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From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
	"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	"Samasth Norway Ananda" <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
	"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
	"Demi Marie Obenour" <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
	"Alyssa Ross" <hi@alyssa.is>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 4/6] landlock/selftests: Test named UNIX domain socket restrictions
Date: Mon,  9 Feb 2026 00:10:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260208231017.114343-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260208231017.114343-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>

* Exercise the access right for connect() and sendmsg() on named UNIX
  domain sockets, in various combinations of Landlock domains and
  socket types.
* Extract common helpers from an existing IOCTL test that
  also uses pathname unix(7) sockets.

The tested combinations are the cross product of these sets of fixture
fields:

* {{.handled=RESOLVE_UNIX},
   {.handled=RESOLVE_UNIX, .allowed=RESOLVE_UNIX}}
* {{.sock_type=SOCK_STREAM},
   {.sock_type=SOCK_DGRAM},
   {.sock_type=SOCK_DGRAM, .use_sendto=true},
   {.sock_type=SOCK_SEQPACKET}}
* {{.server_in_same_domain=false},
   {.server_in_same_domain=true}}

Some additional fixtures exercise scenarios with two nested domains.

Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 381 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 365 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b318627e7561..9d3f5dab4567 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -4358,30 +4358,61 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl)
 	ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0));
 }
 
+/*
+ * set_up_named_unix_server - Create a pathname unix socket
+ *
+ * If the socket type is not SOCK_DGRAM, also invoke listen(2).
+ *
+ * Return: The listening FD - it is the caller responsibility to close it.
+ */
+static int set_up_named_unix_server(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+				    int type, const char *const path)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+	};
+
+	fd = socket(AF_UNIX, type, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+	strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)));
+
+	if (type != SOCK_DGRAM)
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(fd, 10 /* qlen */));
+	return fd;
+}
+
+/*
+ * test_connect_named_unix - connect to the given named UNIX socket
+ *
+ * Return: The errno from connect(), or 0
+ */
+static int test_connect_named_unix(int fd, const char *const path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+	};
+	strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+
+	if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1)
+		return errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* For named UNIX domain sockets, no IOCTL restrictions apply. */
 TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
 {
 	const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
 	int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd;
-	struct sockaddr_un srv_un = {
-		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
-	};
-	struct sockaddr_un cli_un = {
-		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
-	};
 	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
 		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
 	};
 
 	/* Sets up a server */
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
-	srv_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-	ASSERT_LE(0, srv_fd);
-
-	strncpy(srv_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(srv_un.sun_path));
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, sizeof(srv_un)));
-
-	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(srv_fd, 10 /* qlen */));
+	srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, path);
 
 	/* Enables Landlock. */
 	ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
@@ -4393,9 +4424,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
 	cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
 
-	strncpy(cli_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(cli_un.sun_path));
-	ASSERT_EQ(0,
-		  connect(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, sizeof(cli_un)));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, test_connect_named_unix(cli_fd, path));
 
 	/* FIONREAD and other IOCTLs should not be forbidden. */
 	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(cli_fd));
@@ -4570,6 +4599,326 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_access_file)
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
 }
 
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(unix_socket) {};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(unix_socket) {};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(unix_socket) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(unix_socket)
+{
+	const __u64 handled;
+	const __u64 allowed;
+	const __u64 handled2;
+	const __u64 allowed2;
+	const int sock_type;
+	const int expected;
+	const bool use_sendto;
+	const bool server_in_same_domain;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_handled_not_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_handled_and_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_handled_not_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_handled_and_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_sendto_handled_not_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.use_sendto = true,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_sendto_handled_and_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.use_sendto = true,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, seqpacket_handled_not_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_SEQPACKET,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, seqpacket_handled_and_allowed)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_SEQPACKET,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_handled_not_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_handled_and_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_handled_not_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_handled_and_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_sendto_handled_not_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.use_sendto = true,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, dgram_sendto_handled_and_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_DGRAM,
+	.use_sendto = true,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, seqpacket_handled_not_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_SEQPACKET,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, seqpacket_handled_and_allowed_and_same_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_SEQPACKET,
+	.expected = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_nested_domains_scope_path)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+	.handled2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_nested_domains_path_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+	.handled2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed2 = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_nested_domains_scope_scope)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+	.handled2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed2 = 0,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(unix_socket, stream_nested_domains_path_path)
+{
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.server_in_same_domain = true,
+	.handled2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.allowed2 = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+	.sock_type = SOCK_STREAM,
+	.expected = 0,
+};
+
+/*
+ * test_sendto_named_unix - sendto to the given named UNIX socket
+ *
+ * sendto() is equivalent to sendmsg() in this respect.
+ *
+ * Return: The errno from sendto(), or 0
+ */
+static int test_sendto_named_unix(int fd, const char *const path)
+{
+	static const char buf[] = "dummy";
+	struct sockaddr_un addr = {
+		.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
+	};
+	strncpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+
+	if (sendto(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+		   sizeof(addr)) == -1)
+		return errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(unix_socket, test)
+{
+	const char *const path = "sock";
+	int cli_fd, srv_fd, ruleset_fd, res;
+	struct rule rules[] = {
+		{
+			.path = ".",
+			.access = variant->allowed,
+		},
+		{},
+	};
+
+	/* Sets up a server (in the case where the server is in the parent domain) */
+	if (!variant->server_in_same_domain)
+		srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, variant->sock_type,
+						  path);
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/* Sets up a server (in the case where the server is in the same domain) */
+	if (variant->server_in_same_domain)
+		srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, variant->sock_type,
+						  path);
+
+	if (variant->handled2) {
+		/* Enables Landlock another time, if needed. */
+		rules[0].access = variant->allowed2;
+		ruleset_fd =
+			create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled2, rules);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+	}
+
+	/* Sets up a client connection to it */
+	cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, variant->sock_type, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
+
+	/* Connecting or sendto to the Unix socket is denied. */
+	if (variant->use_sendto)
+		res = test_sendto_named_unix(cli_fd, path);
+	else
+		res = test_connect_named_unix(cli_fd, path);
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected, res);
+
+	/* Clean up. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+}
+
 /* clang-format off */
 FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
 /* clang-format on */
-- 
2.52.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-08 23:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-08 23:10 [PATCH v4 0/6] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-02-08 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Günther Noack
2026-02-09 17:51   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-09 18:33     ` Tingmao Wang
2026-02-09 19:53       ` Tingmao Wang
2026-02-10 13:02     ` Justin Suess
2026-02-08 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path Günther Noack
2026-02-09 10:21   ` Günther Noack
2026-02-09 13:11     ` Justin Suess
2026-02-10 23:04       ` Günther Noack
2026-02-09 17:28     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-10 23:09       ` Günther Noack
2026-02-09 18:03     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-08 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions Günther Noack
2026-02-08 23:10 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-02-09 17:29   ` [PATCH v4 4/6] landlock/selftests: Test " Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-15  3:01     ` Tingmao Wang
2026-02-08 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets Günther Noack
2026-02-08 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] landlock: Document design rationale for scoped access rights Günther Noack

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