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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
	Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 03/11] KEYS: trusted: remove redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map
Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2025 23:41:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251127214138.3760029-4-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

Trusted keys duplicates tpm2_hash_map from TPM driver internals. Implement
and export `tpm2_find_hash_alg()` in order to address this glitch, and
replace redundant code block with a call this new function.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v8:
- Remove spurious tpm2_alg_to_crypto_id.
- Check return value of tpm2_find_hash_alg correctly in trusted_tpm2.c
  i.e, fail on "hash_alg < 0". Trusted keys were tested but I had my
  test harness misconfigured. I bisected the failure to this patch.
- The diff was not exactly minimal. Further optimize it.
v7:
- A new patch.
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c               | 14 +++++++++++++-
 include/linux/tpm.h                       |  1 +
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 23 ++++-------------------
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 5b6ccf901623..dd502322f499 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity;
 module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend");
 
-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
+struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
 	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
@@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
 	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
 };
 
+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++)
+		if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id)
+			return tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg);
+
 int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 {
 	chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 0e9e043f728c..3d8f7d1ce2b8 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max);
 extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void);
 void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
+int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id);
 
 static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
 {
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 024be262702f..edd7b9d7e4dc 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
 
 #include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
 
-static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512},
-	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
-};
-
 static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 };
 
 static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
 	struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
 	int blob_len = 0;
-	u32 hash;
+	int hash;
 	u32 flags;
-	int i;
 	int rc;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
-		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
-			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+	if (hash < 0)
+		return hash;
 
 	if (!options->keyhandle)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.52.0


       reply	other threads:[~2025-11-27 21:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-11-27 21:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 04/11] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 05/11] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 07/11] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 08/11] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 09/11] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 11/11] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen

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