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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS),
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY
	SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH v8 00/12] Streamline TPM2 HMAC sessions
Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:21:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251216092147.2326606-1-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)

This patch set contains accumulated patches, which gradually improve 
TPM2 HMAC session management and TPM driver memory management.

RNG test
========

I run this test both TPM1 and TPM2 chips using QEMU and swtpm:

#!/bin/sh

ctrl_c() {
  set +e
  echo 0 > tracing_on
  echo nop > current_tracer
  echo BYE
  exit
}

trap ctrl_c EXIT INT
mount -t tracefs none /sys/kernel/tracing

set -e
cd /sys/kernel/tracing
echo function > current_tracer
echo p:tpm_get_random tpm_get_random > kprobe_events
echo tpm_get_random > set_ftrace_filter
echo 1 > tracing_on
cat /dev/hwrng > /dev/null &
echo > trace
cat trace_pipe &
sleep 10

Change Log
==========

v8:
- Patch was a bit out-of-sync after piling new stuff. Now it is somewhat
  sane: RNG patches first, then tpm2-sessions and finally managed
  tpm_buf allocations.
- I added inline comment on explaining why unconditional sha256_update()
  call is safe to do when managing only single authorization handle. 
v7:
- Updated cover letter to match better the current state of the patch
  set.
v6:
- OK, so I decided to send one more update with managed allocations
  moved to the tail so that it does not block reviewing more trivial
  patches.
- Trimmed some of the patches and improved commit messages.
v5:
- I decided to add the managed allocation patch to this and take it from
  the master branch for the time being, as it needs more eyes despite
  having already one reviewed-by tag (especially tested-by tags).

Jarkko Sakkinen (12):
  KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM
  KEYS: trusted: Use get_random_bytes_wait() instead of tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Orchestrate TPM commands in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Change tpm_get_random() opportunistic
  tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE
  KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append()
  KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd
  KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls
  tpm2-sessions: Remove the support for more than one authorization
  tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle
  tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW
  tpm-buf: Implement managed allocations

 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c                | 156 ++++-----
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c          | 145 ++++++++-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c              |  23 +-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h                    |   3 -
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c               | 198 ++++--------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c               | 371 +++++++---------------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c          | 281 +++++++---------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c             |  44 ++-
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c         |  30 +-
 include/linux/tpm.h                       |  77 +++--
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c |  70 ++--
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 329 ++++++++++---------
 12 files changed, 783 insertions(+), 944 deletions(-)

-- 
2.39.5


             reply	other threads:[~2025-12-16  9:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-16  9:21 Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random-fallback for TPM Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] KEYS: trusted: Use get_random_bytes_wait() instead of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19  9:21   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] tpm: Orchestrate TPM commands in tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19  9:43   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] tpm: Change tpm_get_random() opportunistic Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16 22:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19  9:42   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19  9:32   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-19  9:37   ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-12-19 20:54   ` James Bottomley
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] tpm2-sessions: Remove the support for more than one authorization Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-16  9:21 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] tpm-buf: Implement managed allocations Jarkko Sakkinen

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