From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 04/11] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_load()
Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2025 23:41:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251127214138.3760029-5-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
tpm2_load() allocates a blob indirectly via tpm2_key_decode() but it is
not freed in all failure paths. Address this with a scope-based cleanup
helper __free(). For legacy blobs, the implicit de-allocation is gets
disable by no_free_ptr().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v7:
- Fix compiler warning.
v6:
- A new patch in this version.
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 +++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index edd7b9d7e4dc..36e20a9a94b4 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -98,9 +98,8 @@ struct tpm2_key_context {
u32 priv_len;
};
-static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
- struct trusted_key_options *options,
- u8 **buf)
+static void *tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
int ret;
struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
@@ -111,16 +110,15 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
payload->blob_len);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!blob)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- *buf = blob;
options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
- return 0;
+ return blob;
}
int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -372,6 +370,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
+ u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@@ -380,11 +379,14 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
int rc;
u32 attrs;
- rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
- if (rc) {
+ blob = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options);
+ if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
/* old form */
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Bind to cleanup: */
+ blob_ref = blob;
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@@ -449,8 +451,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
- if (blob != payload->blob)
- kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)
--
2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-27 21:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 03/11] KEYS: trusted: remove redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 05/11] KEYS: trusted: Use tpm_ret_to_err() in trusted_tpm2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 07/11] tpm2-sessions: Unmask tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 08/11] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 09/11] tpm-buf: unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-27 21:41 ` [PATCH v8 11/11] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
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