From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B91B225524C; Fri, 28 Nov 2025 02:54:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764298472; cv=none; b=bi/spvuuiUA6fNs39um6yj2MULL+jGE7fYX3RFLY1Ri9LRZiKiih3P2rpn0i8AjXMYS7jnIrfwDWU8Lzlqp7KnJBE+SHGEeNlzQLhpDaQJgkwVEFdrP5BCBK+kprz4Wk428rfy10PuSqgannQJfW6/s/nbgobCAa2KfjOgoUQTY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1764298472; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2sk65LE1raMiUPZaVJ6CSZ+cwZCR1ikqTZm/0v9EiXk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=pLQzl5o6TfrMowTiCjvN2kwKPOqacP/A6rZmXWlXxOpEvkmMYPCzlzRjAoOrEf9RQqn4EtH9RassKL3M5b+E+8yVvxyJ8Wvc3CYyBv+aGEmaghSGVIYtOu2sI1Widtsige/MWTRIIv5I+LwicAXu6tuqaNQoX31ngQABCdSBkkc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=hrYAedE9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="hrYAedE9" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B6D34C4CEF8; Fri, 28 Nov 2025 02:54:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1764298472; bh=2sk65LE1raMiUPZaVJ6CSZ+cwZCR1ikqTZm/0v9EiXk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hrYAedE9NT9rSV1WBFKNg/ibtYQcUfO3VKFTrV3inRxelrTAyeObKqYlhsnewo4+n flwulsXy9Ds0ZjYE3w2GbepUeoZzMV/bFRW5cNC5B8pUEXfEPKrDL5g/OnxIdLjvUb h3vHpxwlflB8oLB6u1UfCpWmM4CjAPfTpx2INIW5qRtTRWGMDbAJGM4Po/DKthUVE4 OxlEfboiAdYpgGSyqkYNE4QIriHvq2GrIxXSDFIvnD5pe0Br5SAuoqemwKvBqqhQXu UXLUomCPbj2Rmp80m3nJMIAtR9Rfrx7vVai9gyOtzzOSXjtJH4PhLXRU1fbGDx36Ws H/Qggo/cNklyg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell , Stefano Garzarella , Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v9 3/8] KEYS: trusted: Replace a redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 04:53:55 +0200 Message-ID: <20251128025402.4147024-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251128025402.4147024-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251128025402.4147024-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 'trusted_tpm2' duplicates 'tpm2_hash_map' originally part of the TPN driver, which is suboptimal. Implement and export `tpm2_find_hash_alg()` in the driver, and substitute the redundant code in 'trusted_tpm2' with a call to the new function. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v9: - Improved the commit message a bit. v8: - Remove spurious tpm2_alg_to_crypto_id. - Check return value of tpm2_find_hash_alg correctly in trusted_tpm2.c i.e, fail on "hash_alg < 0". Trusted keys were tested but I had my test harness misconfigured. I bisected the failure to this patch. - The diff was not exactly minimal. Further optimize it. v7: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 23 ++++------------------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index e298194883e8..a121c518ff6f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_pcr_integrity, "Disable integrity protection of TPM2_PCR_Extend"); -static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { +struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, @@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, }; +int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) + if (crypto_id == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) + return tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; + + return -EINVAL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_find_hash_alg); + int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) { chip->timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 973458a38250..cbd3a70c0378 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); +int tpm2_find_hash_alg(unsigned int crypto_id); static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index c414a7006d78..4467e880ebd5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -18,14 +18,6 @@ #include "tpm2key.asn1.h" -static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { - {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512}, - {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, -}; - static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 }; static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, @@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; struct tpm_buf buf, sized; int blob_len = 0; - u32 hash; + int hash; u32 flags; - int i; int rc; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { - if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { - hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; - break; - } - } - - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) - return -EINVAL; + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); + if (hash < 0) + return hash; if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; -- 2.52.0