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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
	Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 4/8] KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 04:53:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251128025402.4147024-5-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251128025402.4147024-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode'
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v9:
- Fixed up the commit message. It was not up to date and referred to wrong
  function.
- Simplified the patch considereably. It was not optimally small.
v8:
- No changes.
v7:
- Fix compiler warning.
v6:
- A new patch in this version.
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 4467e880ebd5..225b8c9932bf 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			 struct trusted_key_options *options,
 			 u32 *blob_handle)
 {
+	u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	unsigned int private_len;
 	unsigned int public_len;
@@ -379,6 +380,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		/* old form */
 		blob = payload->blob;
 		payload->old_format = 1;
+	} else {
+		/* Bind for cleanup: */
+		blob_ref = blob;
 	}
 
 	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@@ -443,8 +447,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
 
 out:
-	if (blob != payload->blob)
-		kfree(blob);
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
 	return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
-- 
2.52.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-28  2:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20251128025402.4147024-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2025-11-28  2:53 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] tpm2-sessions: Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28  2:53 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] KEYS: trusted: Replace a redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28  9:44   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-11-28 15:14     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28  2:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-11-28  2:53 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28  2:53 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28  2:54 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen

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