From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 85BFD3B8D70; Sat, 6 Dec 2025 11:31:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765020687; cv=none; b=YK00gJSljCJ+aMo6OL4TCopYpc8y25VC5LXzI5iT2N9WF+//Qb69Z+NaV7mLbNa21vkUNZEqQpaxitMDg+x7aA84Cldy8m6iq7E+78wT2euLw4yg4Q2s8swidfBf/XW9leJiMUlkdRrG2Fg5L4IuOvUb4lbMDw10VNcBHeP1mxo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765020687; c=relaxed/simple; bh=0NTqmK0sP9NWngg3Q0qP5FtoHiuddFmCR5+NkhQleuM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=pFX8zGXmF8k/c0PDVTe/rkg5ePr9mVwini+3hBFShsNr2n1TJaAHcuN3Ni4h8a8Up7nsN+yS+1X6gEWFrcDdeBwf1oMmTX4oRVe4qvN4ay0Vh2D68Yg8e0tGpPizenPMJ62Fk1QmRSsSVqyXB96ecAJdBZyGyEWXsFuR/DwkVyo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=gsiRoyA2; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="gsiRoyA2" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4E341C4CEF5; Sat, 6 Dec 2025 11:31:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765020686; bh=0NTqmK0sP9NWngg3Q0qP5FtoHiuddFmCR5+NkhQleuM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gsiRoyA2H1WPkbAcQMYboLmxT/Avf5PdBBqLkX6Z6FCVetkaHLgRQKWzH7PbQMk6U lJWUpMBzdCU/Fyqwp2mogwYIy2bQsI0ea9RJpruG9o8OoAyGu+Vsue23B9vek3cZgE Ynveqql1pnKILvtkJdNu1PGOdf9ov51yX70BL/mpoTdU8RU/ebMeJcahLU+qItwOB0 yT3rdbDzOHTBZjObO/j2MxlKyEwRnpHU4EKWjmxAb680LRBVnhbtrR7EJLjgtSrx9R +2G78emU98G0EJ/hes37OXngirnhaJh/Ycu+JsYB1sQRD7z5aBK9wBW3jwoGEgg2uZ tGpjeeCFcRf5w== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan McDowell , Peter Huewe , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH 1/3] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2025 13:31:08 +0200 Message-Id: <20251206113110.1793407-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20251206113110.1793407-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251206113110.1793407-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID, given that they are identical. The only difference are the log messages. In addition, add a missing TPM_BUF_INVALID check to tpm_buf_append_handle() following the pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 14 ++++++++------ include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index dc882fc9fa9e..69ee77400539 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -104,13 +104,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); */ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length) { - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -157,8 +156,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); */ void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) + return; + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } @@ -177,14 +180,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void { off_t next_offset; - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; next_offset = *offset + count; if (next_offset > buf->length) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 202da079d500..aed34f119e8c 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -369,12 +369,10 @@ struct tpm_header { } __packed; enum tpm_buf_flags { - /* the capacity exceeded: */ - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), /* TPM2B format: */ - TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(1), - /* read out of boundary: */ - TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR = BIT(2), + TPM_BUF_TPM2B = BIT(0), + /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */ + TPM_BUF_INVALID = BIT(1), }; /* diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index a7ea4a1c3bed..fdba641fefdb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* creation PCR */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) { + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; goto out; } @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc = -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; -- 2.39.5