From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
"Samasth Norway Ananda" <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
"Demi Marie Obenour" <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
"Alyssa Ross" <hi@alyssa.is>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 6/9] landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2026 11:51:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260215105158.28132-7-gnoack3000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260215105158.28132-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Even when a process is restricted with the new
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET right, the kernel can continue
writing its coredump to the configured coredump socket.
In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write
coredumps into it. We then create a child process within a Landlock
domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_SOCKET is restricted and make
the process crash. The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the
connecting client process is the expected one.
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 122 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 8fa9d7c49ac3..705d8a13d2e0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -4922,6 +4923,127 @@ TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full)
#undef USE_SENDTO
#undef ENFORCE_ALL
+static void read_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ ret = read(fd, buf, buf_size - 1);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ buf[ret] = '\0';
+}
+
+static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
+ const char *pattern)
+{
+ int fd;
+ size_t len = strlen(pattern);
+
+ fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+FIXTURE(coredump)
+{
+ char original_core_pattern[256];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
+{
+ disable_caps(_metadata);
+ read_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern,
+ sizeof(self->original_core_pattern));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump)
+{
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern);
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that even when a process is restricted with
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, the kernel can still initiate a connection
+ * to the coredump socket on the processes' behalf.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
+{
+ static const char core_pattern[] = "@/tmp/landlock_coredump_test.sock";
+ const char *const sock_path = core_pattern + 1;
+ int srv_fd, conn_fd, status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ struct ucred cred;
+ socklen_t cred_len = sizeof(cred);
+ char buf[4096];
+
+ /* Set up the coredump server socket. */
+ unlink(sock_path);
+ srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path);
+
+ /* Point coredumps at our socket. */
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
+ /* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
+ drop_access_rights(_metadata, &(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
+ .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
+ });
+
+ /* Fork a child that crashes. */
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ struct rlimit rl = {
+ .rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ .rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl));
+
+ /* Crash on purpose. */
+ kill(getpid(), SIGSEGV);
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Accept the coredump connection. If Landlock incorrectly denies the
+ * kernel's coredump connect, accept() will block forever, so the test
+ * would time out.
+ */
+ conn_fd = accept(srv_fd, NULL, NULL);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, conn_fd);
+
+ /* Check that the connection came from the crashing child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, getsockopt(conn_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred,
+ &cred_len));
+ EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, cred.pid);
+
+ /* Drain the coredump data so the kernel can finish. */
+ while (read(conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0)
+ ;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(conn_fd));
+
+ /* Wait for the child and verify it coredumped. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WCOREDUMP(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(sock_path));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-15 10:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-15 10:51 [PATCH v5 0/9] landlock: UNIX connect() control by pathname and scope Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 1/9] lsm: Add LSM hook security_unix_find Günther Noack
2026-02-18 9:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 13:26 ` Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:04 ` [PATCH v6] " Justin Suess
2026-02-19 20:26 ` Günther Noack
2026-03-10 22:39 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-11 12:34 ` Justin Suess
2026-03-11 16:08 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-12 11:57 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-20 15:49 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-21 13:22 ` Justin Suess
2026-02-23 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 2/9] landlock: Control pathname UNIX domain socket resolution by path Günther Noack
2026-02-18 9:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 9:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-19 13:59 ` Günther Noack
2026-03-08 9:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-08 11:50 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-14 23:15 ` Günther Noack
2026-03-17 21:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 14:33 ` Günther Noack
2026-03-08 9:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-10 15:19 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-11 4:46 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-03-08 9:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-15 20:58 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 3/9] samples/landlock: Add support for named UNIX domain socket restrictions Günther Noack
2026-02-18 9:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 16:08 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 4/9] landlock/selftests: Test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-02-18 19:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-20 16:27 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-20 17:04 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 5/9] landlock/selftests: Audit test for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-02-18 20:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/9] landlock/selftests: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted Mickaël Salaün
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 7/9] landlock/selftests: fs_test: Simplify ruleset creation and enforcement Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 8/9] landlock: Document FS access right for pathname UNIX sockets Günther Noack
2026-02-18 9:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-03-14 21:16 ` Günther Noack
2026-02-15 10:51 ` [PATCH v5 9/9] landlock: Document design rationale for scoped access rights Günther Noack
2026-02-15 18:09 ` Alyssa Ross
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