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From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ipc: don't audit capability check in ipc_permissions()
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2026 15:13:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260122141303.241133-1-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)

The IPC sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and
they override the file access mode based on the CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
capability, which is being checked regardless of whether any access is
actually denied or not, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit
record may be logged even when access is in fact granted.

It wouldn't be viable to restructure the sysctl permission logic to only
check the capability when the access would be actually denied if it's
not granted. Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions()
(net/sysctl_net.c) - switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(),
so that the check never emits an audit record.

Fixes: 0889f44e2810 ("ipc: Check permissions for checkpoint_restart sysctls at open time")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++
 ipc/ipc_sysctl.c           | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 1fb08922552c7..37db92b3d6f89 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
 		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
 }
 
+static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
+		ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   const struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c b/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c
index 15b17e86e198c..9b087ebeb643b 100644
--- a/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c
+++ b/ipc/ipc_sysctl.c
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int ipc_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, const struct ctl_table
 	if (((table->data == &ns->ids[IPC_SEM_IDS].next_id) ||
 	     (table->data == &ns->ids[IPC_MSG_IDS].next_id) ||
 	     (table->data == &ns->ids[IPC_SHM_IDS].next_id)) &&
-	    checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(ns->user_ns))
+	    checkpoint_restore_ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns))
 		mode = 0666;
 	else
 #endif
-- 
2.52.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-01-22 14:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-22 14:13 Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2026-01-22 14:37 ` [PATCH] ipc: don't audit capability check in ipc_permissions() Alexey Gladkov
2026-01-26 22:50 ` Paul Moore
2026-01-27  2:01   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-01-27 22:06     ` Paul Moore
2026-01-28  3:26       ` Serge E. Hallyn

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