[PATCH v4 6/6] landlock: Document design rationale for scoped access rights

["Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>]

Document the (possible future) interaction between scoped flags and
other access rights in struct landlock_ruleset_attr, and summarize the
rationale, as discussed in code review leading up to [1].

Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260205.8531e4005118@gnoack.org/
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index 3e4d4d04cfae..49ef02d5e272 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -89,6 +89,44 @@ this is required to keep access controls consistent over the whole system, and
 this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused
 deputy attack).
 
+Interaction between scoped flags and other access rights
+--------------------------------------------------------
+
+The ``scoped`` flags in ``struct landlock_ruleset_attr`` restrict the
+use of *outgoing* IPC from the created Landlock domain, while they
+permit reaching out to IPC endpoints *within* the created Landlock
+domain.
+
+In the future, scoped flags *may* interact with other access rights,
+e.g. so that abstract UNIX sockets can be allow-listed by name, or so
+that signals can be allow-listed by signal number or target process.
+
+When introducing ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX``, we defined it to
+implicitly have the same scoping semantics as a
+``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` flag would have: connecting to
+UNIX sockets within the same domain (where
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX`` is used) is unconditionally
+allowed.
+
+The reasoning is:
+
+* Like other IPC mechanisms, connecting to named UNIX sockets in the
+  same domain should be expected and harmless.  (If needed, users can
+  further refine their Landlock policies with nested domains or by
+  restricting ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK``.)
+* We reserve the option to still introduce
+  ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` in the future.  (This would
+  be useful if we wanted to have a Landlock rule to permit IPC access
+  to other Landlock domains.)
+* But we can postpone the point in time when users have to deal with
+  two interacting flags visible in the userspace API.  (In particular,
+  it is possible that it won't be needed in practice, in which case we
+  can avoid the second flag altogether.)
+* If we *do* introduce ``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_PATHNAME_UNIX_SOCKET`` in the
+  future, setting this scoped flag in a ruleset does *not reduce* the
+  restrictions, because access within the same scope is already
+  allowed based on ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX``.
+
 Tests
 =====
 
-- 
2.52.0