From: Dmitry Safonov via B4 Relay <devnull+dima.arista.com@kernel.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Silvia Sisinni <silvia.sisinni@polito.it>,
Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ima_fs: Avoid creating measurement lists for unsupported hash algos
Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2026 03:05:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260127-ima-oob-v1-1-2d42f3418e57@arista.com> (raw)
From: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
ima_init_crypto() skips initializing ima_algo_array[i] if the alogorithm
from ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is not supported.
It seems avoid adding the unsupported algorithm to ima_algo_array will
break all the logic that relies on indexing by NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip).
Grepping HASH_ALGO__LAST in security/integrity/ima/ shows that is
the check other logic relies on, so make
create_securityfs_measurement_lists() ignore unknown algorithms.
On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name:
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
> Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1
>
> CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90
> print_report+0xc4/0x580
> ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80
> ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
> kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
> ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
> create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
> ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300
> ima_init+0x7d/0xd0
> init_ima+0x28/0x100
> do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0
> kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740
> kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0
> ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80
> ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
> </TASK>
>
> The buggy address belongs to the variable:
> hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420
>
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x107ce18
> flags: 0x8000000000002000(reserved|zone=2)
> raw: 8000000000002000 ffffea0041f38608 ffffea0041f38608 0000000000000000
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
> ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> >ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9
> ^
> ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9
> ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
> ==================================================================
Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in
tpm_algorithms:
> tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027
Fixes: 9fa8e7625008 ("ima: add crypto agility support for template-hash algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Cc: Silvia Sisinni <silvia.sisinni@polito.it>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 012a58959ff0..e9283229acea 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -404,6 +404,9 @@ static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(void)
char file_name[NAME_MAX + 1];
struct dentry *dentry;
+ if (algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ continue;
+
sprintf(file_name, "ascii_runtime_measurements_%s",
hash_algo_name[algo]);
dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
---
base-commit: 63804fed149a6750ffd28610c5c1c98cce6bd377
change-id: 20260127-ima-oob-9fa83a634d7b
Best regards,
--
Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
next reply other threads:[~2026-01-27 3:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-27 3:05 Dmitry Safonov via B4 Relay [this message]
2026-01-27 9:14 ` [PATCH] ima_fs: Avoid creating measurement lists for unsupported hash algos Roberto Sassu
2026-01-27 9:55 ` Dmitry Safonov
2026-01-27 10:02 ` Roberto Sassu
2026-01-27 10:12 ` Dmitry Safonov
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