linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Abhinav Saxena" <xandfury@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/5] Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT
Date: Sat,  6 Dec 2025 20:51:26 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251207015132.800576-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com> (raw)

Hi,

This is version 4 of the LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT series, which
implements a new flag to suppress inheritance of access rights and
flags from parent objects.

This series is rebased on v6 of Tingmao Wang's "quiet flag" series.

The new flag enables policies where a parent directory needs broader
access than its children. For example, a sandbox may permit read-write
access to /home/user but still prohibit writes to ~/.bashrc or
~/.ssh, even though they are nested beneath the parent. Today this is
not possible because access rights always propagate from parent to
child within a layer.

When a rule is added with LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT:

  * access rights on parent inodes are ignored for that inode and its
    descendants; and
  * operations that change the filesystem ancestors of such objects
    (via rename, rmdir, link) are denied up to the VFS root
    (new in v4); and
  * parent flags do not propagate below a NO_INHERIT rule.

These parent-directory restrictions help mitigate sandbox-restart
attacks: a sandboxed process could otherwise move a protected
directory before exit, causing the next sandbox instance to apply its
policy to the wrong path.

Changes since v3:

  1. Trimmed core implementation in fs.c by removing redundant functions.
  2. Fixed placement/inclusion of prototypes.
  3. Added 4 new selftests for bind mount cases.
  4. Protections now apply up to the VFS root instead of the mountpoint
     root.

Changes since v2:

  1. Add six new selftests for the new flag.
  2. Add an optimization to stop permission harvesting when all
     relevant layers are tagged with NO_INHERIT.
  3. Suppress inheritance of parent flags.
  4. Rebase onto v5 of the quiet-flag series.
  5. Remove the xarray structure used for flag tracking in favor of
     blank rule insertion, simplifying the implementation.
  6. Fix edge cases involving flag inheritance across multiple
     NO_INHERIT layers.
  7. Add documenting comments to new functions.

Links:

v1:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20251105180019.1432367-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/T/#t
v2:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20251120222346.1157004-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/T/#t
v3:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20251126122039.3832162-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/
quiet-flag v6:
  https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/cover.1765040503.git.m@maowtm.org/

Example usage:

  # LL_FS_RO="/a/b/c" LL_FS_RW="/" LL_FS_NO_INHERIT="/a/b/c"
    landlock-sandboxer sh
  # touch /a/b/c/fi                    # denied; / RW does not inherit
  # rmdir /a/b/c                       # denied by ancestor protections
  # mv /a /bad                         # denied
  # mkdir /a/good; touch /a/good/fi    # allowed; unrelated path

Again, if preferred, I'm happy to split the selftests into multiple
commits.

This version simplifies a lot of the code in the core implementation.
Special thanks to Tingmao Wang for your valuable feedback.

Thank you for your time and review.

Regards,
Justin Suess

Justin Suess (5):
  landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT
  landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT userspace api
  samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT to
    landlock-sandboxer
  selftests/landlock: Implement selftests for
    LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT
  landlock: Implement KUnit test for LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT

 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h              |  29 +
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c               |  13 +-
 security/landlock/fs.c                     | 389 ++++++++++-
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                | 108 +++-
 security/landlock/ruleset.h                |  29 +-
 security/landlock/syscalls.c               |  16 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 710 +++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 1285 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)


base-commit: 92f98eb2cc08c6e2d093d4682f1cd1204728e97e
-- 
2.51.0


             reply	other threads:[~2025-12-07  1:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-07  1:51 Justin Suess [this message]
2025-12-07  1:51 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2025-12-12 13:27   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-12-12 22:02     ` Justin Suess
2025-12-07  1:51 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] landlock: Implement LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT userspace api Justin Suess
2025-12-07  1:51 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT to landlock-sandboxer Justin Suess
2025-12-07  1:51 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] selftests/landlock: Implement selftests for LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_NO_INHERIT Justin Suess
2025-12-07  1:51 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] landlock: Implement KUnit test " Justin Suess

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20251207015132.800576-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    --to=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=m@maowtm.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=xandfury@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).