,
place command names from TCG 1.2 and 2.0 specifications to the @dest
parameter, which will e.g., help tracing bugs.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
v6
- Update commit message.
v5:
- There was a spurious change in tpm2_seal_trusted() error
code handling introduce by this patch.
v4:
- Since every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be
changed anyhow, use 'dest' parameter more structured and
actually useful way, and pick the string TCG 1.2 and 2.0
specifications.
- tpm1-cmd: Remove useless rc declarations and repliace them
with trivial "return tpm_transmit_cmd" statement.
- Reverted spurious changes in include/linux/tpm.h.
- Use concisely TPM_BUFSIZE instead of PAGE_SIZE.
v3:
- A new patch from the earlier series with more scoped changes and
less abstract commit message.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 122 +++++----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 21 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 -
drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 162 +++++-------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 299 ++++++++++------------
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 122 +++++----
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 44 ++--
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 30 +--
include/linux/tpm.h | 18 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 ++-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 175 ++++++-------
11 files changed, 484 insertions(+), 544 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
index 1b9dee0d0681..a3bf3c3d0c48 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -7,82 +7,109 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
-/**
- * tpm_buf_init() - Allocate and initialize a TPM command
- * @buf: A &tpm_buf
- * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS
- * @ordinal: A command ordinal
- *
- * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM
- */
-int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
+static void __tpm_buf_size_invariant(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
{
- buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf->data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal);
- return 0;
+ u32 buf_size_2 = (u32)buf->capacity + (u32)sizeof(*buf);
+
+ if (!buf->capacity) {
+ if (buf_size > TPM_BUFSIZE) {
+ WARN(1, "%s: size overflow: %u\n", __func__, buf_size);
+ buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (buf_size != buf_size_2) {
+ WARN(1, "%s: size mismatch: %u != %u\n", __func__, buf_size,
+ buf_size_2);
+ buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init);
-/**
- * tpm_buf_reset() - Initialize a TPM command
- * @buf: A &tpm_buf
- * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS
- * @ordinal: A command ordinal
- */
-void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
+static void __tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
{
struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+ __tpm_buf_size_invariant(buf, buf_size);
+
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
+ return;
+
WARN_ON(tag != TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND && tag != TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS &&
tag != TPM2_ST_SESSIONS && tag != 0);
buf->flags = 0;
buf->length = sizeof(*head);
+ buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
+ buf->handles = 0;
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag);
head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head));
head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal);
+}
+
+static void __tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
+{
+ __tpm_buf_size_invariant(buf, buf_size);
+
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
+ return;
+
+ buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
+ buf->length = 2;
+ buf->capacity = buf_size - sizeof(*buf);
buf->handles = 0;
+ buf->data[0] = 0;
+ buf->data[1] = 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset);
/**
- * tpm_buf_init_sized() - Allocate and initialize a sized (TPM2B) buffer
- * @buf: A @tpm_buf
- *
- * Return: 0 or -ENOMEM
+ * tpm_buf_init() - Initialize a TPM command
+ * @buf: A &tpm_buf
+ * @buf_size: Size of the buffer.
*/
-int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+void tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
{
- buf->data = (u8 *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf->data)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(buf, 0, buf_size);
+ __tpm_buf_reset(buf, buf_size, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init);
- tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf);
- return 0;
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_init_sized() - Initialize a sized buffer
+ * @buf: A &tpm_buf
+ * @buf_size: Size of the buffer.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size)
+{
+ memset(buf, 0, buf_size);
+ __tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf, buf_size);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_init_sized);
/**
- * tpm_buf_reset_sized() - Initialize a sized buffer
+ * tpm_buf_reset() - Re-initialize a TPM command
* @buf: A &tpm_buf
+ * @tag: TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS or TPM2_ST_SESSIONS
+ * @ordinal: A command ordinal
*/
-void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal)
{
- buf->flags = TPM_BUF_TPM2B;
- buf->length = 2;
- buf->data[0] = 0;
- buf->data[1] = 0;
+ u16 buf_size = buf->capacity + sizeof(*buf);
+
+ __tpm_buf_reset(buf, buf_size, tag, ordinal);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset_sized);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset);
-void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf)
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_reset_sized() - Re-initialize a sized buffer
+ * @buf: A &tpm_buf
+ */
+void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf)
{
- free_page((unsigned long)buf->data);
+ u16 buf_size = buf->capacity + sizeof(*buf);
+
+ __tpm_buf_reset_sized(buf, buf_size);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_reset_sized);
/**
* tpm_buf_length() - Return the number of bytes consumed by the data
@@ -92,6 +119,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy);
*/
u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf)
{
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
+ return 0;
+
return buf->length;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
@@ -104,10 +134,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
*/
void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length)
{
+ u32 total_length = (u32)buf->length + (u32)new_length;
+
if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
return;
- if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (total_length > (u32)buf->capacity) {
WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n");
buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
return;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index 94231f052ea7..f5dcadb1ab3c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -32,28 +32,29 @@ struct tpm_readpubek_out {
static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
- struct tpm_buf tpm_buf;
struct tpm_readpubek_out *out;
int i;
char *str = buf;
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
char anti_replay[20];
+ struct tpm_buf *tpm_buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tpm_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
memset(&anti_replay, 0, sizeof(anti_replay));
if (tpm_try_get_ops(chip))
return 0;
- if (tpm_buf_init(&tpm_buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_READPUBEK))
- goto out_ops;
-
- tpm_buf_append(&tpm_buf, anti_replay, sizeof(anti_replay));
+ tpm_buf_init(tpm_buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(tpm_buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_READPUBEK);
+ tpm_buf_append(tpm_buf, anti_replay, sizeof(anti_replay));
- if (tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_buf, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE,
- "attempting to read the PUBEK"))
- goto out_buf;
+ if (tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, tpm_buf, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, "TPM_ReadPubek"))
+ goto out_ops;
- out = (struct tpm_readpubek_out *)&tpm_buf.data[10];
+ out = (struct tpm_readpubek_out *)&tpm_buf->data[10];
str +=
sprintf(str,
"Algorithm: %4ph\n"
@@ -71,8 +72,6 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 16)
str += sprintf(str, "%16ph\n", &out->modulus[i]);
-out_buf:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tpm_buf);
out_ops:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return str - buf;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index a37712c02e44..ca391b2a211c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
#endif
#define TPM_MINOR 224 /* officially assigned */
-#define TPM_BUFSIZE 4096
#define TPM_NUM_DEVICES 65536
#define TPM_RETRY 50
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
index 5c49bdff33de..10cb5d008c9f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
@@ -323,20 +323,14 @@ unsigned long tpm1_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal)
*/
static int tpm1_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- dev_info(&chip->dev, "starting up the TPM manually\n");
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_STARTUP);
- if (rc < 0)
- return rc;
-
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ST_CLEAR);
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to start the TPM");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_STARTUP);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM_ST_CLEAR);
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM_Startup");
}
int tpm1_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
@@ -463,50 +457,45 @@ int tpm1_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
int tpm1_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, const u8 *hash,
const char *log_msg)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE, log_msg);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE, log_msg);
}
#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP 101
ssize_t tpm1_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_CAP);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_CAP);
if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 ||
subcap_id == TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, subcap_id);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, subcap_id);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 0);
} else {
if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM_CAP_FLAG);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM_CAP_FLAG);
else
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM_CAP_PROP);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM_CAP_PROP);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 4);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, subcap_id);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 4);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, subcap_id);
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, min_cap_length, desc);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, min_cap_length, desc);
if (!rc)
- *cap = *(cap_t *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4];
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ *cap = *(cap_t *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4];
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm1_getcap);
@@ -531,81 +520,69 @@ int tpm1_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
{
struct tpm1_get_random_out *out;
u32 num_bytes = min_t(u32, max, TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA);
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 total = 0;
int retries = 5;
u32 recd;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
do {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, num_bytes);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, num_bytes);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len),
- "attempting get random");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, sizeof(out->rng_data_len), "TPM_GetRandom");
if (rc) {
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
- out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ out = (struct tpm1_get_random_out *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
recd = be32_to_cpu(out->rng_data_len);
- if (recd > num_bytes) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (recd > num_bytes)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (buf->length < TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
+ sizeof(out->rng_data_len) + recd)
+ return -EFAULT;
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
- sizeof(out->rng_data_len) + recd) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
memcpy(dest, out->rng_data, recd);
dest += recd;
total += recd;
num_bytes -= recd;
-
- tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM);
} while (retries-- && total < max);
rc = total ? (int)total : -EIO;
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return rc;
}
#define TPM_ORD_PCRREAD 21
int tpm1_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCRREAD);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_PCRREAD);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE,
- "attempting to read a pcr value");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE, "TPM_PCRRead");
if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
+ return rc;
- memcpy(res_buf, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (buf->length < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE)
+ return -EFAULT;
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ memcpy(res_buf, &buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
return rc;
}
@@ -619,16 +596,13 @@ int tpm1_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
*/
static int tpm1_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "continue selftest");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM_ContinueSelfTest");
}
/**
@@ -742,22 +716,24 @@ int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr)
{
u8 dummy_hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
- struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int try;
int rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
/* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
if (tpm_suspend_pcr)
rc = tpm1_pcr_extend(chip, tpm_suspend_pcr, dummy_hash,
"extending dummy pcr before suspend");
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE);
+
/* now do the actual savestate */
for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, NULL);
/*
* If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
* this command then retry before giving up. It can take
@@ -772,7 +748,7 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr)
break;
tpm_msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
- tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE);
}
if (rc)
@@ -782,7 +758,5 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr)
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "TPM savestate took %dms\n",
try * TPM_TIMEOUT_RETRY);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index e548b0ac7654..768719bbbf04 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -104,12 +104,15 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
{
int i;
int rc;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
struct tpm2_pcr_read_out *out;
u8 pcr_select[TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN] = {0};
u16 digest_size;
u16 expected_digest_size = 0;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
if (pcr_idx >= TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -124,36 +127,31 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
expected_digest_size = chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ);
pcr_select[pcr_idx >> 3] = 1 << (pcr_idx & 0x7);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digest->alg_id);
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)pcr_select,
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, digest->alg_id);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, (const unsigned char *)pcr_select,
sizeof(pcr_select));
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to read a pcr value");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_PCR_Read");
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
- out = (struct tpm2_pcr_read_out *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ out = (struct tpm2_pcr_read_out *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
digest_size = be16_to_cpu(out->digest_size);
if (digest_size > sizeof(digest->digest) ||
- (!digest_size_ptr && digest_size != expected_digest_size)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ (!digest_size_ptr && digest_size != expected_digest_size))
+ return rc;
if (digest_size_ptr)
*digest_size_ptr = digest_size;
memcpy(digest->digest, out->digest, digest_size);
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return rc;
}
@@ -169,46 +167,45 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
struct tpm_digest *digests)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
int i;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
- if (rc) {
- if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return rc;
- }
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
if (!disable_pcr_integrity) {
- tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
- tpm_buf_append_handle(&buf, pcr_idx);
- tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, &buf, NULL, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx);
+ tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, NULL, 0);
}
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digests[i].alg_id);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&digests[i].digest,
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, digests[i].alg_id);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, (const unsigned char *)&digests[i].digest,
chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size);
}
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
- tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_PCR_Extend");
if (!disable_pcr_integrity)
- rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, buf, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -233,7 +230,6 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
{
struct tpm2_get_random_out *out;
struct tpm_header *head;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 recd;
u32 num_bytes = max;
int err;
@@ -245,51 +241,50 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA)
return -EINVAL;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (err)
return err;
- err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0);
- if (err) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return err;
- }
-
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
do {
- tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf,
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf,
TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT |
TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
NULL, 0);
} else {
- offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+ offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
}
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes);
- tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf,
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, num_bytes);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf,
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out,
buffer),
- "attempting get random");
- err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, err);
+ "TPM2_GetRandom");
+ err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, buf, err);
if (err) {
if (err > 0)
err = -EIO;
goto out;
}
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
/* Skip the parameter size field: */
if (be16_to_cpu(head->tag) == TPM2_ST_SESSIONS)
offset += 4;
- out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)&buf.data[offset];
+ out = (struct tpm2_get_random_out *)&buf->data[offset];
recd = min_t(u32, be16_to_cpu(out->size), num_bytes);
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) <
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) <
TPM_HEADER_SIZE +
offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer) +
recd) {
@@ -303,11 +298,9 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
num_bytes -= recd;
} while (retries-- && total < max);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
return total ? total : -EIO;
+
out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
return err;
}
@@ -319,20 +312,18 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max)
*/
void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
- if (rc) {
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n",
handle);
return;
}
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
- tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_FlushContext");
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_flush_context);
@@ -359,19 +350,20 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value,
const char *desc)
{
struct tpm2_get_cap_out *out;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, property_id);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, NULL);
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, property_id);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 1);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, NULL);
if (!rc) {
- out = (struct tpm2_get_cap_out *)
- &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
+ out = (struct tpm2_get_cap_out *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE];
/*
* To prevent failing boot up of some systems, Infineon TPM2.0
* returns SUCCESS on TPM2_Startup in field upgrade mode. Also
@@ -383,7 +375,6 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value,
else
rc = -ENODATA;
}
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_get_tpm_pt);
@@ -400,15 +391,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_get_tpm_pt);
*/
void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN);
- if (rc)
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
return;
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, shutdown_type);
- tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "stopping the TPM");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, shutdown_type);
+ tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_Shutdown");
}
/**
@@ -426,20 +416,19 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
*/
static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int full;
int rc;
- for (full = 0; full < 2; full++) {
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, full);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0,
- "attempting the self test");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST);
+ for (full = 0; full < 2; full++) {
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, full);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_SelfTest");
if (rc == TPM2_RC_TESTING)
rc = TPM2_RC_SUCCESS;
if (rc == TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE || rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
@@ -464,23 +453,24 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_header *out;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, NULL);
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 1);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, NULL);
/* We ignore TPM return codes on purpose. */
if (rc >= 0) {
- out = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ out = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
if (be16_to_cpu(out->tag) == TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS)
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
}
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_probe);
@@ -520,7 +510,6 @@ struct tpm2_pcr_selection {
ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm2_pcr_selection pcr_selection;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
void *marker;
void *end;
void *pcr_select_offset;
@@ -532,39 +521,37 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
int rc;
int i = 0;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_PCRS);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_CAP_PCRS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 9, "get tpm pcr allocation");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 9, "TPM2_GetCapability(PCRS)");
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ return rc;
- nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup(
- (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]);
+ nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]);
if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) {
pr_err("tpm: unexpected number of banks: %u > %u",
nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
- marker = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
+ marker = &buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
- rsp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[2]);
- end = &buf.data[rsp_len];
+ rsp_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf->data[2]);
+ end = &buf->data[rsp_len];
for (i = 0; i < nr_possible_banks; i++) {
pcr_select_offset = marker +
offsetof(struct tpm2_pcr_selection, size_of_select);
- if (pcr_select_offset >= end) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
+ if (pcr_select_offset >= end)
+ return -EFAULT;
memcpy(&pcr_selection, marker, sizeof(pcr_selection));
hash_alg = be16_to_cpu(pcr_selection.hash_alg);
@@ -576,7 +563,7 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
rc = tpm2_init_bank_info(chip, nr_alloc_banks);
if (rc < 0)
- break;
+ return rc;
nr_alloc_banks++;
}
@@ -588,21 +575,21 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
chip->nr_allocated_banks = nr_alloc_banks;
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 nr_commands;
__be32 *attrs;
u32 cc;
int i;
int rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
rc = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS, &nr_commands, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -619,30 +606,24 @@ int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, nr_commands);
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_CC_FIRST);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, nr_commands);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 9 + 4 * nr_commands, NULL);
- if (rc) {
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 9 + 4 * nr_commands, NULL);
+ if (rc)
goto out;
- }
- if (nr_commands !=
- be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5])) {
+ if (nr_commands != be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5])) {
rc = -EFAULT;
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
goto out;
}
chip->nr_commands = nr_commands;
- attrs = (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
+ attrs = (__be32 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 9];
for (i = 0; i < nr_commands; i++, attrs++) {
chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] = be32_to_cpup(attrs);
cc = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i] & 0xFFFF;
@@ -654,8 +635,6 @@ int tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
}
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
out:
if (rc > 0)
rc = -ENODEV;
@@ -676,20 +655,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl);
static int tpm2_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- dev_info(&chip->dev, "starting up the TPM manually\n");
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_STARTUP);
- if (rc < 0)
- return rc;
-
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to start the TPM");
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_STARTUP);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_Startup");
}
/**
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index bbc05f0997a8..378b8d21b10c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -182,19 +182,18 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic");
if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
- rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, buf);
return rc;
}
@@ -924,7 +923,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm2_auth *auth;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 null_key;
int rc;
@@ -933,6 +931,10 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return 0;
}
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!auth)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -943,41 +945,37 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
/* salt key handle */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, null_key);
/* bind key handle */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RH_NULL);
/* nonce caller */
get_random_bytes(auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
- tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
+ tpm_buf_append_salt(buf, chip, auth);
/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
/* symmetric encryption parameters */
/* symmetric algorithm */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_AES);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM_ALG_AES);
/* bits for symmetric algorithm */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, AES_KEY_BITS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, AES_KEY_BITS);
/* symmetric algorithm mode (must be CFB) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_CFB);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM_ALG_CFB);
/* hash algorithm for session */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
- rc = tpm_ret_to_err(tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "StartAuthSession"));
+ rc = tpm_ret_to_err(tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_StartAuthSession"));
tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key);
if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
- rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, &buf);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ rc = tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(auth, buf);
if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
chip->auth = auth;
@@ -1199,18 +1197,18 @@ static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
u32 *handle, u8 *name)
{
int rc;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- struct tpm_buf template;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&template);
- if (rc) {
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
- }
+ struct tpm_buf *template __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!template)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY);
+ tpm_buf_init_sized(template, TPM_BUFSIZE);
/*
* create the template. Note: in order for userspace to
@@ -1222,75 +1220,71 @@ static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
*/
/* key type */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_ECC);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_ECC);
/* name algorithm */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
/* object properties */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&template, TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(template, TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY);
/* sauth policy (empty) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, 0);
/* BEGIN parameters: key specific; for ECC*/
/* symmetric algorithm */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_AES);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_AES);
/* bits for symmetric algorithm */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, AES_KEY_BITS);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, AES_KEY_BITS);
/* algorithm mode (must be CFB) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_CFB);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_CFB);
/* scheme (NULL means any scheme) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
/* ECC Curve ID */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256);
/* KDF Scheme */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, TPM_ALG_NULL);
/* unique: key specific; for ECC it is two zero size points */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&template, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(template, 0);
/* END parameters */
/* primary handle */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, hierarchy);
- tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, hierarchy);
+ tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
/* sensitive create size is 4 for two empty buffers */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 4);
/* sensitive create auth data (empty) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
/* sensitive create sensitive data (empty) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
/* the public template */
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, template.data, template.length);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&template);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, template->data, template->length);
/* outside info (empty) */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
/* creation PCR (none) */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 0);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0,
- "attempting to create NULL primary");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "TPM2_CreatePrimary");
if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
- rc = tpm2_parse_create_primary(chip, &buf, handle, hierarchy,
+ rc = tpm2_parse_create_primary(chip, buf, handle, hierarchy,
name);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
index 60354cd53b5c..cbf86ff5931f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
@@ -71,24 +71,25 @@ void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
unsigned int *offset, u32 *handle)
{
- struct tpm_buf tbuf;
struct tpm2_context *ctx;
unsigned int body_size;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *tbuf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(tbuf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD);
ctx = (struct tpm2_context *)&buf[*offset];
body_size = sizeof(*ctx) + be16_to_cpu(ctx->blob_size);
- tpm_buf_append(&tbuf, &buf[*offset], body_size);
+ tpm_buf_append(tbuf, &buf[*offset], body_size);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tbuf, 4, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, tbuf, 4, NULL);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
__func__, rc);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
} else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HANDLE ||
rc == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
@@ -103,64 +104,55 @@ int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
* flushed outside the space
*/
*handle = 0;
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -ENOENT;
} else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_INTEGRITY) {
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (rc > 0) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
__func__, rc);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
}
- *handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
+ *handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&tbuf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
*offset += body_size;
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return 0;
}
int tpm2_save_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, u8 *buf,
unsigned int buf_size, unsigned int *offset)
{
- struct tpm_buf tbuf;
unsigned int body_size;
int rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *tbuf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&tbuf, handle);
+ tpm_buf_init(tbuf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(tbuf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(tbuf, handle);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tbuf, 0, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, tbuf, 0, NULL);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a system error %d\n",
__func__, rc);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
} else if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0) {
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -ENOENT;
} else if (rc) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: failed with a TPM error 0x%04X\n",
__func__, rc);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -EFAULT;
}
- body_size = tpm_buf_length(&tbuf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ body_size = tpm_buf_length(tbuf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
if ((*offset + body_size) > buf_size) {
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: out of backing storage\n", __func__);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
+ memcpy(&buf[*offset], &tbuf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], body_size);
*offset += body_size;
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tbuf);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
index 0818bb517805..682dfc93845d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c
@@ -395,40 +395,36 @@ static bool vtpm_proxy_tpm_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
static int vtpm_proxy_request_locality(struct tpm_chip *chip, int locality)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
const struct tpm_header *header;
struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS,
- TPM2_CC_SET_LOCALITY);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SET_LOCALITY);
else
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
- TPM_ORD_SET_LOCALITY);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, locality);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SET_LOCALITY);
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, locality);
proxy_dev->state |= STATE_DRIVER_COMMAND;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to set locality");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 0, "attempting to set locality");
proxy_dev->state &= ~STATE_DRIVER_COMMAND;
- if (rc < 0) {
- locality = rc;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
- header = (const struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
+ header = (const struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
rc = be32_to_cpu(header->return_code);
if (rc)
locality = -1;
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
return locality;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 6ff76a4b8a53..a453271933cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
-#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
+#define TPM_BUFSIZE 4096
#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8
@@ -376,13 +377,15 @@ enum tpm_buf_flags {
};
/*
- * A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands.
+ * A buffer for constructing and parsing TPM commands, responses and sized
+ * (TPM2B) buffers.
*/
struct tpm_buf {
- u32 flags;
- u32 length;
- u8 *data;
+ u8 flags;
u8 handles;
+ u16 length;
+ u16 capacity;
+ u8 data[];
};
enum tpm2_object_attributes {
@@ -413,11 +416,10 @@ struct tpm2_hash {
unsigned int tpm_id;
};
-int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal);
+void tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size);
+void tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_size);
void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal);
-int tpm_buf_init_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf);
void tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf);
-void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf);
u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf);
void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length);
void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 636acb66a4f6..3ac204a902de 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -310,9 +310,8 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
if (!chip)
@@ -322,15 +321,12 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
if (rc)
return rc;
- buf.flags = 0;
- buf.length = buflen;
- buf.data = cmd;
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sending data");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, 4, "sending data");
dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+ /* Convert TPM error to -EPERM. */
if (rc > 0)
- /* TPM error */
rc = -EPERM;
tpm_put_ops(chip);
@@ -624,23 +620,23 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
- ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
return ret;
}
@@ -650,14 +646,15 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
- struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
- ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tb)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
- ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+ ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -665,7 +662,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
- tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 991f9af92eb1..79e2209fb369 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -210,13 +210,20 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
u32 hash;
u32 flags;
int i;
int rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sized)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
@@ -238,91 +245,79 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
goto out_put;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
- if (rc) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- goto out_put;
- }
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&sized);
- if (rc) {
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- goto out_put;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
if (options->blobauth_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, sized->data, sized->length);
/* public */
- tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
+ tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, hash);
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
/* policy */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
if (options->policydigest_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, 0);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, sized->data, sized->length);
/* outside info */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
/* creation PCR */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 0);
- if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
rc = -E2BIG;
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
goto out;
}
- tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
- rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 4, "sealing data");
+ rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, buf, rc);
if (rc)
goto out;
- blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
- if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
+ blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset);
+ if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
rc = -E2BIG;
goto out;
}
- if (buf.length - offset < blob_len) {
+ if (buf->length - offset < blob_len) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
+ blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf->data[offset],
+ blob_len);
if (blob_len < 0)
rc = blob_len;
out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
if (!rc)
payload->blob_len = blob_len;
@@ -349,7 +344,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
@@ -401,33 +395,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
- if (rc) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return rc;
- }
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
- if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
- rc = -E2BIG;
+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- goto out;
+ return -E2BIG;
}
- tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
- rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 4, "loading blob");
+ rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, buf, rc);
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
- (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
-
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+ (__be32 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
@@ -450,26 +440,25 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle)
{
struct tpm_header *head;
- struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
int offset;
u8 *data;
int rc;
+ struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
- if (rc) {
- tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
- return rc;
- }
-
- tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL);
+ tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
+ tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL);
+ tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, blob_handle, NULL);
if (!options->policyhandle) {
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
options->blobauth,
options->blobauth_len);
} else {
@@ -478,39 +467,35 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
* the password will end up being unencrypted on the bus, as
* HMAC nonce cannot be calculated for it.
*/
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->policyhandle);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, options->policyhandle);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
- offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
+ offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
}
}
- tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
- rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
+ tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 6, "unsealing");
+ rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, buf, rc);
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
- (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
- if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
+ (__be16 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
+ if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EFAULT;
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ data = &buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
if (payload->old_format) {
/* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
@@ -527,8 +512,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
}
-out:
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
--
2.39.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations.
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2025-10-20 9:04 ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-10-24 18:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Stefano Garzarella @ 2025-10-20 9:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: linux-integrity, keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson,
Jonathan McDowell, Roberto Sassu, Jarkko Sakkinen, Stefan Berger,
Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
linux-kernel, keyrings, linux-security-module
On Sat, Oct 18, 2025 at 02:17:25PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
>
>Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be
>done trivially:
>
> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE,
> GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!buf)
> return -ENOMEM;
> tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>
>Alternatively, stack allocations are also possible:
>
> u8 buf_data[512];
> struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data;
> tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data));
>
>Given that every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be changed,
>place command names from TCG 1.2 and 2.0 specifications to the @dest
>parameter, which will e.g., help tracing bugs.
Perhaps my previous message fell through the cracks, but I still have a
couple of comments (perhaps trivial, sorry in that case) that have not
been answered about this patch:
>
>Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>---
>v6
>- Update commit message.
>v5:
>- There was a spurious change in tpm2_seal_trusted() error
> code handling introduce by this patch.
>v4:
>- Since every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be
> changed anyhow, use 'dest' parameter more structured and
> actually useful way, and pick the string TCG 1.2 and 2.0
> specifications.
>- tpm1-cmd: Remove useless rc declarations and repliace them
> with trivial "return tpm_transmit_cmd" statement.
>- Reverted spurious changes in include/linux/tpm.h.
>- Use concisely TPM_BUFSIZE instead of PAGE_SIZE.
>v3:
>- A new patch from the earlier series with more scoped changes and
> less abstract commit message.
>---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 122 +++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 21 +-
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 -
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 162 +++++-------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 299 ++++++++++------------
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 122 +++++----
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 44 ++--
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 30 +--
> include/linux/tpm.h | 18 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 ++-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 175 ++++++-------
> 11 files changed, 484 insertions(+), 544 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
>index 1b9dee0d0681..a3bf3c3d0c48 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
[...]
>@@ -92,6 +119,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy);
> */
> u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf)
Should we update the return value to u16?
> {
>+ if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
>+ return 0;
>+
> return buf->length;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
[...]
>diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>index 636acb66a4f6..3ac204a902de 100644
>--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>@@ -310,9 +310,8 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
> * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
> * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
> */
>-static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
>+static int trusted_tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> {
>- struct tpm_buf buf;
> int rc;
>
> if (!chip)
>@@ -322,15 +321,12 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
>- buf.flags = 0;
>- buf.length = buflen;
>- buf.data = cmd;
> dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
>- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sending data");
>+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, 4, "sending data");
Is it fine here to remove the intermediate tpm_buf ?
IIUC tpm_transmit_cmd() needs a tpm_buf, while here we are passing just
the "data", or in some way it's a nested tpm_buf?
> dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
>
>+ /* Convert TPM error to -EPERM. */
> if (rc > 0)
>- /* TPM error */
> rc = -EPERM;
>
> tpm_put_ops(chip);
Thanks,
Stefano
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations.
2025-10-20 9:04 ` Stefano Garzarella
@ 2025-10-24 18:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2025-10-24 18:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefano Garzarella
Cc: linux-integrity, keyring, dpsmith, ross.philipson,
Jonathan McDowell, Roberto Sassu, Jarkko Sakkinen, Stefan Berger,
Peter Huewe, Jason Gunthorpe, James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
linux-kernel, keyrings, linux-security-module
On Mon, Oct 20, 2025 at 11:04:51AM +0200, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 18, 2025 at 02:17:25PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
> >
> > Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be
> > done trivially:
> >
> > struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE,
> > GFP_KERNEL);
> > if (!buf)
> > return -ENOMEM;
> > tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
> >
> > Alternatively, stack allocations are also possible:
> >
> > u8 buf_data[512];
> > struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data;
> > tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data));
> >
> > Given that every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be changed,
> > place command names from TCG 1.2 and 2.0 specifications to the @dest
> > parameter, which will e.g., help tracing bugs.
>
> Perhaps my previous message fell through the cracks, but I still have a
> couple of comments (perhaps trivial, sorry in that case) that have not been
> answered about this patch:
I think what happened is that there was enough time that I forgot what
I had or hadn't done :-) I'll address your comments.
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > v6
> > - Update commit message.
> > v5:
> > - There was a spurious change in tpm2_seal_trusted() error
> > code handling introduce by this patch.
> > v4:
> > - Since every single tpm_transmit_cmd() call site needs to be
> > changed anyhow, use 'dest' parameter more structured and
> > actually useful way, and pick the string TCG 1.2 and 2.0
> > specifications.
> > - tpm1-cmd: Remove useless rc declarations and repliace them
> > with trivial "return tpm_transmit_cmd" statement.
> > - Reverted spurious changes in include/linux/tpm.h.
> > - Use concisely TPM_BUFSIZE instead of PAGE_SIZE.
> > v3:
> > - A new patch from the earlier series with more scoped changes and
> > less abstract commit message.
> > ---
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 122 +++++----
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 21 +-
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 -
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 162 +++++-------
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 299 ++++++++++------------
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 122 +++++----
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 44 ++--
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c | 30 +--
> > include/linux/tpm.h | 18 +-
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 ++-
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 175 ++++++-------
> > 11 files changed, 484 insertions(+), 544 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> > index 1b9dee0d0681..a3bf3c3d0c48 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
>
> [...]
>
> > @@ -92,6 +119,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_destroy);
> > */
> > u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf)
>
> Should we update the return value to u16?
Ack.
>
>
> > {
> > + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > return buf->length;
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length);
>
> [...]
>
> > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > index 636acb66a4f6..3ac204a902de 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> > @@ -310,9 +310,8 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
> > * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
> > * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
> > */
> > -static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> > +static int trusted_tpm_send(void *cmd, size_t buflen)
> > {
> > - struct tpm_buf buf;
> > int rc;
> >
> > if (!chip)
> > @@ -322,15 +321,12 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
> > if (rc)
> > return rc;
> >
> > - buf.flags = 0;
> > - buf.length = buflen;
> > - buf.data = cmd;
> > dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> > - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sending data");
> > + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, 4, "sending data");
>
> Is it fine here to remove the intermediate tpm_buf ?
>
> IIUC tpm_transmit_cmd() needs a tpm_buf, while here we are passing just
> the "data", or in some way it's a nested tpm_buf?
This does not look right at all. I'll fix it and add automated test
suite for TPM 1.x to my standard test shenanigans so that I can
continuously test its correctness [1]. It anyhow should have TPM 1.2
tests (especially for trusted keys). As it becomes more rare
accidental bugs could easily hover in.
Thanks, this was really good catch. I'll address both bug and make
sure that I don't do the same mistake twice :-)
>
> > dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
> >
> > + /* Convert TPM error to -EPERM. */
> > if (rc > 0)
> > - /* TPM error */
> > rc = -EPERM;
> >
> > tpm_put_ops(chip);
>
> Thanks,
> Stefano
>
[1] https://codeberg.org/jarkko/linux-tpmdd-test
BR, Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-10-24 18:49 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
[not found] <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 03/10] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-18 11:17 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-10-20 9:04 ` Stefano Garzarella
2025-10-24 18:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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