From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8792E2EC554; Sat, 18 Oct 2025 11:18:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760786290; cv=none; b=HVxjEZjxVdSsz56wUhu4l0OPyr/WKz59McDPNbqkdCKEYsPpliIpWUfEpPPgvdAvJxYveW/BDnQOuBpRW1/9Ubnam7xghL/nStENCAnsg2z7wVT4FLAN9LAp9WyB4XBlezJ1t+GYf/C+jt4A94MYNfbFBRqKpOE3w1ZiGloodTo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1760786290; c=relaxed/simple; bh=rYD+3EtekAuzaTyNHotcuDeeA5eiWTQXM5VcqjbLk9c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=YZjf8h3PF9fKtF2LnF2UBmGIffr3sI4C0VfXVn8yIQ3dE14xZ/88BkHg01rR7i32cq31QfXfex9sOJy79qEIJPT7IjydFQhEdZ6yWTG/YutgUdsb/xmwLxqY/2x2Ex+DeXCghdMvZwClIn2+A2IqNZkx0AVH4/OrB0hp0KJgb74= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=OjUSUq9D; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="OjUSUq9D" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 31D3EC4CEF8; Sat, 18 Oct 2025 11:18:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1760786289; bh=rYD+3EtekAuzaTyNHotcuDeeA5eiWTQXM5VcqjbLk9c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=OjUSUq9DhaomjzzaO1cvhXaU5ayXsgSmXaOHv1MM+xfjRf1ssXa5wM6yakvAI4ewL k64+zkKgfeJO7ie5kKr/2CeT1fBQ8fxqQM+FjFxkMcLWcsMIb2WDLH0qJQKblXm7FO GUg27sXyJSHR+xICcFtmltul5SsTdEjn5PFu0N/wRSFBoP1PKauanOoI9529KafLA/ f3kUAjdnPa++JnwFjAT5YyxSyoH+y+Hf0j5ViM7rxKVpByPQPDB0xc/Vwc62S9KKhX utsYyxvO+VgJlrEAl6p9R6Mcw77LkVuSf0WKl78qkAnKXLe5cQDu+OO4dCP2wqFt6W hbtG46xH5tD9A== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyring@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell , Roberto Sassu , Stefano Garzarella , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan McDowell , Peter Huewe , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2025 14:17:23 +0300 Message-Id: <20251018111725.3116386-9-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251018111725.3116386-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen Unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID, given that they are identical. The only difference are the log messages. In addition, add a missing TPM_BUF_INVALID check to tpm_buf_append_handle() following the pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell --- v6: - Change short summary to something more descriptive. v5: - No changes. v4: - No changes. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 14 ++++++++------ include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index dc882fc9fa9e..69ee77400539 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -104,13 +104,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); */ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) { - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -157,8 +156,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); */ void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) + return; + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -177,14 +180,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void { off_t next_offset; - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; next_offset = *offset + count; if (next_offset > buf->length) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 973458a38250..3eae22a06558 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -369,12 +369,10 @@ struct tpm_header { } __packed; enum tpm_buf_flags { - /* the capacity exceeded: */ - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), /* TPM2B format: */ - TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(1), - /* read out of boundary: */ - TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR = BIT(2), + TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(0), + /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */ + TPM_BUF_INVALID = BIT(1), }; /* diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 74eb1223c3da..991f9af92eb1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* creation PCR */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) { + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; -- 2.39.5