From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6899328278; Thu, 27 Nov 2025 21:42:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764279746; cv=none; b=nggfqeCJqU0Ni0xNQZdiXAT4wQsfeH33YT3FQzA97Jf3hq/6sgeihu61WbVLiTYTtyI8DzZ1OJqEEaRIOQV786xAFjNJyZ6Q4l3+Hsy2Ck/FiPA4izdRqydmRjwARhV0/kuXNZZ/KUAgy3ewcxkg11HNIWdTyzUm7rTBqnD5xwM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764279746; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VfnpC7B5+fvPC16y4Ba0nnFdW2qn++u3sSdL/Of9vAU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=oVrsf06sVfMFpMgeEmpuh4SiagIN8mX5IS3OqwLAEEzCkeQ1AbvdtFHNGKX/OuxBEn0Q3M1vyD8IBlbNmIDlQTKOwvaX0iE9JI3RjOh3xjh4/NwOJd7/HlCs6OWwLZOSwP1PLimjcdZ54GvuZPt+ISLBm/OUiTSWNxvzOLPETQc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=XwSmsxqC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="XwSmsxqC" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EF3FDC4CEF8; Thu, 27 Nov 2025 21:42:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1764279746; bh=VfnpC7B5+fvPC16y4Ba0nnFdW2qn++u3sSdL/Of9vAU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=XwSmsxqCN/rd6YzbGExt2rx+6IYDAFakfb7WxqLPencIDUbqCZF1phs6wPb2FntW7 U68XMmX9LLPZAbg2xfZnUP94iWKvWcgiy2+LvP7jWjhZvqRB9cR+sNL6JMH18x0Wjy in9XbsNoB3T1mJKzv4gJpWzXBOzFcd7/vdbh3kmwgeuh2jZaqRrMevgU9EmUXsZflU sGtoPPofKu8/j6fDJSMLGX3OW/Qdz/7niax7Z1agPWdY9T+my1kQiVndlTHIqqkSl2 3u4HXXk/UJ9Ez28Gq80ba542UMhCxXqtP/vtWXhdOGdrRsfwrNYNS48tGa5KtOkIoi wXPHUuaPjWroQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell , Stefano Garzarella , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Bottomley , Jarkko Sakkinen , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 08/11] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2025 23:41:33 +0200 Message-ID: <20251127214138.3760029-9-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251127214138.3760029-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen tpm2_buf_append_auth() has only single call site and most of its parameters are redundant. Open code it to the call site. Remove illegit FIXME comment as there is no categorized bug and replace it with more sane comment about implementation (i.e. "non-opionated inline comment"). Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell --- v6: - No changes. v5: - No changes. v4: - No changes. v3: - No changes. v2: - No changes. --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 51 ++++------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index de418fb98df6..0110e8806da7 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -188,36 +188,6 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return 0; } -/** - * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. - * - * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance - * @session_handle: session handle - * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used - * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used - * @attributes: the session attributes - * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used - * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used - */ -static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, - const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, - u8 attributes, - const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); - - if (nonce && nonce_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); - - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); - - if (hmac && hmac_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); -} - /** * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key * @@ -492,19 +462,16 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth_len); } else { /* - * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the - * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't - * calculate a HMAC on it. Therefore, the user can - * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must - * send down the plain text password, which could be - * intercepted. We can still encrypt the returned - * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer - * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated - * password. + * The policy session is generated outside the kernel, and thus + * the password will end up being unencrypted on the bus, as + * HMAC nonce cannot be calculated for it. */ - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->policyhandle); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); } else { -- 2.52.0